Thailand's human rights record a significant setback : US

The coup leaders repealed the constitution (except for provisions related to the monarchy), suspended parliament, continued martial law imposed two days earlier on May 20, and issued numerous decrees severely limiting civil liberties, including restrictions on freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, and freedom of the press. The NCPO summoned and detained, without charge, more than 900 political leaders, academics, journalists, and others, holding many for up to seven days. The NCPO promulgated an interim constitution on July 22 and appointed individuals to a National Legislative Assembly on July 31, the members of which unanimously selected coup leader and head of the army, General Prayut, as prime minister on August 21.

In addition to limitations on human rights occasioned by the coup and implemented by the NCPO, the most persistent human rights problems consisted of abuses by government security forces and local defense volunteers in the context of the continuing Malay-Muslim insurgency in the three southernmost provinces, and occasional excessive use of force by security forces, including police killing, torturing, and otherwise abusing criminal suspects, detainees, and prisoners. After the May 22 coup, citizens no longer had the ability to change the government through the right to vote in free and fair elections.

Other human rights problems included arbitrary arrests and detention; poor, overcrowded, and unsanitary prison and detention facilities; insufficient protection for vulnerable populations, including refugees; violence and discrimination against women; sex tourism; sexual exploitation of children; trafficking in persons; discrimination against persons with disabilities, minorities, hill tribe members, and foreign migrant workers; child labor; and some limitations on worker rights.

Authorities occasionally dismissed, arrested, prosecuted, and convicted security force members who committed abuses. Official impunity, however, continued to be a serious problem, especially in provinces where the 2005 Emergency Decree and the 2008 Internal Security Act (ISA) remained in effect. The military’s invocation of martial law nationwide on May 20 magnified this problem. Article 48 of the NCPO-imposed interim constitution grants immunity to coup leaders and their subordinates for any pre- or postcoup actions ordered by the NCPO, regardless of the legality of the action.

 

 

Insurgents in the southernmost provinces continued to commit human rights abuses, including attacks on civilian targets.

Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom from:Share

a. Arbitrary or Unlawful Deprivation of Life

There were continued reports that security forces at times used excessive and lethal force against criminal suspects and committed or were connected to extrajudicial, arbitrary, and unlawful killings. According to the Ministry of Interior’s Investigation and Legal Affairs Bureau, from August 2013 to June 2014 security forces--including police, military, and other agencies--killed 45 suspects during the arrest process. The police department with jurisdiction over the location of the killings investigated each case, although no details were available.

 

 

While there were no confirmed reports that the government or its agents committed politically motivated killings during the year, there were at least 28 deaths linked to attacks during large antigovernment demonstrations in Bangkok and elsewhere from late 2013 to May 2014. Unknown assailants shot and killed Suthin Thararin, a protest leader of the anti-Puea Thai government People’s Democratic Reform Committee, as he led demonstrators who blocked and closed a voting station in Bangkok on January 26 during national legislative elections. The shooting also injured nine others.

Armed individuals on January 22 shot and seriously injured Kwanchai Phraiphana Sarakham, a leader of the United Front of Democracy against Dictatorship (Red-Shirts)--allied with former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra--at his community radio station and residence compound in Udon Thani Province. Authorities charged six individuals involved in the attack: Maduenang Masae, a Territorial Defense Volunteer with the Narathiwat Provincial Authority; Master Sergeant Mawin Yangbua; Sergeant Wirot Phimsing; Sub-Lieutenant Pratya Chanrotphai; Sergeant Chanon Thapthimthong; and Sergeant Banchong Kanthathon, all of whom, except Maduenang, were assigned to the 19th Cavalry Battalion of the 9th Infantry Division in Kanchanaburi province. All individuals except Maduenang were free on bail as of August 1.

On April 23, unknown assailants shot and killed poet Kamol Duangphasuk, a vocal critic of the country’s lese majeste laws (see section 2.a.) and Red Shirt activist. The investigation of the killing continued as of November with no arrests.

There were reports of killings during the year in connection with the conflict in the southernmost provinces (see section 1.g.).

 

On August 28, the Criminal Court dismissed murder charges against former prime minister and current Democrat Party leader Abhisit Vejjajiva and his then deputy Suthep Thaugsuban for their roles in the 2010 clashes between security forces and antigovernment protesters in Bangkok and the Northeast. The court ruled it lacked jurisdiction because both individuals were public office holders at the time of the killings and had acted under an emergency decree. The court stated that only the Supreme Court’s Criminal Division for Holders of Political Positions had the authority to consider the allegations. Cases brought on behalf of individual victims against Abhisit and Suthep remained with the Department of Special Investigations (DSI), the National Anti-Corruption Commission (NACC), and other government entities. As in previous cases, the DSI did not file charges against the soldiers who killed individuals as part of the government’s response to protests, since it found they acted in accordance with executive orders.

Thai security forces clashed with loggers engaged in illegal cross-border logging, mostly Cambodian citizens, throughout the year. On April 6, Thai security forces killed one Cambodian allegedly involved in illegal logging. In a clash at the border with Laos on June 6, one Thai officer was injured.

 

b. Disappearance

On April 17, a prominent ethnic Karen activist, Porlajee Rakchongcharoen (known as “Billy”), disappeared in southwest Thailand. Billy had led a legal fight against government authorities, including the superintendent of Kaengkrachan National Park in Petchaburi Province, Chaiwat Limlikitaksorn, whom community members alleged had ordered the destruction in 2011 of more than 100 houses and rice stocks belonging to more than 20 Karen households for their alleged encroachment into the park. At the time of his disappearance, Billy was reportedly traveling to meet with ethnic Karen villagers and activists to prepare for a court hearing. On April 18, Chaiwat stated that park authorities detained Billy on April 17 but released him after questioning. In an April 20 statement, Human Rights Watch urged, “Thai authorities should not stay silent about Billy’s case but explain what happened to him.” At year’s end police officials neither identified any suspects nor made any arrests.

