All signs point to state power centralisation

After all, local resources and administrative challenges are usually best managed by local representatives. 

However, the key problem with this is that local administrative bodies do not have any real authority and their duties often overlap with those of Interior Ministry units. Hence, understandably, there have been calls for further power decentralisation in different forms and models. 

Yet, signs from those currently in control of the country – the military and bureaucrats – suggest that the trend of power decentralisation is about to be reversed. 

The first sign came in the form of the National Council for Peace and Order’s announcement No 85/2014, which ordered that local administrative polls be “postponed” due to “safety concerns”. 

Opponents would argue, however, that serious security measures are not really required for local elections, as they are not all held at the same time nationwide, and are thus easier to monitor and control. 

The second sign came in the form of high participation by former governors or Interior Ministry officials, such as Pairoj Promsan, Wanlop Pringpong, Pongpayom Wasaputi, Sayumporn Limthai, in the National Reform Council (NRC)’s local administration reform subpanel. 

Trakool Meechai, a prominent political scientist from Chulalongkorn University who has conducted extensive research in local administrative reform, has said: “Most public officials distrust people’s decision-making abilities, or elected politicians chosen by the people.” 

Why? Because many genuinely believe that local administration elections are nothing but an excuse for local mafia and influential groups to enter politics only to pursue personal interests and material gains, while the community remains “too weak” to regulate against bad candidates.

Bureaucrats generally spend most of their lives working hard and undergoing training before they are appointed as district chiefs or provincial governors. Hence, it is understandable why they take so much pride in their “expertise” in governing people and why they dread the idea of “outsourcing” their power via such things as provincial gubernatorial elections. 

“The junta is genuinely concerned about security, especially if too much power is transferred from the central government to the people,” Trakool pointed out. 

This is particularly true when the military junta considers politicians, especially local politicians, a threat to national security. 

Politicians on both national and local fronts tend to work together, as banding together gives them and their political party more strength, and the stronger they become the less power the central authority has.

Therefore, the likelihood that the junta will push for power decentralisation – which in effect would empower the very people whom the junta perceives as “troublemakers” – is very slim. 

It is likely that local administrative reform will come in the form of “centralised” power, not because of the junta’s concerns about “security” and “weak community”, but because they are in power and have a dominating presence in the National Legislative Assembly and the National Reform Council. 

At this point, the junta needs to be clear about whether they want to centralise their power or decentralise it. However, the powers-that-be also need to remember that centralising power goes against the political stance of the People’s Democratic Reform Committee, the Democrat Party and elected local administration officials. 

The junta also needs to clarify whether it will abolish district and sub-district administrations, while empowering appointed provincial governors and district chiefs. 

A debate on this is imperative so representatives from all sectors can take part and come up with a long-term, sustainable local administration reform model. 

It may prove to be too late if the junta waits until the NRC proposes the idea to the charter drafting committee.