Railway politics shows true face of Thai-China ties

Both countries last year celebrated their 40th anniversary relationship with much fanfare.

However, over the year-long tussle related to business modalities and conditionality, all pretentions and pleasantries finally wore off. As it turned out, both sides were quite persistent in their stated objectives. They were not yielding—knowing full well what was at stake over one of the region’s super infrastructures that would physically link southern China to Singapore, nearly 3,000 kilometres away.

Suddenly last week, the Thai government announced that it would totally own the project—no more a joint venture—with financial and technical assistance from China after Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha met with his Chinese counterpart, Li Keqiang in Sanya, Hainan Island.

Complaints and frustration have already surfaced over repeated failure to iron out the final contract, albeit a broad tentative agreement. The groundbreaking ceremony was held in December last year to showcase the project. Both sides wanted badly to move forward. But whether they know it or not, the fabric of Thai-Chinese relations has changed.

Truth be told, Thai officials felt that China has not been as generous as they would have expected in the beginning. As a major power with huge financial backup as well as human resources and technology, they expected their Chinese counterparts to be more forthcoming in this mega-economic engagement, especially over the risk-sharing schemes.

One of the arguments was if this super infrastructure was so pivotal to China and its southward strategic movement, Beijing should be more open-minded and willing to absorb future business consequences. That was not the case.

From the Chinese perspective, the Thais were not decisive as their minds kept changing from one day to the other. Nobody knew exactly who had a final say. Citing successful examples from Laos, Indonesia and other parts of the world, the Chinese officials reiterated that it was a business of give and take dealing and their flexibility still could not catch up with the Thais’ ever-changing conditions and offers.

Overland connectivity has long been on Beijing’s drawing board. But overall progress has been sluggish due to the unforeseen domestic development both in China and Thailand. Under the leadership of President Xi Jinping, China has enthusiastically pushed connectivity infrastructure in mainland and maritime Southeast Asia.

However, there are common threads in their frustration over the railway project - revealing deep-rooted symptoms of Thai-Chinese relations, often hailed as one of the best bilateral relations in the region. In more ways than one, archaic mindsets, stereotypical thinking and mutual ignorance have incrementally undermined their relationship.

Unlike bilateral ties Thailand has with the rest of the world, Thai-Chinese relations are unique in that they have been blessed with excellent rapport from the top and the bottom. HRH Thai Princess Chakri Sirindhorn has visited China 39 times since her first visit in 1981. She authored several books on China and has been a champion in promoting the studies of Chinese languages, literature and culture. In December 2009, she was voted as one of the top-ten international friends of China by China International Radio.

At the ground level, last year 8.87 million Chinese, or 24,301 daily, visited Thailand, making it the strongest people-to-people contact between the two peoples in Asia.

Ironically, Thai-Chinese relations are still fragile as they lack the comprehensive nature of China’s ties with other Asean countries such as Malaysia or Singapore. Additional rapport from various stakeholders is still found to be wanting more than ever before. Business transactions are still restricted and monopolised by a handful of companies. Cultural relations are state-driven and quite selective without broad-based appeal, except those related to traditional aspects. Grassroots-based activities and programmes are still nonexistent.

In general, knowledge of China—history, language and culture—is still insufficient among Thais. As such, China’s soft power has yet to make its presence felt in Thailand in ways that would further strengthen friendship and cooperation as well as inspire each party. 

Most importantly, the railway episode also revealed China’s and Thailand’s Achilles’ heels in that the decision-making process on the public sector has changed markedly. Power decentralisation and multi-stakeholders have brought infrastructure deals under closer scrutiny from social media networking and civil society organisations than ever before, particularly in the case of Thailand.

However, the security sector is an exception. Since May 2014, Thai-Chinese security cooperation, such as joint training, has increased and expanded in scope covering all armed forces. However, major arms procurements, including the three submarines worth 36-billion baht, are still subject to public scrutiny, as before.  

Looking forward to Thai-Chinese relations in the next four decades, both sides must carefully craft and orchestrate common strategies in systematic ways to prevent their friendship from undesired backlash and xenophobia that could easily be conjured up.