Bangkok must do more to get separatists around the table

The 93 young men in the staged surrender were finally paraded in front of the media on September 11. But sources in the separatist movement said the vast majority of the suspects, with the exception of half a dozen, were little more than sympathisers who at most had provided logistical support or worked as the “eyes and ears” of the militants. In other words, they weren’t combatants, or juwae in the local Malay language.

The episode has echoes of an announcement in April 2011 by the then secretary-general of the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre (SBPAC), Panu Uthairat, that 1,692 sympathisers had surrendered to the authorities between January and March of that year.

The figure sounds impressive, but people soon forgot about it as violence continued to dominate in the mind of the public.

Sources in the Patani Malay exiled community and in the Thai police said Panu had worked with a former Europe-based separatist leader to carry out the staged surrender. Apparently, the aim was to save Panu’s job, but the result was a flop when his contact couldn’t get anybody from the exiled community to surrender, mainly because they couldn’t see the merit in such a staged event.

Exiled separatist leaders, mainly members of the Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Coordinate (BRN-C) with working relations with juwae, said they were not convinced that the recent surrender, or similar activities over recent years, would have any impact on the course of the insurgency. And as the recent car-bomb attacks and other high-profile incidents suggest, things could get worse before they get better, they said.

But because Thailand is desperate for good news, few were willing to ask tough questions of the Army over the recent mass surrender of the 93. These questions include why these suspects had not been through any legal proceedings, and whether the Sai Buri car bomb was a retaliatory act, as claimed by the exiled separatist leaders.

Just as uncertain is the fate of the 93 men who surrendered, and were then immediately sent home. Local residents said they hoped the military had more sense than to turn these men into double agents after exposing their identity.

Juwae have demonstrated over the years that spies are fair game, and many of these “agents of the Siamese” have wound up killed by gunmen firing from very close range.

The government in Bangkok praised the event as well. But political insiders said the security team of Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra’s government was not happy with the surrender because it was preparing a staged surrender of its own. The military had beaten them to it and stolen the show.

Deputy Prime Minister Chalerm Yoobamrung in early August announced that 40 suspected insurgents would be surrendering to authorities. His initiative turned out to be a flop.

But the most significant response from the juwae didn’t require the use of bullets or bombs. For the last three Fridays, shopkeepers in the three southernmost provinces Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat have been ordered to observe the Muslim Sabbath by closing their shops.

Needless to say, this is a big slap in the face for the authorities, as the closure demonstrated that the people had lost faith in the state security apparatus.

It is not clear whether the juwae can sustain the shutdowns, as a similar initiative six years ago did not last more than two weeks. Moreover, the moral support that the juwae enjoy from the local Malay Muslims could quickly evaporate if the closing of businesses on Friday continues indefinitely.

Officials and security analysts often paint the ongoing conflict as a battle for hearts and minds between the insurgents and government officials. Getting the local residents on your side is the name of the game.

Where the violence with political underpinnings ends, no one seems to know. For the time being, the juwae, as well as their BRN-C backers, appear to be more interested in creating greater psychological impact with their attacks.

Judging from the reaction from the Yingluck government, the strategy is working. All of a sudden, many people in Bangkok are speaking of the strife in the deep South in political terms. There have also been some massive knee-jerk reactions. Political heavyweight Chalerm Yoobamrung was brought into the line-up and the so-called Pentagon II was established to give the impression of civilian control over policy for the South.

Few journalists have bothered to learn the official name of this new set-up or where it is, much less whether its headquarters actually has five sides.

But after the initial huff-and-puff from the military, a deal will be cut. Deputy Prime Minister Yuthasak Sasiprapha will remain the symbolic head of the Pentagon II while the Army will have day-to-day control over the centre’s operation.

Furthermore, the army has agreed not to sabotage the Pheu Thai Party’s secret peace process with the militants, which mainly involves speaking with the exiled leaders from long-standing Malay-Muslim separatist movements, who may or may not have much influence over the juwae on the ground.

This task has been given to the current SBPAC chief, Thawee Sodsong, one of the government’s most trusted bureaucrats. Before Thawee, the job of talking to the enemies was undertaken by the then deputy secretary-general of the National Security Council, Somkiat Boonchu, who was recently moved to an inactive post. Thaksin Shinawatra’s confidant Lt-General Paradorn Pattanathabutr is now the NSC chief and the agency is expected to play a supporting role to Thawee’s initiative.

At first, Thawee was using former Wadah politicians and local leaders to do his legwork. But after the juwae retaliated with a triple car-bomb attack in Yala and Hat Yai on March 31, Thawee and the team went back to the drawing board. This time he is looking for friendly Muslim clerics to do the legwork.

On the political front, the Pheu Thai Party is also asking the Democrats to be good sports on this. After all, everybody at one time or another has met the leaders of the exiled separatist groups.

The Malaysian government has agreed to help facilitate this peace process but sources in the BRN-C say they are not particularly interested in mediation because they don’t see an honest broker anywhere around, not even in an organisation like the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, which they say has only paid lip service to the idea of peace for the past three decades but is not willing to employ serious pressure. In fact, the OIC has permitted Thailand Permanent Observer status, thus in effect blocking all the Patani Malay separatist organisations from obtaining the position.

In essence, say exiled leaders, it is up to the Thai side to make the kind of concessions needed to move a peace process forward. They are in the best position to judge Thai sincerity and commitment, not outsiders.

Unfortunately, for the time being, it doesn’t seem that the juwae are in a hurry to talk. And so, says one source, whatever the Thai government is going to offer will have to be very bold and attractive to bring the juwae to the table.