CDC's dilemma: How powerful should our leader be?

There are supporters and detractors for both suggestions. One side wants a government to be strong while the other does not want a government that is “too strong”.
One side backs the idea of complete power separation between the administrative and legislative branches – MPs could not become cabinet members, the prime minister could not dissolve the House, and lawmakers could not censure government ministers, among other proposals.
For proponents of this idea, it would make it easier to scrutinise the administration. But its detractors believe such a complete separation of powers would make it impossible for the legislature to examine the administration closely.
In fact, direct or indirect election of a prime minister is not the essence of this matter. Both ways have their strengths and weaknesses. Something more important than acquiring a government head is the scope of the PM’s duties, power and responsibilities, as well as the framework for scrutinising the PM’s use of authority.
Many of those who want direct election of the prime minister and cabinet members desire a government head with decisive and complete power who is able to run the country more independently than before. This kind of expectation is no different from that of people in countries where voters elect the top government leader.
However, direct election of the prime minister would be useless if the new constitution limited the power of the government leader – for example, if the PM were to be prohibited from keeping certain election promises or transferring senior bureaucrats. Despite massive backing from voters, such a PM would end up being unable to do anything much while in office.
With complete separation of power, it would be more difficult for the legislature to scrutinise the PM’s use of authority. It is likely the majority of MPs in the House of Representatives would be from the same political party as the government head. Also, with complete separation of the administrative and legislative branches, the PM would barely have any responsibility towards Parliament. He or she would be unable to dissolve the House even when there was a political vacuum, such as a crippling conflict between the government and Parliament.
Therefore, the idea of complete separation of powers is likely to lead to either a directly elected PM who is much more powerful or a government that is largely paralysed.
The question is: Will there really be direct election of a PM and complete separation of powers between the administrative and legislative branches?
The recent coup and many ideas for drafting a new constitution seem to derive from fear of certain types of politician who have strong charisma and could win a widespread following. Direct election of a PM would certainly lead to more of such a breed of politicians. Such politicians can attract much support and also spawn controversies that lead to opposition from people who disagree with them. That scenario could bring about conflict between their supporters and detractors.
This is something the people involved with drafting the new constitution should take into consideration. Clauses about the government head should be carefully written, as they could lead to further progress for the country’s politics, or a new round of conflict.