Several legislative agendas are scheduled to commence debate on the mending of fences next year, but the effort of ending political animosity might backfire and deepen divisions. And if Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra continues being coy about spearheading reconciliation, her government might end up being plagued by instability next year.
Yingluck is obliged to project decisiveness in steering the reconciliation process, otherwise her opponents will only hijack the fence-mending debate and turn it into a bashing campaign against her brother Thaksin.
In order to bring about reconciliation, the government must frame the debate so it focuses on closing the political divide. As long as the push for mending fences is seen as a pretext to bring Thaksin back, the political turmoil will intensify rather than dissipate.
Yingluck is understandably trying to avoid a conflict of interest when commenting on issues involving her brother. But her vague stance is fuelling suspicions of there being an ulterior motive behind the push for reconciliation. This is, in turn, is being exploited by the anti-Thaksin camp to drive a deeper wedge in society.
In South Africa, reconciliation could only be achieved after the advocates of racism repented and brought apartheid to an end.
Among the Thai politicians, reconciliation has become a catch phrase for political opportunism rather than a genuine attempt to heal the rift.
Though all sides agree that a political malady exists, they continue bickering about what the malady is and how it can be fixed.
Both pro- and anti-Thaksin camps are poles apart on their version of the term reconciliation. The rivalling camps have deeply entrenched views, attaching the country’s political future to the fate of one man.
Thaksin’s supporters believe that the political landscape will continue being mired by injustice if the former PM is not completely vindicated. His opponents, on the other hand, believe that politics can never be back on course until Thaksin starts serving his two-year jail term.
Both sides are refusing to swallow their pride for the sake of a greater good.
In 2007, street protests erupted to derail the charter rewrite spearheaded by the governments of Samak Sundaravej and Somchai Wongsawat.
Next year, Pheu Thai Party and red-shirt allies are slated to activate the process of amending the charter, which they claim holds the key for reconciliation. However, the yellow shirts and their splinter groups are already preparing to block the charter amendments, which they see as a pretext to absolve Thaksin of his conviction.
Yingluck should be careful about how she treads the stormy waters of the legislative debate on charter rewrite. Her predecessors, Samak Sundaravej and Somchai Wongsawat, had opted for a hands-off approach, allowing the then-People Power Party to dominate the rewrite and leave the opposition Democrat Party out in the cold.
The end result was an eruption of violence because the charter debate had spiralled out of control.
The Democrat-led government under Abhisit Vejjajiva had witnessed political disturbances and much bloodshed in 2009 and 2010 brought on by the wrath of the red shirts. Abhisit tried but failed to push for reconciliation because he kept the Pheu Thai Party on the sidelines.
Past efforts on reconciliation have failed because those in power had opted for a unilateral approach. If fences are to be mended, then those on either side of the fence should take a bipartisan approach. Yingluck is about to face the tough challenge of steering all sides toward making a concerted effort toward reconciliation. If she fails, she might see her early downfall.