Can Burma transition as well as Indonesia did?

MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 05, 2011
Can Burma transition as well as Indonesia did?

Comparisons are often made between Indonesia and Burma; two Southeast Asian nations where the militarisation of politics, democracy struggles, their achievements and transitional phases, have defined their people's recent histories.

Burma's former military regime; the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), was renamed from the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) in 1997, and is said to have copied Suharto's "New Order" regime that guaranteed the dual role of the Indonesian army in politics and security affairs. SLORC initiated the writing of a constitution in January 1993 that was completed by the SPDC in May 2008 with a sham referendum in the wake of Cyclone Nargis. It has become known as the "2008 Constitution" and can be seen to reflect Suharto and his New Order regime.

The Burmese version of the Suharto-era Golka Party, the Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA), was first created a few months after the constitution drafting process started in 1993. The USDA was renamed the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) in mid-2010, months before the general election in November of the same year, conducted under the 2008 Constitution and, according to many, with a healthy dose of cheating. General Thein Sein, Prime Minister of the SPDC was a candidate for the USDP and has now been elected to the presidency.

While many are very critical about the 2008 Constitution, the 2010 election and its outcomes, and the government of President Thein Sein, some argue that these are inevitable steps in a gradual democratic transition.

Despite many critics lacking faith in President Thein Sein's ability to initiate democratic transition, the developments witnessed lately on his initiatives have raised eyebrows. These initiatives include formal talks between opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi and government ministers;  changes in the attitude of the government toward the media, which included the first ever lively and fairly transparent government press conference in Naypyidaw; and public announcements in the newspapers offering peace talks with armed ethnic groups, even if these were met with scepticism.

During the historic meeting between the president and the ever iconic Aung San Suu Kyi, both parties expressed satisfaction which could not help but cast a warm PR glow onto the news pages. Lastly, but by no means least, there was the visit of Tomas Ojea Quintana, the UN special rapporteur on human rights on Burma, and his meetings with high-ranking government officials and Aung San Suu Kyi. He had previously been barred from the country for his frank call for the creation of a commission of inquiry into the numerous serious human rights violations in Burma. Furthermore, the president in his speech to the parliament on August 22 vowed that his government would reach out to the opposition. After all, even Aung San Suu Kyi's political visit to Pegu, a town north of Rangoon, was followed and escorted by government security forces instead of being attacked by them, as was the case in 2003.

Whilst these developments are received cautiously by many observers, it seems unlikely that the president is doing all this just for PR purposes. One hopes it would be too much for any PR campaign. Many people, including Aung San Suu Kyi and her party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), view these as positive developments that could be the beginning of a long-awaited transition.

These developments once again remind one that a major transition took place in Indonesia under the presidency of Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie. Once seen as Suharto's subordinate and merely an engineer rather than a decisive politician, Habibie surprised the world by introducing aggressive initiatives that made a dramatic transition to democracy possible.

The initiatives included, but were not limited to: East Timor's referendum on independence; the introduction of three new political laws - the Law on Political Partyies, the Law on General Elections and the Law on the Structure and Position of Parliament - which collectively paved the way for the 1999 democratic general election, the first in the country since 1955.

The successful holding of a free and fair general election and the transfer of power to democratically elected leaders in 1999 was a clear indicator that the most important steps of democratic transition in Indonesia occurred during the presidency of BJ Habibie in less than two years between 1998 and 1999.

In Burma, U Thein Sein became president via a controversial election, while BJ Habibie was sworn in by his mentor, Suharto, in May 1998. But both are considered the nominees or heirs of outgoing strongmen.

It is natural then, that one of the major tasks of the successor is to safeguard the legacy and ill-gotten gains of the mentor. Habibie, however, strikingly had the courage to diverge from his mentor. An investigation into alleged corruption by Suharto was initiated in late 1998, and it later put Suharto on trial. If Habibie was being controlled by Suharto during the critical period of 1998 to 1999, then Indonesia's transition would have been a very different story.

Despite such a record as a transitional leader, Habibie himself failed to stay in power. Some still saw him as being too close to their bitter memory of the Western-backed dictator Suharto. People perceived Habibie's initiatives for transition emanating not from a sincere conviction, rather because of pressures from activists and the public. In addition, a majority of law-makers lost confidence in him largely because of his policy on East Timor. But Habibie, to his credit, never tried to extend his grip on power beyond his mandate.

One of the most important factors contributing to the success of the transition under the presidency of Habibie was the divergence of the Indonesian army (TNI) from the Suharto family and politics. The TNI itself went trough a reform programme that greatly benefitted the orderly transition in Indonesia.

Lately, it has not escaped conjecture to wonder if President Thein Sein could be Burma's Mikhail Gorbachev, the Soviet leader who introduced Glasnost (openness) and Perestroika (restructuring) in the late 1980s. President Thein Sein's initiatives mentioned above may be considered the beginning of Glasnost despite the fact that other initiatives that could be considered Perestroika are yet to come.

President Thein Sein is widely believed to be one of the more humble and clean elements from the previous regime in the current government. But despite that, he may still be heavily influenced by his mentor, Senior General Than Shwe. The description "yes man" has been used to describe the protege. But he could also be compared to former Indonesian president Habibie, as the two countries have been compared for some time.

If Thein Sein is to become Burma's equivalent of BJ Habibie for introducing initiatives to pave the way for a democratic transition, two additional but very important conditions should be met in order to make Burma's transition successful: First, President Thein Sein must have the courage to walk his own walk and diverge from his mentor, Than Shwe. Second, Burma's army; the Tatmadaw, must learn lessons from the TNI on how to contribute to and cope with democratic transition.

Khin Maung Win is deputy director of the Democratic Voice of Burma, expressing his personal views.