A fork in the southern road

The meeting and the dialogue are hailed as “historic”, and it is indeed momentous. In this long-drawn-out conflict, trust is the most elusive commodity. Credit must go to all parties that collectively made this past Tuesday meeting possible, regardless of the differing views as to who it is that is negotiating from the position of strength.

The titanic question for Thailand is “What now?” 

This year has seen an escalation of violence in the three southernmost provinces of Yala, Pattani and Narathiwat. A string of coordinated attacks has been deadly. Absent are well-coordinated policies at the highest strategic level on the government side. At times our civilian administration and the Army appear not to see eye to eye on the nature and gravity of the situation, or on the appropriate offensive and defensive measures and mechanisms to take.

The problem for too many of us is that we don’t understand the problem.

The southern conflict has been described frequently and ubiquitously as an Islamic insurgency, while at its core, it is not.

The root cause of the armed struggle is ethnic. But in and by itself, ethnicity can only fuel this conflict so far, but not beyond a certain point. Islam just happens to be the religion of the ethnic Malays who yearn for a return of the glorious day of the Pattani kingdom that was lost even before the annexation of the sultanate by Siam over 100 years ago. By turning the struggle into an Islamic jihad, the struggle for some becomes pious and therefore more potent.  

There are currently 7-8 million Muslims in Thailand and about 1 million are ethnic Malays. The majority of Muslims in Thailand have enjoyed a peaceful coexistence with the majority Buddhist population. Even in the deep South, before the recent deadly escalation of the insurgency since 2004, Buddhist temples stood side by side with mosques. As one Middle-Eastern diplomat recently put it, in Thailand, Islam is not only accepted by Thais, it is respected.

Over the years, misguided policies on the part of the government and its agencies have accentuated, not lessened the sense of alienation and discontent among the Malay people of the region, who speak and dress differently. Even when Thai governments tried to do good, they did bad.

Millions of baht have been poured into Islamic schools in the region in the hapless hope that money could buy love. Not only did the money fail to do so, it inadvertently further strengthened the hand of the ethnic fighters. Some of the money found its way to fund the purchase of arms and ammunition. Some was just wasted on useless activities that had nothing to do with the intended purpose of the central government – to demonstrate that Bangkok cared. If anything, it helped solidify the coupling of ethnicity with religion, and obliterate the fine line between the two.

This happened when the regular secular schools in the three provinces became largely ignored by the central government in terms of budget and attention. As a result, a balanced admixture of ethnic communities in the deep South was diluted.

The despicable and widespread abuse of power by some authorities, both local and transplanted, further enhance the sense of disenfranchisement and alienation of the local people. Criminal activities funded or conducted by powerful and well-connected mafiosi and politicians have turned the region into a lawless and dangerous place. Those who lost hope for a better and less dangerous life, and were capable of relocating their families and loved ones elsewhere, have done so. Those who are left behind are those who entertain no hope in life, live in a decrepit environment, not knowing who the real bad guys are. To them, Islam is their only hope and salvation, as well as a coping mechanism. Ingrained deeper and deeper into their consciousness and sub-consciousness is the sense of outright injustice they have suffered at the hands of the authorities. And they are not wrong in wanting desperately to end that situation.

Most recently, the lack of a coherent and visionary national policy and strategy for the southern region is glaring. Some people jokingly describe it as the military performing a perpetual opening act while the main actors try to get dressed for their parts.  Meanwhile, the ticket scalpers are having a field day. 

However, if a peace accord was possible for the protracted and deadly conflict in Northern Ireland, and the Mindanao accord is making real inroads, why not here? 

Thailand has a successful track record in dealing with communist insurgencies. The end of that long struggle came as a result of a clear strategic vision and collaborative effort by both internal and external players. By the time it ended, most of the areas surrounding Bangkok had been described as “pink”. 

The coming out of the RKK strongmen represents for Thailand a fork in the road. It does not help that some high-level administrators still blame the situation in the deep South on criminal gangs comprising drug and human traffickers. While it is true that the cards may not be stacked in the optimum way for us, it is not impossible to make a truce stick. A game of cards can be won even without the best cards in your hand. Most importantly, it should be obvious to us that peace is the only way in which everybody can win and innocent lives can be spared.

As Robert Frost wrote, the road less travelled can make all the difference.