Southern crisis: the worse is yet to come

For him the stake is extremely high because the outcome will directly impact on his career’s sustainability, institutional stabilities and national political profile which is currently under the control of Pheu Thai Party with Yingluck Shinawatra as the country’s prime minister. Obviously, the general rapport between the army and the Yingluck government would be the major determinant of how these situations would play themselves out during Prayuth’s remaining two years.

At the press conference, he literally laid out all the frustration and structural problems the Thai army has been facing in keeping peace in the South. He lamented the sense of apathy among the public, lack of coordination among government agencies, lack of legislative supports essential to efficient counter-insurgency strategies. Interesting, he had not made such complaints under the previous government due to his excellent relations with former prime minister Abhisit Vejjajiva both at the personal and policy level. The Southerners are known for their unwavering supporters of Democrat Party, in particular the Chinese and Thai Buddhists. After the Tak Bai massacre in October, 2004, the Thai-Malay voters dumped the Wadah group – a prominent Thai-Muslim political group set up in 1988 – closely associated with Thaksin Shinawatra. Since then, none of them won a seat in the deep South. Apparently the ruling Pheu Thai Party intends to turn around this unfavourable situation.

That helps to explain why the containment of conflicts during 2009-11 was working allowing the government to claim some success. The trust has increased between the Malays and the Thai state at the time however it has not impacted on the insurgency and the state of violence there. More attacks were targeting urban areas with car combs even though they were less frequent. The revival of the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre was also put into place once again under the Abhisit government as well as the new structure of Internal Security Operations Command. This allows both development and security works – essential to the strategy of winning heart and mind – to go hands in hands. Indeed, through this strategy, political means have taken precedent. However, with more senior non-military officials manning the SPBAC, inevitably it has caused coordination problems with the security-oriented ISOC headed by the Fourth Region’s Army commander in chief and other security agencies.

In order to circumvent this problem, the Yingluck government decided to establish the Operation Centre for Solving Problems in the Southern provinces under the care of three deputy prime ministers to cover five major tasks on security affairs, developments, administration of justice, human rights and government-civilian relations. At first glance, the Yingluck government’s decision to set up this new centre makes sense for two reasons. First of all, it will throw everything back to the purviews of security-first approach to counter the increasing attacks. Secondly, it is to ensure there are sufficient levels of coordinating policies and cooperation among various agencies in security and civilian sectors. It was clear that Thaksin Shinawatra is behind this idea as he said over the weekend he was looking into the issue. However, upon close scrutiny, the new guidelines would backfire in the long-run because it would increase the bureaucratic red tapes and lethargy in government’s responses to the conflicts and threats of violence. Prior to this, the deep South was under the Special Provinces Administrative Centre Act (2010) which gives the civilians the authorities to run day-to-day affairs. The ISOC has also its own guidelines.

At the moment, a total of 17 ministries with 66 government agencies are involved in restoring peace in the southern Thailand. As the nerve centre some 1,000 kilometres away, it would not be able to respond as quick as possible and could result in creating a sense of disconnectedness among operatives on the ground. This could encourage further violence in urban areas rather in conflicting zones, where police and civilian works are involved. As in the previous six months, there have been heavy tolls on the civilians – nearly 421 deaths. If the past is any judge, when the military was in good terms with the government in power, the soldiers are able to prevent attacks because of the better coordination on the ground among various agencies with shared intelligence. 

Prayuth also shed some light at the press conference stating unequivocally that violence today was committed by the fellow Thais only, regardless of their religions. Most problematic ones are dual nationalities who seek sanctuary across border. They are just a small group of people, he pointed out, with their own conflicts stemming from criminal activities, drug trafficking, illegal migrant workers, politics, personal conflicts as well as disputed land ownerships. 

At the moment, the Thai army has deployed 60,000 troops including police, border patrol, rangers, defence volunteers to oversee security in the South. In fact, the army chief reiterated that only three thousands special trained soldiers would be sufficient to keep the troublemakers in check. However, the reality in the South dictates otherwise. Albeit the numbers, unlike the army of yesteryears, the Thai soldiers today, he reiterated, have to observe strict rule of engagement and are operating with many restrictions. In acknowledgement of international norms, Prayuth has previously mentioned the international humanitarian law and the principle of responsibility to protect, much to chagrins of his contemporaries. He is also acutely aware that the international community, especially human rights organisation, is watching the Thai army, which has a notorious history of staging coups inside the country.

According to the Deep South Watch’s statistics, from January 2004-July 2012 there were 11,754 attacks, killing 5,206 and wounding 9,137 persons. Since the violence broke out, the government spent a total of Bt160 billion or average Bt16 billion per month to quell down the southern violence. It must be pointed out that the budget under the Abhisit government was slashed for two consecutive years. This year’s budget for the restive South under the Yingluck government increased 25 per cent from Bt16.2 billion last year to the current Bt20.7 billion this year. Some of the increased budget has been used by the SBPAC Secretary General Pol Col Thavee Sodsong to prevent further new recruitments among the youth into insurgency and provide financial assistance to thousands of local small entrepreneurs, who used to depend on their underground networks in Malaysia, and cash payments to victims.

It is unfortunate that the future of conflict looks grim as interested parties at all levels still could not find common grounds. Changes of mind-set of concerned officials are imperative and serious administration of justice must prevail – nearly 80 per cent of the alleged cases were eventually acquitted. At this juncture, disagreement among stakeholders could derail efforts to build lasting peace and implement useful local development projects. Most importantly, the Yingluck government has yet to assure the Thais that the situation in Southern Thailand would not be used to shore up for its own political support and undermine the opponents at the expense of national interests. While political parties have shown some restraints for the time being, the Southern crisis could quickly be politicized when opportunities arise.