After the coup security forces detained hundreds of activists and in some instances withheld information about their safety for brief periods before announcing their whereabouts. For instance, on September 5, plainclothes soldiers arrested Kittisak Soomsri at a teacher-training center in Bangkok. Military officials refused to acknowledge his detention for six days. On September 11, authorities charged Kittisak as one of the “men in black,” who allegedly initiated violent acts during the 2010 protests.

As of August the government had not taken action on the UN Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances’ June 2011 request for a country visit.

 

c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

Prior to the coup, the constitution prohibited such practices; upon the military coup, however, its leaders revoked the constitution and decreed martial law. The interim constitution protects “all human dignity, rights, [and] liberties,” but it does not specifically prohibit torture. Section 17 of the Emergency Decree on Public Administration in the State of Emergency (2005), hereinafter “the emergency decree,” and article 48 of the interim constitution effectively provide immunity from prosecution to security officials for actions committed during the performance of their duties. As of September the cabinet renewed the emergency decree 37 times for consecutive three-month periods since 2005 in several provinces in the South.

Credible nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and legal entities continued to report that police and military officials occasionally tortured and beat suspects to obtain confessions, and newspapers continued to report numerous cases of citizens accusing police and other security officials of brutality. There were criminal actions pursued against Royal Thai Police (RTP) officers. Available official statistics showed 332 charges filed from January to mid-July, compared with 456 charges during January-August in 2013. There were 1,963 internal investigations of official misconduct from January through June, compared with 2,663 during all of 2013.

On August 5, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), Human Rights Watch, and the International Commission of Jurists called on authorities to investigate the claims of Red Shirt leader Kritsuda Khunasen that officials tortured her during her 29-day detention at a military facility. Military authorities subsequently claimed that an internal investigation revealed no evidence of torture (see section 1.d.). On August 9, police officials filed criminal charges against Kritsuda for illegal weapons possession.

On August 24, police officials summoned Somchai Homlaor and Pornpen Khongkachonkiet in response to libel and defamation charges made by the army. Paramilitary Unit 41 charged that Somchai and Pornpen disseminated an open letter, which included allegations of torture by the unit, and caused embarrassment to the army (see section 5).

In October human rights organizations called on the government to investigate allegations by two Burmese nationals accused of killing two British tourists in September that police officials tortured them to extract confessions, which the Burmese nationals later recanted. Police authorities denied the allegations.

 

Prison and Detention Center Conditions

Conditions in prisons and various detention centers--including drug rehabilitation facilities and immigration detention centers (IDCs) where authorities detained undocumented migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers--remained poor, and most were overcrowded. The Ministry of Justice’s Department of Corrections is responsible for monitoring prison and detention facility conditions.

Physical Conditions: As of June 1, approximately 303,000 persons were in prisons and detention facilities with a maximum design capacity of 217,000. An estimated 15 percent of the detainees were women, and less than 1 percent were juveniles. At the IDC in Bangkok, as of August 1, authorities detained approximately 900 foreign nationals.

In some prisons sleeping accommodations were insufficient, the lack of medical care was a serious problem, and communicable diseases were widespread. Prisoners generally had access to potable water. Authorities at times transferred seriously ill prisoners and detainees to provincial or state hospitals.

Approximately 28 percent of the prison population consisted of pretrial detainees. Prison officials did not segregate these detainees from the general prison population. The government often detained individuals held under the emergency decree in the southernmost provinces in military camps or police stations rather than prisons.

NGOs reported that authorities occasionally held men, women, and children together in police station cells, particularly in small or remote police stations, pending indictment. Separate detention facilities for juvenile offenders were available in all provinces. Conditions for women were typically better than for men, in large part because the prisoners themselves managed and implemented much of the prison’s maintenance and cleaning.

In IDCs, however, authorities detained women and men together and placed juveniles above age 14 with adults. On September 2, Human Rights Watch released a report on detention of children in IDCs that claimed the government arbitrarily detained thousands of undocumented migrant, asylum seekers, and refugee children--including infants and toddlers--in squalid immigration facilities and police lock-ups, some for weeks, months, or years. The report was based on more than 100 interviews, including with 41 migrant children, and asserted that child detainees lacked a nutritional diet or opportunities for physical exercise and that their detention exacerbated previous traumas and contributed to lasting depression and anxiety. The report urged the government to enact legislation and policies to end detention of children and adopt alternatives, such as supervised release and noncustodial, community-based housing while their immigration status was being resolved. Other NGOs reported complaints, especially by Muslim detainees, of inadequate and culturally inappropriate food. There also were persistent reports of forced labor and extortion by guards and poor facility ventilation.

Prison authorities sometimes used solitary confinement of not more than one month, as permitted by law, to punish male prisoners who consistently violated prison rules or regulations or were a danger to others. The Department of Corrections maintained that the average confinement was approximately seven days. Authorities also used heavy leg irons on 600 to 1,000 prisoners deemed escape risks or possibly dangerous to other prisoners.

According to the Ministry of Interior’s Investigation and Legal Affairs Bureau, 823 persons died in official custody from August 2013 to June 2014. Authorities attributed most of those deaths to natural causes. There were no reports of officials killing prisoners as of July.

The law classifies drug users as patients rather than criminals, and the government may detain individuals who use drugs in compulsory rehabilitation centers for either 120 or 180 days to convert drug addicts into “decent citizens.” These centers, a joint project of the Ministries of Justice and Public Health as well as the armed forces, were located in approximately 56 military camps and 11 civilian centers and held an estimated 18,000 individuals as of July. Military personnel with no medical background operated most centers.

