A path through minefield of Kim’s nuclear endgame

North Korean observers are roughly divided into two groups. At one end are those who advocate that Kim Jong-un and his cohorts will never abandon weapons of mass destruction, which are the last hope for his regime’s survival. At the other end are those who believe they will give them up if coercive persuasion or force is applied 
For the moment, the former opinion seems to prevail. It represents defeatism. In this age of thermonuclear wepaons, war is not a continuation of diplomacy by other means, but a failure of global political leadership. Hence, the latter view that careful coercive diplomacy with global leadership can avoid inadvertent war, and make for a win-win policy deal for Korea’s two halves. 
The Korean question has two components. One is the ultimate objective, reuniting Korea, and the other is the ways and means of realising it. The ultimate goal was stipulated in the Cairo Declaration on December 1, 1943, by US President Franklin D Roosevelt, Chiang Kai-shek and Winston Churchill. Namely, “mindful of the enslavement of the Korean people” under Japanese colonial rule that “in due course Korea shall become free and independent”. 
Seventy-four years after this declaration, Korea remains divided, with the North shooting off ballistic missiles and tinkering with nuclear tests. The supreme irony is that South Korea is a donor nation in the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. North Korea, notwithstanding its WMDs, is among the poorest recipient states. 
To deal with the Kim Jong-un’s reckless nuclear missile gamble, the catchphrase of the new US administration’s policy under Donald Trump is “maximum pressure and engagement”. 
The new South Korean government’s policy under Moon Jae-in is proactive engagement with the North with the proviso that the Korean Peninsula be denuclearised in the end. 
At first glance, the North Korea policies of Moon and Trump seem different. But closer scrutiny reveals they are complementary. Both nations are seriously committed to resolving North Korean WMD threats and unravelling the Korean Gordian knot. 
Differently put, Korean reunification is the ultimate aim of every Korean and freedom-loving person around the world. But North Korea’s WMDs are the greatest obstacles in its path to achieving this goal.
The Moon government is taking a step-by-step approach. It is ready to ease tensions in inter-Korean relations by relaunching the meeting of separated families, resuming sports and cultural exchanges, and halting provocative activities along the Demilitarised Zone. 
Simultaneously, until and unless the North irrevocably dismantles its WMD programme, the Moon government must actively impose a variety of sanctions. It must do so in close coordination with the US, our only treaty ally, along with Japan, China, Russia, the UN, Association of Southeast Asian Nations and EU members. 
 Four points are noteworthy here. 
1. Several countries have previously abandoned either nuclear weapons or nuclear development programmes. For example, South Africa destroyed its nuclear bombs in 1989. In the aftermath of the demise of the Soviet Union, Ukraine dismantled its nuclear arsenal and joined the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1994. 
Libya’s Muammar Gadhafi stopped nuclear weapons development programmes in 2003. Iran is in the process, under the Joint Plan of Action. 
2. Israel, India and Pakistan, three de facto nuclear states, joined the UN International Atomic Energy Agency in 1957. But they did not sign the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation on Nuclear Weapons or Safeguards Agreement. 
3. The UN Security Council P5 joined the IAEA in 1957, except for China which joined it in 1984. Also, the NPT was ratified by the UK in 1968 and the US and Russia (then the Soviet Union) in 1970 while China and France only acceded in 1992. 
4. North Korea joined the IAEA in 1974 and NPT in 1985 and signed its SA in 1992. But it is the only country to withdraw from the IAEA (1994) and the NPT (2003). It has also refused IAEA safeguards in its nuclear facilities. North Korea’s compliance has been unreliable. 
Thus, if the ongoing sanctions prove ineffective in dismantling North Korea’s WMD programmes, the best available alternative framework for denuclearising the Korean Peninsula may be a modified Iranian version of the Joint Plan of Action. Specifically, talks by the UN P5 plus Japan and Asean representatives with Seoul and the Pyongyang may be the answer. 
Yes, North Korea is not Iran. Every nuclear conundrum is unique. And yet, North Korea’s WMD threats are now far more potentially apocalyptic than any other menace on Earth. 
 
Yang Sung-chul is former South Korea ambassador to the United States and senior adviser of the Kim Dae-Jung Peace Foundation.