Can Burma live up to the world's great expectations?

In late 2005, the administrative capital of Burma was moved from Rangoon to Naypyidaw, a newly constructed city made for the sole purpose of government. There was a sense that the Burmese military government wanted to get away from all the criticism that it was receiving from the international community, thus the decision to move away from the crowded port city of Rangoon and into a more remote area located in the centre of the country. Some analysis thought that strategy had a lot to do with the decision, while some locals believed that astrology had played a role in the decision-making process.

But the fact of the matter is, to this day nobody really knows why the government moved – lock, stock and barrel – unless, of course, one wants to believe the official explanation about the need for more breathing space so that government agencies and ministries could expand. Although in a way, this also makes a lot of sense.

But all the while, foreign embassies had to stay put in Rangoon. And when they asked about the need to communicate with government agencies during the move to the new capital, Burma’s Foreign Ministry replied: “If you need to communicate on urgent matters, you can send a fax to Pyinmana,” using the name of a logging town near the new capital that was being built at the time.

This is Burma, where sometimes the answer to your question can be blunt, and sometimes so mysterious as to leave you dumbfounded.

The burning question at this point in time, of course, is whether any of the current reforms being pushed forward by the new “civilian” administration are irreversible?

Nobody in their right mind really believes that the half-baked “democratically” elected government of Prime Minister Thein Sein is free from the grip of hardline military officers, both retired and active.

On the surface, it seems that the government is saying and doing the right things for international observers. Reformist fervour seems to have taken hold in some quarters, while others are still taking the government to task. And while the Burmese authorities are no longer responding with “send a fax” to the questions and concerns of the international community, one can’t ignore the fact that the government’s capabilities remain extremely limited.

Burma had been ruled by the military for the past four decades, until the nominally “democratic” election last year, in which the outcome was basically predetermined, as the military effectively cemented its place in politics via its civilian political party.

Burma has a strong and vicious military. But its state apparatus is weak because it is unable to provide basic goods and services to people throughout the country. In fact, the state doesn’t have full control of the country. Pockets of territory along the borders with Thailand, China and India are controlled by armed ethnic groups, most of whom have sporadic ceasefire agreements with the central government.

Given the current economic and military situation, there is a real concern that the Burmese government will not be able to deliver on reform promises. At the same time, there is acknowledgement among seasoned observers that none of the current reform initiatives are irreversible.

So how does one move forward in Burma? Answer: very carefully. Prime Minister Thein Sein is a battle-hardened military man who understands very well how to negotiate. Unlike the frivolous Thai ministers and political leaders who go to Burma with one eye set on concessions for their cronies, for the Burmese leaders, negotiation is a matter of life and death; it’s a matter of regime survival.

No one is telling Thein Sein that he has to go. But the combat veteran should know that if he wants the things the West can offer – normalisation of diplomatic ties, the lifting of trade embargos – he is going to have to meet the world halfway. This means more reforms, the release of all political prisoners and an end to human rights abuses against political opponents and the ethnic groups.