Department of Probation authorities contended that the government periodically evaluated the effectiveness of the operations and that medical personnel or a medical team visited many military camps at least once a week. Prior to detention, local authorities made no individual clinical assessments of the severity of drug dependence and afforded no due process. After release, government officials typically did not offer patients follow-up treatment. Media reports catalogued abuses of addict detainees, including physical abuse. Health services such as medically assisted detoxification; HIV prevention, treatment, care, and support; and evidence-based drug dependence treatment were unavailable.

For instance, authorities closed a center in Phetchaburi Province, and the army replaced it with a new center, after a military trainer allegedly forced an addict detainee to withdraw 600,000 baht ($18,000) from a bank before fatally shooting him in 2013. As of July the accused was on trial in a military court. There were no reports during the year of violent incidents involving military personnel at these rehabilitation centers.

Civil society groups operating harm-reduction programs faced barriers to delivering their services to drug users, and there continued to be reports that law enforcement officers arrested and harassed outreach workers acting within this government-approved project.

Administration: Officials used an online data-sharing system for prisoner record-keeping, which they sometimes supplemented with letters and telephone calls if information conflicted. Prisoners and detainees had access to visitors, and authorities permitted religious observance. Authorities permitted prisoners and detainees or their representatives to submit complaints without censorship to ombudsmen but not directly to judicial authorities. Ombudsmen in turn may consider and investigate complaints and petitions received from prisoners and provide recommendations to the Department of Corrections, but they are not empowered to act on a prisoner’s behalf, nor may they involve themselves in a case unless an individual files an official complaint. Authorities rarely investigated complaints and did not make public the results of such investigations.

In IDCs, according to independent human rights observers, detainees and their children may be held for years unless they pay a fine and their way home, since by law, “…the alien will have to pay the expense of deportation…[and] [t]he expense of detention shall be charged to the alien’s account.”

Judicial authorities often imposed alternative penalties (e.g., probation, suspended sentence, fine, or restriction on movement) rather than imprisonment on nonviolent offenders, minors, and convicts with disabilities. The Department of Probation used personal electronic monitoring devices during the year to detain 190 persons at their homes instead of in prisons.

IDCs, administered by the Immigration Police Bureau, which reports to the RTP, were not subject to many of the regulations that govern the regular prison system.

Independent Monitoring: The government permitted visits to prisons and IDCs by independent human rights observers, and it allowed representatives of human rights organization to meet prisoners without third parties present, make repeated visits, and receive access to all police facilities in the southernmost provinces. An international human rights organization reported that authorities allowed access to all prisons in the country during the year and continued to engage with military and police agencies regarding international policing standards and the exercise of police powers.

Representatives of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) had access to some detainees at the Suvarnabhumi Airport IDC in Bangkok, but access to these detainees varied on a case-by-case basis. Access to detainees at other IDCs also varied on a case-by-case basis. UNHCR officials were able to interview detainees in the Suan Phlu IDC, and access continued for resettlement country representatives to process recognized refugees for third-country resettlement. The International Organization for Migration and the International Committee of the Red Cross also had access to detainees in various IDCs elsewhere in the country.

 

d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention

Prior to the coup, the constitution prohibited arbitrary arrest and detention, but government forces occasionally arrested and detained persons arbitrarily. On May 20, then army commander in chief Prayut declared martial law throughout the country, which allows the government to detain individuals without warrant for up to seven days.

The emergency decree, which gives the government authority to detain persons without charge for up to 30 days in unofficial places of detention, was in effect in the three southernmost provinces of Yala, Narathiwat, and Pattani, except the Mae Lan District of Pattani Province, throughout the year (see section 1.d., Role of the Police and Security Apparatus).

On January 22, the Yingluck Administration extended the emergency decree for 60 days to areas of Bangkok and surrounding provinces. On March 18, the administration replaced the decree with the less expansive ISA, which was in effect until June 30. The decree is in addition to martial law, which was in force nationwide at year’s end by order of the NCPO.

On May 20, Prayut invited political party and movement leaders as well as government officials to engage in talks to end the political crisis. Two days later he abruptly ended the talks, ordered all participants detained, and announced the military coup on state television. Over the next several months, military authorities summoned at least 900 persons, including political leaders, government officials, academics, and journalists, and held many without charge, in some cases for up to seven days. Military authorities required many detained individuals, in order to secure release, to sign documents affirming that officials had treated the detainee well, the individual would refrain from political activity, and the individual would seek authorization prior to travel outside of the local area. Military authorities threatened those who failed to respond to summonses with prison and seizure of assets.

Emergency decree provisions make it very difficult to challenge a detention before a court. Under the decree detainees should have access to legal counsel, but in practice, there was no assurance of prompt access to counsel or family members, nor were there transparent safeguards against the mistreatment of detainees. Additionally, the decree effectively provides broad-based immunity from criminal, civil, and disciplinary liability for officials acting under its provisions.

According to the DSI, of the 269 protest-related cases under its jurisdiction, it completed 232 investigations as of August. The DSI continued to investigate the 37 remaining cases. In September police arrested four men and one woman--Kittisak Soomsri, Chamnan Phakeechai, Preecha Yuyen, Ronnarit Suricha, and Punika Chusri, known as the “men in black”--for their alleged involvement in protests that killed soldiers and civilians in 2010. The five remained in detention pending further investigation as of November.

Role of the Police and Security Apparatus

The declaration of martial law on May 20 gave military forces authority over civilian institutions, including the police, regarding the maintenance of public order. On August 24, the National Police Policy Commission, chaired by coup leader and NCPO chief General Prayut, appointed Somyot Pumpunmuang as the new national police chief.

The Border Patrol Police have special authority and responsibility in border areas to combat insurgent or separatist movements.

The ISA created the Internal Special Operations Command (ISOC) as a state agency under the command of the prime minster, who acts as ISOC director. The ISOC is an interagency monitoring body with both civilian and military representation.

