How the Shinawatras helped pass the charter draft

I’m referring to Thaksin and Yingluck Shinawatra. They were the comet hurtling towards the earth, aimed at what they dubbed a constitutional monster, only to end up having completely the opposite effect.

Even supporters of the military government and opponents of the Shinawatras were divided by the controversial draft constitution. Days before the August 7 referendum, the document’s fate hung in the balance, seriously threatened by a surging “No” sentiment. 

Then, Thaksin and his sister popped up to change the equilibrium completely.

The siblings made a huge political mistake in launching an all-out attack on the draft. Its critics can blame the “information blackout” or other “undemocratic” factors that preceded the vote all they like, but it seems the biggest reason the “Yes” camp comfortably triumphed was something else. Thaksin and his sister should have kept their mouths shut, period.

In other words, while there were indeed credible critics of the charter draft, the Shinawatras were not among them. When Democrat leader Abhisit Vejjajiva, a bitter rival of Thaksin’s clan, attacked the document a few days before the referendum and vowed to vote “No”, many in the pro-military camp were swayed. They were pushed back the other way by the Shinawatras, though. Triggering the renewed pro-draft feeling was the sentiment that if Thaksin and Yingluck “fear” the proposed constitution so much, then there must be something good in it.

The Shinawatras got carried away. They forgot the most crucial facts: that their supporters did not need their opinions, because they would vote against the draft no matter what, and that they were not in a credible position to convince neutrals that the draft was “bad”. They should have kept a low profile and let people like Abhisit do the job. Instead, Thaksin and his sister took centre stage, cancelling out Abhisit’s impact in the process.

The situation resembled the Bangkok mayoral election a few years ago, when incumbent Sukhumbhand Paribatra was poised to lose big because even many anti-Shinawatra voters were reluctant to back him. It turned out that the “fear factor”, drummed up a couple of days before the city vote, propelled him to a landslide victory.

The difference between then and now is that opponents of the Shinawatras exploited the fear factor before the mayoral vote, whereas the “No” campaign against the charter draft unwittingly invoked the fear factor itself. The involvement of Thaksin and Yingluck prompted stinging questions: What makes them fear the charter draft so much? Is it because it prescribes such strong medicine against corruption?

Less than a week before the referendum, Thaksin described the draft as a “folly”. Yingluck also vowed to vote “No”, saying she could not accept the document’s “undemocratic” principles. As a result, the siblings gave the “Yes” camp what it badly needed – newspaper headlines linking the Shinawatras to the “No” campaign. Thais are politically fickle, and until Thaksin and Yingluck came along voters were frowning primarily on the military.

As far as the stumbling “Yes” camp was concerned, nothing could be better than the name of Thaksin in the news just a couple of days before the vote. Even more encouraging, his media presence was voluntary. Whether the draft was a “folly” or not, Thaksin’s emergence reminded many politically fickle Thais how they should vote.

Reasons were given as to why the “No” camp was defeated, some more credible than the others. The information “blackout” might have played a small part, but it surely could not stop criticism against the draft on the social media and elsewhere. The relatively low voter turnout could also be interpreted either way. On the one hand, we could say it was because the charter draft was a turn-off. Or we could say it proved that nobody was being dragged out at gunpoint to vote.

The referendum was a test of strength. It’s more than likely that the vast majority of voters had not even read the draft. They headed to the polls weighing the pros and cons of full-scale democracy, against a controlled political system in which elected politicians are prevented from doing a lot of things they once could. Ideological differences are the crux of the political crisis, and the outcome of the referendum more or less reflects what Thais want, at least for now.

The ideological battle may remain, but this latest round has gone to the controlled-democracy camp. In no small measure, it has the Shinawatra siblings to thank for its unexpectedly comfortable win.