How not to end an insurrection

For a man who is supposed to be one of the key persons mandated to quell the violence in the southern border provinces, Lt General Piyawat Nakwanit, commander of the Fourth Army Area, doesn’t seem to actually understand the concept of counterinsurgency. This was clear enough in his recent decision – made in response to an ambush on his men – to designate two tambon in Pattani’s Nong Chik district as “special control zones”.
Piyawat has every right to feel anger at the deaths of two of his 
soldiers and the wounding of four others at the hands of insurgents. They were attacked while on patrol on September 11. But it is his duty as a military professional to accept the loss and move on with his mission, not to punish residents who had nothing to do with the incident, just because they live where they live. 
Their mere geographic proximity to the ambush made them targets in a sweep involving more than 1,000 soldiers and police officers. It was supposed to be a dragnet in search of incriminating evidence. A military spokesman tried to brush off the operation as a means of assuring the communities that their safety was secure. 
This is a region that has suffered through 14 years of near-constant violence, arbitrary arrests, torture and even extra-judicial killings. The high-profile presence of security forces is irritating, disrupting day-to-day life. And now there was Piyawat lashing out at the residents of the two tambon near the scene of the attack, threatening to introduce a new law allowing him to arrest the wives, parents and other relatives 
of anyone he suspected of involvement in the attack on his troops. 
Speaking to reporters off the record, senior soldiers in the region said they could only shake their heads, knowing there already was an Emergency Law on the books that permits the detention of suspects for up to 30 days without legal representation. It also allows for the arrest of family members if sufficient grounds exist.
Tossing out threats is no way to win over the hearts and minds of citizens in a conflict area. It only widens the trust gap between the state and the Malay minorities who form the majority of the population in the three southernmost provinces. 
Piyawat and the policymakers in Bangkok need to understand that counterinsurgency is chiefly political in nature, with military action merely a tool to abet it and to be used sparingly. Perhaps Piyawat is prepared to end all such efforts, since they have accomplished nothing in 14 years. Instead, he should be thinking outside the usual box and abandon the mindset that has trapped the military. What we have in the deep South is a political 
conflict, not some sort of crime wave.
The generals enjoy patting themselves on the back over the dramatic drop in the number of violent incidents in the South compared to a decade ago. But the level of hostility towards the state is as intense as ever and the insurgents are better now at making every attack count. How the state responds is of fundamental importance. 
It is safe to say that citizens in the South – and probably many people in government and the armed forces too – will be happy when Piyawat’s mandatory retirement rolls around in a few days’ time.