No quick-fix solutions in deep South

Thailand’s negotiators will be meeting Patani Malay separatists in the upcoming days to sign the terms of reference (TOR) on how the dialogue progress should be carried out.
Details of the TOR have been nailed by the two sides with the facilitation of the Malaysian government.
Theoretically, the two sides are at the “confidence-building” stage, what chief negotiator General Aksara Kherdphol was quoted as calling the “most difficult” stage of any peace process.
Though the two sides have yet to start a formal peace process – and continue to bill this stage as “unofficial” talks, or pre-talks, – the ball is rolling in that direction.
In a way, the initiative launched by the Yingluck Shinawatra government – on February 28, 2013 – has tied the hands of the Thai military rulers who were not on board for that initiative.
But when they launched the coup, they had to decide whether to go along or ditch the whole process and look bad in the eyes of the world.
And when they agreed to continue the Kuala Lumpur-facilitated initiative, the military set conditions. First, the self-styled separatist organisations must forge a common platform. Second, they must have the ability to influence armed militants on the ground.
To meet the first demand, the six participating groups formed MARA Patani, an umbrella organisation, and went public in late August last year.
They also came up with their own demands: Thai Parliament declared the peace process with them a national agenda, officially recognising MARA Patani as an official entity for the peace talks, and granted them diplomatic and legal immunity.
The problem with these demands is that the junta in Bangkok is not in a mood to yield anything because that would legitimise these separatist leaders.
The fact that they are sending negotiators to talk to them is enough legitimacy for the southern alliance.
Just as important is the question of whether MARA Patani members can influence the combatants on the ground. It is now quite clear that they cannot. The same could be said for Yingluck’s initiative: the self-proclaimed “liaison” for the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), Hasan Taib, was not able to influence the militants on the ground as a result there was no reduction in violence.
If the military-installed government in Bangkok wants to curb the violence on the ground, then they are talking to the wrong people. But if they want to talk to a group of exiles with the hope of generating traction and expanding this initiative to something bigger and better, perhaps MARA Patani is not a bad start.
But don’t expect a miracle overnight. The junta needs to know that they are up against something much bigger than MARA Patani and the combatants on the ground. Most observers, government and non-government entities, would agree that vast majority of the combatants come under the BRN network.
And the BRN has made it clear that they are not a part of the peace initiative – neither this one and nor the one launched by the Yingluck government.
The Thai government is up against an entire region that continues to question the Thai state’s legitimacy in their historical homeland. The unwillingness to accommodate their needs and demands, especially during the height of Thai nationalist movements, has given rise to an armed struggle for independence.
Thailand tends to forget that the Malays of Patani didn’t question the Thai state’s sovereignty after their region came under direct Bangkok rule at the turn of the century when the border was drawn.
Armed insurgency came 50 years later and so we have to ask ourselves what happened to the comfort level enjoyed by the two sides.
Bangkok can cut a deal with MARA Patani or exterminate all insurgents on the ground but that will not bring permanent and sustainable peace to the region as long as their historical-cultural narrative is still alive.
And since you can’t really kill a narrative, Thailand will have to come up with ways to accommodate it. The question is, do the current crop of military leaders have the wisdom and political will to do that?