Decoding Chinese diplomacy

The visit was productive because the two countries signed eight agreements including on dry port management on the Nepal-China border, the establishment of a training academy for the Nepalese police, and an agreement on assistance to Nepal worth US$750 million.

The visit of the Chinese premier marks another significant turn in expediting Nepal-China relations. While the foreign policy pundits were debating whether to call Premier Wen’s visit a “stopover” or a state visit, they failed to read underlying dynamics.

We have long been so obsessed with the Tibet factor that we choose not to see beyond. Of the four Ts that dominate China’s global engagement – Tibet, Taiwan, Tiananmen and Trade – Nepal fits into China’s strategic calculus due to its proximity to Tibet. From a request to extend rail connectivity from Lhasa to Lumbini, to constructing an outer ring road in Kathmandu, and seeking Beijing’s assistance to minimise Nepal’s trade deficit, our demands have been endless.

The question of whether the China-Nepal relationship is solely concentrated on Tibet, however, needs some attention. Tibet certainly is the centrepiece, but the appendages to a thriving China-Nepal relationship are gaining momentum. China’s recent drive for closer relations with Nepal, therefore, needs to be studied through two lenses: Nepal’s volatile transition and China’s global foreign policy.

Historically, China has followed a low-risk, pro-establishment policy in Nepal. Since the announcement of a republic and the Maoists emerging as the largest party, China is treading more cautiously. Because of its policy consistency, China has managed to build public opinion as a friendly neighbour and a remarkably attractive alternative to India. Still, with the drawn-out political transition, a vacuum has formed. At the moment, the international presence in Nepal is on the rise, while security lapses are rampant. The massive presence of Americans, Europeans and others rings alarm bells in Beijing.

Further, for China to triumph as the sole power in Asia, it needs a solid footing in South Asia that can balance the age-old Indian hegemony. With a strong naval presence in other South Asian countries encircling India, the so-called “string of pearls”, inroads into Nepal would complete China’s stake in South Asia.

Globally, despite its meteoric growth, China has its problems. It is finding it hard to balance Iran’s interests (from which it imports large amounts of oil) with that of the Western countries seeking stricter sanctions against Iran. Burma, a stable ally, recently cancelled the China-backed Myitsone Dam project. China has had spats with India over visas for Kashmiri residents, and on the Korean Peninsula for failing to condemn the North for attacking South Korea. In short, China’s neighbourhood diplomacy is going through a rocky phase.

This highlights, in China’s peripheral diplomacy, the increased importance of maintaining cordial relations with Nepal. With old partners falling out, a closer relationship with Nepal is important to the Chinese. This could be one reason why the premier decided on a Nepal visit despite restricting it to a four-hour layover en route to the Gulf. His gains is more salient as it also precedes the Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s proposed visit.

Nepal can capitalise on China’s neighbourhood needs by being a friend in need and not letting her soil be used for anti-China activities.