Human rights organizations and academics criticized the government for using the ISA to respond to alleged threats to national security by restricting fundamental rights.

There were reports that police abused prisoners and detainees, generally with impunity. Article 48 of the interim constitution and Section 17 of the emergency decree effectively provide immunity from prosecution to security officials for actions committed during the performance of their duties.

Complaints of police abuse may be filed directly with the superior of the accused police officer, the Office of the Inspector General, or the police commissioner general. The National Human Rights Commission (NHRC), Lawyers’ Council of Thailand (LCT), NACC, Supreme Court of Justice, Ministry of Justice, and Office of the Prime Minister also accepted complaints of police abuse and corruption, as did the Office of the Ombudsman. The NHRC received 60 complaints of police abuse from September 2013 to July 2014, a substantial decrease from the 254 complaints received during the first eight months of 2013.

When police receive a complaint, an internal investigation committee takes up the matter and may temporarily suspend the officer involved in the complaint during the investigation. Various administrative penalties exist, and authorities may refer serious cases to a criminal court.

Procedures for investigating suspicious deaths, including deaths occurring in police custody, require that a prosecutor, forensic pathologist, and local administrator participate in the investigation and that, in most cases, family members have legal representation at the inquests. Officials often did not follow these procedures. Families rarely took advantage of a provision of law that allows them to sue police for criminal action during arrests.

The Ministry of Defense requires that service members receive human rights training. Routine training occurred at various levels, including for officers, noncommissioned officers, enlisted personnel, and recruits. Additionally, military service members deploying in support of counterinsurgency operations in the South received specific human rights training, including training for detailed, situation-specific contingencies.

Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees

With few exceptions the law requires police to obtain a warrant from a judge prior to making an arrest. The system for issuing arrest warrants was subject to misuse by police as well as a judicial tendency to approve automatically all requests for warrants. By law authorities must inform persons of likely charges against them immediately after arrest and allow them to inform someone of their arrest. Criminal detainees have the right to initiate habeas corpus or other court proceedings to determine the lawfulness of their detention and may obtain compensation if authorities unlawfully detained them.

The law provides for access to counsel for criminal detainees, but lawyers and human rights groups claimed police often conducted interrogations without providing access to an attorney. In the southernmost provinces, lawyers reported that under the emergency decree, authorities denied them adequate access to detained clients, and some individuals reported government officials denied them permission to visit detained family members.

Authorities sometimes pressured foreign detainees, especially migrant workers and those in the country illegally, to sign confessions without the benefit of a competent interpreter/translator.

The Ministry of Justice and the Court of Justice assigned volunteer attorneys in 15,332 legal cases for indigent detainees at public expense from October 2013 to May. Lawyers noted that fees offered for such service were often low.

The law provides defendants the right to request bail, and the government generally respected this right. Nevertheless, some human rights groups continued to report that police frequently did not inform detained suspects of their right to request bail or refused to recommend bail after suspects submitted a request, particularly in drug arrests and cases involving violence in the southernmost provinces.

Arbitrary Arrest: Under martial law, the military has the authority to detain persons without charge for a maximum of seven days, and under the emergency decree, authorities may detain a person for up to 30 days without charge (see section 1.g.). Following the May 22 coup, the coup leaders detained more than 900 government officials, academics, journalists, and other individuals. Military officials released most of these persons after several days, although they detained some for the maximum seven days and others beyond this legal limitation. For instance, authorities detained Red Shirt leader Kritsuda Khunasen for 29 days at a military facility.

Pretrial Detention: Under normal conditions the law allows police to detain criminal suspects for 48 hours after arrest for investigation. Lawyers reported that police rarely brought cases to court within that 48-hour period. Laws and regulations place offenses for which the maximum penalty is less than three years under the jurisdiction of the district courts, which have different procedures requiring police to submit cases to public prosecutors within 72 hours of arrest. According to the LCT, pretrial detention of criminal suspects for up to 60 days was not uncommon.

Before charging and trial, authorities may detain individuals for a total of 84 days (for the most serious offenses), with a judicial review required for each seven-day period. After formal charge and throughout trial, depending on prosecution and defense readiness, court caseload, and the nature of the evidence, detention may last for one to two years before a verdict, and up to six years until Supreme Court appellate review. The time a defendant spent in detention prior to sentencing occasionally equaled or exceeded the sentence for the alleged crime.

Detention of Rejected Asylum Seekers or Stateless Persons: Authorities detained unsuccessful asylum applicants pending deportation. NGOs alleged detentions were protracted and detention conditions failed to meet satisfactory standards.

Amnesty: A January royal pardon allowed the release of a Saudi Arabia citizen after he served almost all of a two-year prison sentence for lese majeste offenses.

 

e. Denial of Fair Public Trial

Prior to the coup, the constitution provided for an independent judiciary. After the coup the NCPO issued orders that retained the judiciary’s procedures and functions but also prohibited judicial officials from making any negative public comments against the NCPO. Additionally, Article 44 of the interim constitution provides the NCPO with the power to intervene “regardless of its effects on the legislative, executive, or judiciary” to defend the country against national security threats.

Although observers generally regarded the judiciary prior to the coup as independent, it was subject to corruption and outside influence. According to human rights groups, the lack of progress in several high-profile cases involving alleged police and military abuse continued to diminish public trust in the justice system and discourage some victims of human rights abuses (or their families) from seeking justice.

Trial Procedures

The law provides for the presumption of innocence. There is no trial by jury. A single judge decides trials for misdemeanors; two or more judges are required for more serious cases. Prior to its suspension, the constitution provided for a prompt trial, although a large backlog of cases remained in the court system. While most trials are public, the court may order a closed trial, particularly in cases involving national security, the royal family, children, or sexual abuse.

