Signs are not good for serious reform

Two years after seizing power, the ruling junta – the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) – has come full circle to once again address the subject of government, economic and social reform. “Reform” was the buzzword in the wake of the May 2014 coup, but it soon disappeared from the generals’ vocabulary as the focus shifted to establishing their legitimacy to rule.
A great deal of resources and energy went into drafting a new constitution aimed at securing the military’s role in politics for years to come. Ensuring that voters would approve the draft in a referendum became the name of the game since the generals believed public endorsement would prove to the world that the coup had been justified.
That mission accomplished more or less, the junta began talking about reform again. It’s truly dismaying that so much time was spent on pushing through a constitution that allows little leeway for criticism, but what this means is there is little time left for crying over spilled milk. We need to make the best of the existing situation and push forward needed changes in the most meaningful way possible.
Reform will not be easy. Given the diversity of complaints and priorities, reform means many things to many people. Reform on the scale that’s both envisioned and necessary is likely to take generations, and with that in mind, the NCPO appears to have taken constitutional steps to ensure its own longevity. 
Nevertheless, for our immediate purposes, reform in government structure should come first. State power remains highly centralised and under the junta the power of civil servants has increased. Their authority will not easily be curtailed. Reform should entail the decentralisation of power, even if it diminishes the role of government bureaucrats. To argue that a strong civil service counterbalances political corruption implies that the junta is unable to root out corruption or is insincere in its intent to do so. Clearly a balance needs to be and can be struck.
Reform is also needed among bankruptcy-prone state enterprises, and yet the junta has shown unwillingness to empower what’s been called a “superboard” to bring about crucial reforms. The reluctance should perhaps be no surprise, since the junta swiftly stocked the boards of several state enterprises with its own men – not that their directorships have fostered any positive changes. 
Rather than laying the foundation for meaningful reform, the junta’s preferred approach to governing has been scattershot efforts at boosting efficiency through regulation. For lack of any ground rules, much less an effective opposition voice, the rules it has imposed cannot be challenged. Criticism, such as it is, has come up against a wall of military might backed by the police, all the trappings of totalitarian rule in place to make sure orders and regulations are obeyed. This piecemeal approach to reform has rendered some good, but there is no guarantee that the efficiency imposed by the NCPO will survive once the troops are back in their barracks.
Reform thus far has been the exclusive undertaking of the NCPO, National Legislative Assembly, National Reform Steering Assembly, Constitution Drafting Assembly and Cabinet, all entities that are part of or beholden to the military junta. Given the overarching disregard for the fundamentals of democracy, we can only wonder what kind of future these policymakers really want for the country. Some have even said Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha, who usurped his position with tanks, should retain the post in the next election. Such sentiment bodes ill for any hope that we might all agree on a shared notion of reform.