How Kra Canal can combat piracy in Straits of Malacca

When asked about piracy, many people would paint a picture of speed boats carrying feisty young men armed with Kalashnikovs off the coast of Somalia, as finely highlighted by Tom Hank’s Hollywood hit, Captain Phillips, in 2013. Most would certainly assume that the majority of today’s pirate activities do take place in the Horn of Africa, where Somalia lies.
However, that is not the case. The real hotspot for piracy is, in fact, the Straits of Malacca in Southeast Asia; a narrow waterway of 885km squeezed between the forest settings of Indonesia and Malaysia, heading towards Singapore.
This thin route happens to accommodate one-third of the world’s shipping trade, most notably serving as the very route that transports oil from the Middle East to the energy-thirsty powerhouse China. With around 50,000 ships per year passing through this vast territory; it is, understandably, a breeding ground for pirates.
Southeast Asia suffered 41 per cent of the world’s pirate attacks between 1995 and 2013, while the West Indian Ocean, which includes Somalia, accounted for just 28 per cent.
The International Maritime Bureau (IMB) reported that in 2015 alone, the region accounted for 55 per cent of the world’s 54 piracy and armed robbery incidents. In contrast, entire Africa saw only 11 incidents this year.
A 2010 study by the One Earth Future Foundation shows that the international economy loses between US$7 billion (Bt250 billion) to $12 billion from piracy. With oil tankers heading towards China being the main target, a hiccup in the country’s energy-intensive manufacturing sector could prove significant to the global economy.
So, one must ask, why does piracy abound in an area surrounded by three functioning governments – Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia? None of these states are comparable to Somalia.
One reason for the rampant rate of piracy is due to the complex affair of state sovereignty. With this, the patrols of one state cannot engage in cross-border pursuit into the territorial waters of another. Conveniently, it allows pirates to zigzag through different territorial waters in order to escape the patrols.
Even though these three countries established the Malacca Straits Coordinated Patrol (MALSINDO), to provide a regional effort, piracy continues to exist.
The limitation of resources provided by these countries for the operations also contributes to an increasing number of pirate activities. The “Eyes in the Sky” effort, which allows aerial patrols to travel over another state’s territorial water, proved ineffective as responses to the incidents spotted were slow and unreliable. Moreover, the number of aerial operations was below expectation and long-range patrolling is often a problem, especially during rough weather.
Regional politics also has its part here. Cooperation between these countries is poor, leading to an absence of effective information sharing. The Malaysia-based IMB and the Singapore-based ReCAAP act as rivals rather than working together and providing intelligence coordination. There is a general mistrust of Singapore in Malaysia and Indonesia.
It is agreed that as global maritime trade continues to thrive, especially in Asia, there will be a further increase in the importance of the Malacca Straits.
The continuing reliance on the route suggests that the threat of piracy will inevitably remain.
Looking outside the box, one can argue that an effective way to avoid this threat is for ships to bypass Malacca completely.
This is where Thailand and the possibility of the Kra Canal project come into play.
The canal will shorten the journey from the Indian Ocean to the South China Sea by 1,200km, allowing ships to save both fuel costs and travelling time. More importantly, the threat posed by piracy in the Malacca Straits can be bypassed.
The Kra Canal will not pose the problems associated with Malacca: the issue of state sovereignty, limitation of resources, and the lack of cooperation between involved states.
As both sides of the canal belong to Thailand, it is the sole responsibility of the country to manage, facilitate, and protect ships passing through. There will be no ambiguity regarding the cross-over of territorial waters that is experienced in the Malacca route. The usage of the canal means that Thailand alone will be liable to any disruptions in its territorial water, unlike in Malacca where political blame games between the states involved may occur. The mistrust between states and the lack of cooperation witnessed before will also be non-existent.
Furthermore, the issue of resources will not be a concern. As ships will have to pay tolls to pass through the canal, a significant chunk of the revenue will certainly be dedicated towards the funding of security in the area. And as Thailand alone is accountable for any incidents, security will be high on the government’s agenda. Piracy is an enormous concern for shipping companies, particularly those travelling through the Malacca Straits.
The Kra Canal is a necessary solution for this. While ships using the canal will enjoy the security of Thai territorial waters, those opting to go through the traditional route, too, will be safer as a less congested Malacca means MALSINDO can become more focused and effective.

The author has a master’s degree in energy policy and specialises in energy logistics in Southeast Asia.