In a May 25 order, the NCPO redirected prosecutions for offenses against the monarchy, insurrection, sedition and secession, and violation of its orders from civilian criminal court jurisdiction to military courts, which lack the right of appeal. As of November, 82 civilians were facing criminal prosecution in military courts for such offenses, according to the OHCHR. For example, on August 4, authorities indicted former minister of education Chaturon Chaisaeng in a military court for defying the NCPO’s order to report to it.

In ordinary criminal courts, defendants enjoy a broad range of legal rights, including access to a lawyer of their choosing, prompt and detailed information of the charges (including no-cost interpretation if needed), and adequate time and facilities to prepare a defense. They also have the rights not to be compelled to testify or confess guilt, to confront witnesses, and to present witnesses. Authorities did not automatically provide indigent defendants with counsel at public expense, and there were allegations that defendants were not always afforded all the above rights, especially in small or remote provinces.

The government provided legal aid on an intermittent, voluntary basis, but the aid was of low quality. The LCT budget remained the same as in 2013, approximately 50 million baht ($1.5 million). Some NGOs reported that legal aid lawyers pressured their clients into paying additional fees directly to them, but the LCT’s lawyer etiquette division explained that clients must pay expenses, such as travel, incurred by their attorney. The court is required to appoint an attorney in cases where the defendant disputes the charges, is indigent, or is a minor, as well as in cases where the possible punishment is more than five years’ imprisonment or death. Most free legal aid came from private groups, including the LCT and the Thai Women Lawyers Association.

There is no discovery process; consequently, lawyers and defendants do not have access to evidence prior to trial. The law provides for access to courts or administrative bodies to appeal or seek redress, and the government generally respected this right.

 

Several NGOs continued to express concern over the lack of adequate protection for witnesses, particularly in cases involving alleged police wrongdoing. The Justice Ministry’s Office of Witness Protection had limited resources and primarily played a coordinating role. In most cases witness protection was provided by police, but six other state agencies also participated in the program: the Ministry of Defense; the Office of the Narcotic Control Board; and the Departments of Special Investigations, Provincial Administration, Juvenile Observation and Protection, and Corrections.

Police officials continued to force pretrial criminal suspects to re-enact their alleged crimes in the presence of the media, victims and their families, and the public. The media widely published and broadcast images from these re-enactments on an almost daily basis. Police officials often ordered suspects to perform certain actions consistent with the crime’s circumstances. Police conducted thousands of re-enactments during the year. Although police regulations require that suspects “confess” before re-enactments, police often obtained these “confessions” by coercion, including physical assault. Individuals at re-enactments physically assaulted suspects on at least three separate occasions during the first six months of the year. Human rights organizations criticized forced re-enactments because they violate the presumption of innocence and encourage violence against suspects.

 

 

Political Prisoners and Detainees

Prior to the May 22 coup, there were no government reports of political prisoners or detainees, but sources estimated that 20 persons remained detained under lese majeste laws that outlaw criticism of the monarchy (see section 2.a.). Some of the cases involved persons exercising their rights of freedom of expression and peaceful assembly. Following the May 22 coup, the military government opened at least 15 new lese majeste cases for investigation as of September, while authorities also revived other cases in which officials had not previously filed charges.

Civil Judicial Procedures and Remedies

Prior to the coup, there was an independent and impartial judiciary in civil matters. The law provides for access to courts and administrative bodies to sue for damages for, or cessation of, a human rights violation. The government generally respected this right, but the emergency decree in force in three provinces expressly excludes administrative court scrutiny or civil or criminal proceedings against government officials. Victims may seek compensation from a government agency instead.

 

f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence

Prior to the coup, the constitution prohibited such actions with some exceptions, and the government generally respected these prohibitions. Following the coup the NCPO repealed the constitution and continued martial law, which, along with the emergency decree, gives government security forces authority to conduct warrantless searches, which they continued to use routinely in the southernmost provinces and border areas. There were complaints during the year from persons claiming that security forces abused this authority, although the seriousness of allegations declined compared with prior years.

After the coup military officials harassed family members of individuals who refused to answer their summonses and report to military centers. For instance, two days after the coup, the NCPO ordered Thantawut Taweewarodomkul, who had served three years of a 13-year prison sentence on a lese majeste conviction before receiving a royal pardon, to report to them. After he refused based on his belief that the NCPO lacked legitimacy, police and military officials followed and harassed his elderly father and mother, as well as his brothers, sisters, and son, on a daily basis, causing his mother to seek treatment at a hospital. NCPO officials reportedly told his family that such actions would continue until he presented himself as ordered.

The military government also monitored private communications. On June 19, the Thai Netizen Network, a Bangkok-based digital rights group, reported a fake Facebook application that gave users the impression of merely logging into a website via Facebook and asked users to share personal details such as their date of birth and e-mail address. The application, the group claimed, was actually part of the NCPO’s program to monitor individuals who had attempted to access a prohibited website. Hundreds of users unwittingly gave permission to the RTP’s Technology Crime Suppression Division to access personal information stored on their Facebook pages. Facebook twice removed the fake application for breaching its platform laws, and as of August the application remained suspended. The Technology Crime Suppression Division defended its actions claiming that the program was a valid way to monitor criminal activity on the internet and would allow police to “handle more witnesses, which can lead to more prosecutions and will make the online society more clean.”

On June 22, the NCPO announced a campaign to award informants as a tool to identify individuals opposed to the military government. Authorities urged members of the public to take photographs of anticoup protests and individuals involved, mail them to NCPO officials, and enclose their bank account details to receive the potential award of 500 baht ($15).

Security services monitored persons, including foreign visitors, who espoused extremist or highly controversial views.

