Delayed poll not Pheu Thai’s biggest issue

The trick, therefore, is for the party to show appropriate anger in public, while holding what it really feels inside, if a general election does not take place this year.
The military, of course, stands to gain the most if the return to civilian rule is delayed. That doesn’t necessarily mean, however, that a quick election would be beneficial to the coup-ousted Pheu Thai. For its own good, the party needs to regroup, find a credible new leader and ponder the ultimate question of what to do with its de facto patriarch. (It could also be the other way round: The patriarch might need time to sort out his relationship with the party.)
In fact, it is Pheu Thai’s biggest rival who should be protesting more loudly if the election “road map” is stretched to its limit. The Democrat Party doesn’t need as much time to regroup, and its current leadership is not crippled by a looming political ban. The earlier the election, the more seats the Democrats are likely to win.
Pheu Thai is in disarray for obvious reasons. Supporters advocating an early election are more idealistic than strategic. They want the party to win another landslide so as to deliver a slap in the face to a military that ousted it from power. But the truth is that while the party may be able to win again, it’s unlikely to win big. And whatever else happens in an early election, Pheu Thai would once again be full of nominees with questionable credibility.
Strategically speaking, a delayed election would allow the party to shape up and win more seats. Of course, the military’s shadow will loom over national politics whether the election takes place this or next year, but a numerically strong Pheu Thai should count for something. It’s a no-brainer as to which election date would give Pheu Thai more seats and a more significant political role.
More important perhaps, a delayed election would give Thaksin Shinawatra and Pheu Thai time to sort each other out. Nothing may change as a result, but more time would do both of them more good than harm. Moreover, Pheu Thai will sooner or later have to learn to live without him – for everybody’s sake, including its own.
He has been responsible for the party’s high points  – and also its lowest. Before the last coup, the party had been close to omnipotent. Just about everything was going its way. Yingluck Shinawatra had hit the ground running, well-loved everywhere. The return from a five-year political ban of more than 100 politicians boosted the party’s alliance with smaller parties. Key financial bills were sailing through Parliament. The Democrats had many problems on their hands, notably a simmering rebellion against the party’s leadership.
Then the amnesty bill came along, and the rest is history. Pheu Thai, some may argue, should have seen the signs. The surprise outcome of the last Bangkok mayoral election, in which a much-maligned Democrat incumbent regained his post with a landslide victory, had a lot to do with the Thaksin factor. An early general election could see that repeated, on a national scale.
Pheu Thai has often argued that the amnesty bill was meant to heal divided Thailand, not just benefit Thaksin. But that’s the whole point. Continued close connections with Thaksin will continue to create doubts – reasonable or not. It will keep the party stuck in a loop of election pride, policies whose claimed “legitimate mandate” is constantly questioned by critics, protests by anti-Thaksin elements, and finally military intervention. The connections undermine whatever the party says or does where democracy is concerned.
Building a political clan is normal. But sooner or later, especially when the builders aren’t careful, it clashes with the essence of democracy, which balks at the idea of monopolised domination. Pheu Thai doesn’t need lessons in ideology, though. The party simply needs to think strategically, about its long-term future. It merely needs to figure out whether operating under one family is worth it.
For Pheu Thai, winning elections is the easy part. The difficult bit is what happens after it triumphs: its big mistake is misinterpreting its mandate, and also assuming that any opposition to its policy is a conspiracy. It desperately needs a period of soul-searching, something that an early election would cut short – resulting in the same old ordeals that everyone, both inside and outside the party, has had to suffer.