Asean’s ‘One China’ policy on SC Sea behind the coup, there is only one thing to do, deliver (him)

Asean has survived its first serious test as a new community, one could even say come off with flying colours. Against all odds and predictions, the regional group last week came up with a common response to the ongoing maritime and territorial disputes that four of its members have with China in the South China Sea. 

The wording of a joint statement by their foreign ministers meeting in Vientiane on Monday may not carry much weight to change the situation on the ground, or more precisely in the sea. Nevertheless, it is a position that all the 10 member countries openly subscribe to, although they have different interests and approaches in dealing with China, including in addressing the South China Sea disputes.

They defied earlier scepticism whether the annual Asean foreign ministers meeting could come up with a common position. Since Asean makes its rulings by consensus, it really takes just one member to botch any decision. 

Sceptics took their cue from the disastrous 2012 meeting in Phnom Penh when they failed to issue a communique for the first time in Asean’s history, on that occasion also over how to deal with China. In June, during a meeting between Asean and China’s foreign ministers in the Chinese city of Kunming, an Asean statement referring to the South China Sea was released by Malaysia only to be withdrawn within hours because of China’s protest.

 

Dealing with a thorny issue

“We remain seriously concerned over recent and ongoing developments and took note of the concerns expressed by some Ministers on the land reclamations and escalation of activities in the area, which have eroded trust and confidence, increased tensions and may undermine peace, security and stability in the region,” reads paragraph 174 of the communique adopted by all 10 members in Vientiane.

Paragraph 177 states: “We emphasised the importance of non-militarisation and self-restraint in the conduct of all activities, including land reclamation that could further complicate the situation and escalate tensions in the South China Sea.”

No one can accuse Asean of skirting the thorny issue when eight of the 191 points in the statement were dedicated to the situation in the South China Sea. 

What the statement does not do is directly name China as the main culprit. Also missing is any reference to the July 12 ruling by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague, which said that China’s activities in the South China Sea violated the 1982 UN Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Although China is party to the UNCLOS, it stayed away from the arbitration process filed by the Philippines. Beijing declared the court’s decision “null and void” and refused to abide by it. 

Make no mistake about Asean’s common concerns, even though the wording was couched in such a way so that Beijing is not offended. That’s Asean diplomacy.

The dividing line in Asean has been how to deal with China over the South China Sea disputes. Malaysia, the Philippines, Vietnam and Brunei have overlapping claims in the area with China claiming virtually the entire sea. 

In 2012, when the foreign ministers failed to produce a statement after their meeting in Phnom Penh, it took Indonesia’s then foreign minister Marty Natalegawa to tour Asean capitals and get all members to agree on a text. The communique was released one week after the ministers had gone home.

That mistake was not repeated this time. Intensive lobbying, including a retreat called by Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi, bore fruit as the ministers produced their statement on Monday. Host Laos and Cambodia had opposed any discussion on the South China Sea, while the Philippines had wanted a stronger wording. A few hours after they reached a consensus, the Asean ministers met with their Chinese counterpart Wang Yi, among the many foreign ministers from Asean’s major trading partners who joined the annual gathering this week. 

Asean needed to show a semblance of unity now more than ever before, and their common statement on the South China Sea raises some hopes that the group can still pull off an important stunt like this at a time when most observers had given up hope. 

Asean launched itself as a community on December 31 last year, an event that has hardly had an influence on the lives of its 600-million population because their governments have been lukewarm at best in hailing its arrival. There were no fireworks accompanying the launch in Asean capitals. Contrast this to the all-night party during the formal accession of several East European countries to the European Union. 

 

Fear of marginalisation

When the community idea was first broached by Asean leaders in 2003, they discussed concerns that the rapid economic rise of China then, and to a lesser of India, could marginalise Asean members and reduce these countries, including early Asian economic tigers Singapore, Thailand and Malaysia, to mere satellites of the new Asian giant economies. 

When the Asean Community was launched at the turn of the year in 2016, the urgency seems to have disappeared even though the concerns expressed by the leaders 13 years ago had somewhat materialised. By now, China has become the second-largest economy in the world, and for all Asean member countries, China is their biggest trading partner, and also a major source of badly needed financial investments.

While none of the claimant countries within Asean are backing off from their position in the South China Sea, they continue to pin their hopes on diplomacy. When the PCA ruling came, there were some celebrations, some in Manila even hailing it as a victory of David over Goliath. But their governments knew that China would ignore the ruling. It doesn’t change anything on the ground.

Reality quickly sank in. A negotiated settlement with China is the only viable course. 

The alternative, a military solution, is just unthinkable. While one or two Asean countries have formally, if not protectively, looked to the United States and its allies in Asia, they are still giving Asean diplomatic efforts a chance.

That conciliatory mood prevailed in Vientiane this week as Asean foreign ministers hammered a common position in facing China in the South China Sea. They still have one more card to play with China: The Declaration on the Conduct of the Parties in the South China Sea, a document that China signed with Asean in 2002, by which all parties agreed to manage their conflicts peacefully without the use of power.

Asean has been trying to get China to turn this declaration into a more binding document under a formal Code of Conduct. The Vientiane communique reiterated the call Asean has been making to China almost every year: Let’s speed up the negotiations.

With China now coming under a lot international pressures for defying the decision by the international tribunal this month, the Code of Conduct with Asean may offer Beijing a face-saving exit from the current impasse. 

Asean has extended its hands. The ball is in China’s court.