 

 

g. Use of Excessive Force and Other Abuses in Internal Conflicts

Internal conflict continued in the ethnic Malay Muslim-majority, southernmost provinces (Narathiwat, Pattani, Yala, and portions of Songkhla) throughout the year. Because of frequent bombings and other attacks by suspected insurgents as well as government security operations, tension between the local ethnic Malay Muslim and ethnic Thai Buddhist communities remained high, alongside the local population’s persistent distrust of security officials.

The emergency decree in effect in this southern area gives military, police, and civilian authorities significant powers to restrict some basic rights and delegates certain internal security powers to the armed forces. The decree also provides security forces broad immunity from prosecution. Moreover, martial law--imposed in 2006--remained in effect and significantly empowered security forces in Narathiwat, Pattani, and Yala provinces (see section 1.d.).

 

Killings: Human rights groups accused government forces and progovernment death squads of extrajudicial killings of individuals suspected of involvement with separatists. According to the NGO Deep South Watch, government forces conducted one extrajudicial killing in the three southernmost provinces as of September

A reputable NGO noted that unknown assailants killed five suspected insurgents after they had entered the justice process. In a widely publicized case, paramilitary rangers confessed that in February they killed three children of a suspected individual associated with insurgents with whom they had a personal dispute.

According to statistics from Deep South Watch, violence resulted in 233 individuals killed and 505 injured in 452 incidents as of July, slightly lower than 2013 statistics. They also reported that as of July 31, violence had caused 6,189 deaths and injured 11,208 persons in 14,347 incidents in the region since January 2004, but the organization does not differentiate between violence caused by insurgents, security forces, or criminal elements. As in previous years, separatists frequently targeted government representatives, including district and municipal officials, military personnel, and police, with bombings, shootings, and kidnappings. There was an increase from 2013 in the number of teachers and school employees whom separatists targeted during the year. Separatists also killed and injured both Buddhist and Muslim civilians from many occupations.

Some government-backed civilian defense volunteers, most of them ethnic Thai Buddhists from villages in the South, continued to receive basic training and weapons from security forces. Human rights organizations expressed concerns about vigilantism against ethnic Malay Muslims by these defense volunteers and other civilians.

 

Abductions: The Justice for Peace Foundation reported no forced disappearance in the southern provinces as of August but noted difficulties in collecting information amid widespread NCPO summonses and detentions. There were no confirmed reports that individuals in the southern provinces disappeared after security officials questioned them.

Physical Abuse, Punishment, and Torture: The government continued to arrest suspected militants, some of them juveniles, and in some cases held them for a month or more under emergency decree and martial law provisions. Human rights organizations maintained the arrests were arbitrary, excessive, and needlessly lengthy, and they continued to criticize detention facility overcrowding. Civil society groups accused the army of torturing some suspected militants at detention facilities.

Martial law allows detention for up to seven days, without charge and without court or government agency approval in Pattani, Narathiwat, and Yala provinces. The emergency decree in effect in the same areas allows authorities to arrest and detain suspects for up to 30 days without charge. After the expiration of this period, authorities may begin holding suspects under normal criminal law (see section 1.d.). Unlike under martial law, these detentions under normal criminal law require court consent, although human rights NGOs complained that courts did not always exercise their right of review. In some cases a suspect was held first under martial law for seven days and then detained for an additional 30 days under the decree. The Southern Border Province Police Command and ISOC reportedly arrested 200 persons under the decree in the first eight months of the year.

 

Child Soldiers: Regulations prohibit formal recruitment of children under age 18 to serve as Territorial Defense Volunteers, and volunteers generally joined at age 20 or older, but there continued to be anecdotal information that a small number of children were involved informally in such groups. There were no reports of youth under age 18 conscripted or recruited into government armed forces. There were reports of separatist groups recruiting children under age 18 to commit acts of arson or serve as scouts.

Also see the Department of State’s Trafficking in Persons Report at www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/.

Other Conflict-related Abuses: Overall violence directed against civilian, economic, and city center targets was higher than in 2013. As of September statistics on insurgent attacks on schools in the southernmost provinces were not available. In the 2004-12 period insurgents burned more than 300 schools. The government frequently armed ethnic Thai Buddhist and ethnic Malay Muslim civilians, fortified schools and temples, and provided military escorts to monks and teachers. Some local NGOs reported that military personnel had barracks at local schools. According to the Ministry of Education, as of September separatists killed one student and 10 school personnel. Since 2004 separatist violence had killed 227 teachers, students, and education staff and injured 370. Attacks frequently targeted security escorts for Buddhist teachers. Insurgent violence also included attacks on medical facilities. The Ministry of Public Health reported 27 arson and bombing attacks on public health centers or residences of public health personnel as of April. During the same period, insurgents killed 33 public health officials and injured 30 others, a notable increase over 2013.

Large numbers of Thai Buddhists fled areas in the South affected by violence. Official registration statistics from the Department of Provincial Administration showed that as of December 2013, Yala, Pattani, and Narathiwat provinces all experienced a slight increase in population. Details on the religious breakdown in the changed population were not available. Official registration data, however, may not have accurately reflected numbers of actual residents who may have lived elsewhere for employment or other reasons but remained registered in the region.

 

 

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:Share

 

a. Freedom of Speech and Press

Following the coup the NCPO placed significant restrictions on freedom of speech and press. The NCPO issued broad orders prohibiting criticism of its actions, shut down numerous media outlets, blocked access to internet sites, and summoned members of the media to report to authorities for questioning. In addition to official restrictions on speech and censorship, the NCPO’s actions resulted in a significant increase in self-censorship among the public and the media. The NCPO prohibited political figures, analysts, and others from providing interviews or comments to the media and banned the dissemination of information that could threaten the NCPO or “create conflict” within the country. These prohibitions remained in effect at year’s end.

Prior to the coup, the international and independent media operated relatively freely, except in coverage of matters deemed a threat to national security or offensive to the monarchy. By law the government could restrict freedom of expression to preserve national security, maintain public order, preserve the rights of others, protect public morals, and prevent insults to Buddhism. The law also allows police with a court order to restrict or confiscate publications and other materials that disturb the peace, interfere with public safety, or offend public morals.

