Putting Yingluck's populist foreign policy in perspective

Otherwise, the foreign policy is broadly similar to that of the Abhisit government, with heavy emphasis on strengthening ties with neighbouring countries; and expanding the country's role and profile at the UN as well as at the regional and sub-regional levels. Strategies and policies aimed at increasing Thailand's overall capacity to compete in economic and business arenas have been kept intact, including those toward Asean. While the previous government cited the Asean Charter and developing a people-oriented community as among its most important diplomatic objectives, the present government has chosen to focus on the Asean Economic Community as a whole and the need to prepare all Thai stakeholders for the 2015 deadline.

Though the Yingluck government's policy statement went into specifics on Asean, there was no mention of Asean Connectivity, the policy conceived in 2010 under former prime minister Abhisit Vejjajiva and approved by Asean leaders last October in Hanoi. While avoiding any reference to Asean Connectivity, the government's carefully crafted No 8 priority deals with utilisation of communication networks in the region and sub-regions to expand trade and investment.

Populism is nothing new to Thai politics, differing between governments only in terms of scale and consistency. In response to the new regional political landscape in 1975, the 1975-76 government led by former prime minister Kukrit Pramoj's Social Action Party was the first to infuse a populist agenda into domestic and foreign-policy realms. With the anti-US sentiment inflamed by the 1973 bloodbath still high, Kukrit's first move was to ask US forces to leave Thailand and to shut down their air bases. He also set forth the country's foreign policy towards Asean, whose potential to counter major powers and improve the bargaining power of its small-nation members he greatly valued. He often urged the Thai people to understand themselves and neighbouring countries, both near and far.

That philosophy helps explain his similarly rapid move to establish diplomatic ties with China in 1975, which placed Thailand into the new regional scheme of things. Subsequent governments followed his lead on the populist agenda. In the early 1980s, the new phenomenon of exporting Thai labour saw nearly half a million workers earning a living in the oil-rich Middle East. Protection of Thai citizens took on huge importance after several Thais were executed for crimes, and horror stories of maltreatment emerged. Once overseas Thais were allowed to vote, their support became a valuable political asset pursued by politicians of all stripes.

The Yingluck administration has wisely paid close attention to the concerns of overseas Thais, mindful of the support they gave to political mobilisation in recent years. It is no secret that large segments of the Thai populations living and working in the US, Europe and Australia are among the staunchest red-shirt supporters. They have donated money to finance political activities inside Thailand. In each election, the government spends hundreds of millions of baht to organise voting abroad for these non-tax-paying voters.

After the first Asian financial crisis, Thai foreign policy shifted considerably under the Chuan government (1997-2000), which emphasised economic recovery, human rights and democracy as the main tenets of Thai foreign policy, together with more engagement with Asean. From 2000 to 2006, Thailand became still more ambitious and looked beyond Asean towards broader Asia. It was the ultimate ambition of former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra, Yingluck's brother and now a fugitive living in Dubai, to lead Asia. Indeed, the new government's policy statement leaves room to revive the dormant Asia Cooperative Dialogue, launched to much fanfare in 2003, only to see

sluggish progress since then.

The most interesting aspect of the current Thai foreign policy is its heavy emphasis on a political settlement in the three southernmost provinces (it was Thaksin, after all, who stoked the violent conflict in the three provinces) through the invocation of His Majesty the King's non-violent approach and development schemes. Since the trouble in the South flared up in 2004, ties with Muslim countries, especially members of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference, have become a central theme of Thai foreign policy.

The victims of Krue Se and Tak Bai know best whether the new policy will work. The idea of allowing more local participation in decision-making is a good one, but this policy has been endorsed time and again without ever being fully implemented.

Overall, the new foreign policy looks good on paper and has a broad appeal at the local and regional levels. Unfortunately, in the past few weeks the conduct of Thai diplomacy has run counter to the very people-oriented foreign policy that was pledged. So far, the diplomatic agenda has been

personalised due to familial ties between Foreign Minister Surapong Towichukchaikul and his mentor, Thaksin. Surapong's first error was a potentially fatal one, pressing Tokyo to grant Thaksin an entry visa to Japan. The Democrat Party promptly filed a motion to impeach Surapong over the move.

It remains to be seen how the government will deliver on all 10 diplomatic tasks outlined in Parliament. If it does not, it will all add up to little more than a circus of hypocrisy and doublespeak.