Thailand’s reconciliation trap is preventing democratic progress 

The NCPO says this is a significant step forward since the 2014 coup, and should resolve Thailand’s decade-long political division. 
However, military-led reconciliation has met with sceptical responses both inside and outside the country. Observers question whether it can truly reunite Thailand as a nation, or whether it is simply a political ploy for the military to gain trust and legitimacy, rather than allow reconciliation led by all parties involved. 
So, can the junta’s dream of forced reconciliation become a reality?
The military is fully aware of public scepticism over its role and involvement in the reconciliation process. Thus it has made clear  that it will attend the public reconciliation forums only to listen, not to express any opinion or discuss issues, so as to ensure that “invited participants” are free to express their views on conflict solutions and reconciliation. 
One such forum was held this week at the 21st Military Circle in Nakhon Ratchasima province. An impression it left was that foreign countries and institutions are a potential threat to national security, and their actions and criticism directed at Thailand – particularly in relation to its politics, democracy and human rights since 2014 – are interpreted as a form of intervention. Freedom House classified Thailand as “Not Free” in its 2017 report on political and civil rights. 
Though organised by the military, the NCPO’s reconciliation process is in fact little different from the process pursued under the administration of Abhisit Vejjajiva. Following the 2010 crackdown on red-shirt protesters, Abhisit initiated the National Reform Committee (NRC), chaired by former prime minister Anand Panyarachun. In 2013, we also witnessed reconciliation attempts under the government of Yingluck Shinawatra, who invited the former British prime minister Tony Blair to speak on reconciliation.
The NCPO’s public forums have delivered similar information to those held under Abhisit’s NRC, with proposals for economic, social and political reforms aimed especially at more equable allocation of public resources. In fact, this latest reconciliation effort is providing no new information, instead only mirroring and repeating data already known to the Thai public and international observers from the earlier process.
The junta outwardly claims that Thailand is a democratic country moving towards a more democratic environment. However there is plenty of cause for scepticism over whether the military believes that Thailand’s political divide can be bridged through a more democratic environment.
Throughout the three years since the May 2014 coup, the NCPO has attempted to introduce a military culture as an integral component of “Thai-style” democracy. Inside barracks, power and force, order and commands, are vital to the proper functioning of the Thai military. Seniority based on rank and the strict enforcement of a hierarchical structure is the mechanism that creates unity.
Indeed, this kind of military culture is almost identical to the prevailing concept of “Thainess” enshrined in the NCPO’s “Twelve Core Values for a Strong Thailand”. The military’s prioritising of reconciliation ahead of democracy and human rights makes complete sense to the vast majority of Thais. This is reinforced by memories of the economic damage caused by chaotic rallies in Bangkok and elsewhere, particularly during the protests in 2010 by the red shirts and in 2013-2014 by the People’s Democratic Reform Committee (PDRC).
So what would Thailand be like under a social contract enforced by the military?
Despite its claims go the contrary, the contract is nothing other than a rejection of genuine representative democracy, in favour of establishing a “Thai-style” democracy, in which liberty and freedom are secondary to “order” and “stability”. The NCPO has repeatedly told the Thai people and the international community that Thailand’s cultural uniqueness cannot be undermined by its international commitments and international law, particularly human rights. 
Instead of falling into a reconciliation trap, the military and other Thai authorities must be more open-minded in acknowledging the issues surrounding country’s political conflicts, which are much wider than income inequality and imbalances. Indeed, Thailand’s political conflicts are seated in a poor understanding and perhaps rejection of the universal concept of human rights, which embrace and endorse dignity, rights, liberty, equality and freedom. These key values are given only a token place in the Thai education system, and have not yet been fully integrated. 
From school to university, young Thais are taught to respect adults, and to “live in harmony and promote unity” so that Thailand can be a peaceful, strong and independent society. These characteristics of “Thainess” are not necessarily anti-democratic and anti-human rights, but the ways in they are taught to young generations are an obstacle for Thailand’s democratic progress.
Today, it is increasingly difficult to convince a majority of Thais that promotion of democracy and human rights can produce natural reconciliation and minimise conflicts, through greater equality and respect for individual dignity regardless of social background.
Of course, democracy cannot guarantee equality and unity. But the rule of law is a democratic means to ensure that people’s rights are protected from violation by the state and individuals. In Thailand the law is not always applied equally across all groups.
Unity and harmony cannot be forced, but are rather a product of the true and honest promotion of equality and rights. This challenge will persist as long as Thailand continues to overrule the universal concept of human rights, and keeps falling into the reconciliation trap and historic pride in its Thainess.

Titipol Phakdeewanich is dean of the Faculty of Political Science at Ubon Ratchathani University, and a visiting fellow at the Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation at the University of Warwick in England.