Suthep's back. What's next?

The most obvious consequence is that embattled Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha will have someone with whom to share the headlines. Both men have a few things in common. They both started off facing doubters and critics, but before long we had “Suthep fever” and “Prayut fever” – and then the sceptics returned in full force. Both want “reform before election” and have proved they will stop at nothing in order to achieve that goal.

In Suthep, Prayut will have more than an alternative target who can draw the fire, of course. Amid the political divide, many Thais remain fickle, and Suthep’s return will serve as a strong reminder here and overseas. Here, Suthep’s presence will take some sting out of the looming economic troubles and the tribulations of Prayut’s “undemocratic” rule, reminding one camp of polarised Thais why the risks had to be taken in the first place.

Anti-coup activists may not have  been able to rattle the Prayut regime, but they aren’t merely political nuisances, either. In the social media, criticism of his controversial reign extends far beyond the voices of a few students. And in this era, every ruler knows that “the pen” is mightier than the sword. Suthep’s return has the power to rouse a movement that has been somewhat dormant.

For international observers, Suthep represents a sizeable mass of Thais. At the peak of his popularity, he led arguably Thailand’s largest-ever political rally, though that may have been forgotten by many of his Western critics. He entered the monkhood after Prayut ousted the Yingluck administration in a coup but has now returned to action as a layman. Conspiracy theorists say the coup was simply a case of Suthep passing the torch to the Army general.

It’s one thing to lead demonstrations against a democratically elected government, but it’s another to seize power from it. Prayut has been hit with strongly worded statements, sanctions and relationship downgrades. With Western pressure growing on the PM for a return to democracy, Suthep’s comeback offers a subtle statement directed at critical observers overseas. The message is, “If you think all Thais want an early election, think again.”

Prayut has been a lone target. Now, there are two of them. Strategically speaking, it’s like a football team deciding to play with two strikers after a one-striker approach seemed ineffective. But playing with two strikers has its drawbacks, too.

If the two are working in cahoots, a major problem is that the Suthep’s “mass” support is something that has to remain strictly on paper. If Prayut doesn’t want to wake up the red shirts and become a big-time hypocrite, that is. Political gatherings have been banned since the coup, which means that Suthep is a big cheque that Prayut is unable to cash.

Prayut can’t afford to pit Suthep’s supporters against the red shirts, unless the prime minister wants to undermine his own justification for the coup. The power seizure, Prayut insisted both here and overseas, was meant to nullify threats of a civil war. If he allows the returning Suthep to stage a show of force, the other side will demand to do the same, or just go ahead and do it. Then the potentially explosive confrontation that Prayut proclaimed to be acting to defuse will resume.

As of now, Suthep seems to be of psychological use only. With the red shirts lacking a clear-cut or charismatic leader, he and Prayut hopefully can keep resentment against the latter’s rule in check. Moreover, Prayut can use a supportive “popular” leader as constitutional reform nears its most crucial stage.

In addition to the troubled economy, Western pressure, anti-coup activists and a bumpy political reform process, a court ruling on Yingluck Shinawatra regarding the controversial rice scheme may be handed down soon. When that happens, a reactivated Suthep might come in handy. 

All of the above is based on the theory that Suthep has left the monkhood to be Prayut’s white knight. There is another theory, of course, which says he has come out of self-imposed political retirement to rock the boat. Prayut, goes this theory, has upset hardliners in the People’s Democratic Reform Committee on key issues like oil exploration concessions. Believe it or not, despite the coup, Yingluck’s impeachment by the military-installed legislature and her ongoing court case, some people still suspect that Prayut is on a Dan Brown-esque conspiratorial mission.

Few people buy this theory, however, not least because an anti-Prayut campaign led by Suthep can only lead to one winner, and that winner’s name would not be Suthep or Prayut. Suthep knows that best, and whatever he does, it won’t be intended to open the door for the Shinawatras to slide back in. In other words, if Suthep really does dislike Prayut, the veteran certainly dislikes Thaksin Shinawatra even more, and the best thing to do is keep a distance.

But Thai politics has shown over and over that the “impossible” is always possible. Just recall some of the strange pairings that have intrigued us over the past two decades – Thaksin and Chamlong Srimuang; Thaksin and Sondhi Limthongkul; Thaksin and Sonthi Boonyaratglin. Now we have Prayut and Suthep seemingly taking the tag-team approach. Enjoy the show, but don’t even try to guess the ending.