Freedom of Speech: Article 112 of the criminal code, the so-called lese majeste law, makes it a crime--punishable by up to 15 years’ imprisonment for each offense--to criticize, insult, or threaten the king, queen, royal heir apparent, or regent. The law also allows citizens to initiate lese majeste complaints against each other, which they did on several occasions. The government may conduct trials in secret and prohibit public disclosure of the content of the alleged offenses. International and domestic human rights organizations and academics expressed concern over the chilling effect on freedom of expression.

Official statistics varied by agency, but compared with recent years, the number of new lese majeste cases reportedly increased following the May 22 coup. According to the well-respected local NGO Internet Dialogue on Law Reform (iLaw), the number of new lese majeste cases was 15, as of September. In some of these cases, the accused committed the alleged offense prior to the May 22 coup, but authorities did not bring charges until after the coup. According to iLaw the government detained 20 persons under lese majeste laws as of September.

On June 16, a criminal court issued an arrest warrant for Chatvadee Amornpat, a British citizen who resided in the United Kingdom, for posting allegedly antimonarchy videos on Facebook. On July 31, a criminal court sentenced a musician from Ubon Ratchathani province to 30 years in prison for violation of the lese majeste law and the Computer Crimes Act by posting antimonarchy messages on Facebook. After he confessed to the crimes, the court subsequently reduced the sentences for violations of the two laws to 13 years and 22 months, respectively.

Authorities arrested two students, Patiwat Saraiyim and Porntip Munkong, on August 14 and 15, respectively, and charged them with committing lese majeste for their roles in the performance of the play Chao-Sao-Ma-Pa (Wolf Bride) in 2013 at Bangkok’s Thammasat University to commemorate the 40th anniversary of a student-led uprising. According to a human rights lawyers’ organization, a court denied their bail request, and they remained in detention as of September.

Citizens initiated complaints against each other. For example, on June 2, a passenger filed charges against taxi driver Yuthasak Kangwanwongsakul for purportedly insulting the monarchy during a discussion of the political situation. On August 14, the Bangkok Criminal Court found the taxi driver guilty of lese majeste and sentenced him to 30 months in jail.

 

Press Freedoms: Government entities owned and controlled most radio and broadcast television stations, including the 524 officially registered “regular” AM and FM stations. The armed forces and police owned another 244 radio stations, ostensibly for national security purposes. Other owners of national broadcast media included the government’s Public Relations Department and the Mass Communication Organization of Thailand Public Company Limited, a former state enterprise in which the government maintained a majority share. Government entities leased nearly all stations to commercial companies that provided commercial content to the stations.

The law provides for the regulation of radio and television frequencies and three categories of broadcast licenses (public service, community service, and commercial). The National Broadcasting and Telecommunications Commission (NBTC) allocates broadcast frequencies and regulates broadcast media. Radio stations must renew their licenses every seven years. Government transmitters broadcast radio signals. Stations are required by law to broadcast 30-minute, government-produced newscasts twice daily and to register with the NBTC. Several thousand small community radio stations nationwide also operate under a separate licensing system. The NBTC approved licenses for 24 new digital television channels.

 

Violence and Harassment: During antigovernment demonstrations leading up to the May 22 coup, members of protest groups subjected journalists to intimidation and accused various media outlets of political bias. Following the coup the NCPO ordered hundreds of individuals, including journalists, to report to military authorities or face prison and confiscation of assets.

For instance, military authorities summoned and detained Pravit Rojanaphruk, a reporter at The Nation newspaper, for several days. On May 26, following coup leader General Prayut’s first speech after his seizure of power, journalists Wassana Nanuam and Suparirk Thongchairit questioned him about the scheduling of elections and if he would appoint a new prime minister. The following day military authorities summoned the two reporters and told them to “not ask questions in such a manner again” and that “such a forceful style of questioning is not appropriate,” because the press should, instead, “cheer on” General Prayut.

In July authorities arrested two journalists affiliated with the Burmese Bi-Midday Sun newspaper; both resided in Mae Sot. Officials subsequently handed the journalists over to Burmese Police Special Branch on the Burmese side of the border, where the journalists were charged under Burma’s Emergency Provisions Act for publishing a story that falsely announced that Aung Sang Suu Kyi had established an interim government.

Censorship or Content Restrictions: Following the coup the NCPO restricted content deemed critical of or threatening to it, and the media widely practiced self-censorship. Immediately after seizing power, the NCPO shut down all television channels for more than 24 hours and ordered all radio and television stations--satellite, broadcast, and cable--to stop normal programming and broadcast only army-provided content. Although all free television stations resumed broadcasting on May 23, they refrained from reporting news critical of the NCPO. The NCPO ordered the media not to interview former government officials, academics, judges, or other members of independent organizations in a way that might “create conflict or confusion” among the public. On June 3, the NBTC and the NCPO announced that the majority of television channels could resume operations; however, 13 satellite channels and a digital channel remained banned by an NCPO order. On August 26, the NCPO gave final approval for the remaining satellite television channels to resume broadcasts under strict conditions, but only after the stations signed a memorandum of understanding with the NBTC that required them to change their channel names and agree not to broadcast content deemed “politically divisive.” The NCPO prohibited 4,300 community radio stations and 3,000 illegal radio stations operating without licenses from operating.

On June 25, the NCPO announced the establishment of panels to monitor media content in all branches of the media, including international press. The NCPO assigned the NBTC to monitor broadcast media, the Special Branch Police to oversee print media, the Ministry of Information and Communication Technology to observe online media, and the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to supervise monitoring of foreign media.

On July 18, the NCPO issued an order that prohibited any criticism of military authorities and directed print media, as well as television, radio, cable, and online media operators, not to publish or broadcast any information critical of the military’s actions. In addition the NCPO instructed print media, television, and radio programs not to carry any critical commentaries or invite as guests on their programs anyone who might make negative comments against the NCPO. Military authorities also banned any information they considered distorted or likely to cause public misunderstanding in broadcasts and printed publications or on social media and websites. Following criticism from the media and human rights groups, the NCPO amended its order on July 21 to clarify that the ban on all forms of criticism targeted only criticism made with malice and false information that aimed to discredit the NCPO. A contemporaneous NCPO order also stated that rather than face a forcible shutdown as originally ordered, a media outlet that violated the ban would face an ethics inquiry conducted by relevant media associations.

The emergency decree, which remained in effect in the conflict-affected three southernmost provinces, empowers the government “to prohibit publication and distribution of news and information that may cause the people to panic or with an intention to distort information.” It also authorizes the government to censor news considered a threat to national security.

 

Libel Laws/National Security: Defamation is a criminal offense, punishable by a fine of up to 200,000 baht ($6,000) and two years’ imprisonment. Criminal courts made several rulings on defamation and libel cases against political activists and politicians. On April 17, authorities charged two reporters, Alan Morrison and Chutima Sidasathien, from the English-language news website Phuketwan, with defamation and other offenses for publishing excerpts of a Pulitzer Prize-awarded Reuters report that alleged navy complicity in the trafficking of ethnic Rohingya. Officials released both journalists on bail. The first hearing in the case was scheduled for May 2015 (see section 5).

 

Internet Freedom

Following the May declaration of martial law and the coup, the NCPO imposed significant restrictions on internet freedom. On May 21, military authorities summoned internet service providers to gain their cooperation in monitoring and removing content deemed a threat to national security.

The Ministry of Information and Communication Technology released a report on May 27 that stated during the week of May 20-27, under provisions of martial law, it had blocked access to 219 websites and URLs that it deemed likely to cause division within society. The ministry announced on May 29 that it planned to send representatives to Singapore to ask for cooperation from organizations such as Google, Facebook, and LINE to work with the NCPO to “remove provocative content.” Also on May 29, the NBTC informed domestic internet service and gateway providers that it would disrupt access to 120 websites considered a threat to national security and stability. Facebook was unavailable to all users in the country for approximately one hour on May 29. According to a report by Toronto-based research group Citizen Lab that studies information controls, between May 22 and June 26, 56 URLs were inaccessible, including news sites and a political reform group, 29 of which included web pages, blog posts, news articles, and Facebook pages concerning political reforms and criticism against the NCPO and the monarchy.

On June 9, the acting police chief stated authorities would consider as computer crimes any social media posts that encouraged individuals to protest against the coup or the NCPO. He also warned social media users who clicked “like” on content and pages with anticoup messaging would also be subject to the law. Authorities enlisted the support of the public in policing internet content and encouraged citizens to become “cyberscouts” and report to the NCPO any online political activities. The Technology Crime Suppression Division established a “cyberpatrol” Facebook page and mobile application as a platform for persons to report such activities. On August 6, the information ministry announced its plan to sign a memorandum of understanding with 200 schools to establish a cyberscout program to encourage students to monitor web and social media sites for “unlawful and immoral” activities.

The law establishes procedures for the search and seizure of computers and computer data in certain criminal investigations and gives the information ministry authority to request and enforce the suspension of information disseminated via computer. The government may impose a maximum five-year prison sentence and a 100,000 baht ($3,000) fine for posting false content on the internet that undermines public security, causes public panic, or harms others. Authorities may impose a maximum 20-year sentence and 300,000 baht ($9,000) fine if an offense results in the death of an individual. The law also obliges internet service providers to preserve all user records for 90 days in case officials wish to access them. Any service provider who gives consent to or intentionally supports the publishing of illegal content is also liable to punishment. Most prosecutions continued to be for content-related offenses. By law authorities must obtain a court order to ban a website, although they did not always apply this requirement. Media activists criticized the law, stating that the offenses were too broadly defined and some penalties were too harsh.

Both prior to and after the coup, there was continued internet censorship, and use of the law continued to stifle certain areas of freedom of expression. The government closely monitored and blocked thousands of websites that criticized the monarchy. Many political web boards and discussion forums chose to self-censor and monitor discussions closely to avoid being blocked, and newspapers disabled or restricted access to their public comment sections to minimize exposure to possible lese majeste charges. The government imposed some restrictions on access to the internet and reportedly monitored internet chat rooms and social media without appropriate legal authority. Individuals and groups generally engaged in the peaceful expression of views via the internet, including by email, although there were several limitations on content, such as lese majeste, pornography, and gambling. Internet access was widely available in urban areas and used by citizens, including through a government program to provide limited free Wi-Fi access at 300,000 hotspots in cities and schools.

The RTP Electronic Crime Suppression Division reported receiving 1,047 complaints from January to August that resulted in 145 investigations, which in turn resulted in 73 criminal actions. In contrast, they reported 611 computer-related complaints from October 2012 to September 2013 that resulted in 146 investigations. Authorities received 47 complaints in 2009, 285 in 2010, and 776 in 2011. Most cases involved alleged defamation, lese majeste, and illegal activity such as gambling and pornography. Following the May 22 coup, the military government blocked hundreds of URLs, including those related to social media, human rights organizations, and media, among others. Since passage of the 2007 Computer Crime Act, authorities had blocked more than 102,000 URLs, 76 percent related to lese majeste, according to 2012 statistics.

Academic Freedom and Cultural Events

Following the coup the NCPO banned academics from making public comments to the press that it deemed divisive or potentially causing unrest. In July the NCPO banned all media and social media users from disseminating the opinions of independent scholars, among others, in a manner that could “create conflict, distort facts, confuse society, or lead to violence