Barking up the wrong tree in the deep South

Of all people, it was Deputy Prime Minister Chalerm Yoobamrung who proposed that governors in the three southernmost provinces be locally elected. He believes that elected governors can better deal with the ongoing insurgency in this restive region that has claimed more than 5,000 lives since January 2004.

According to Chalerm, the elected governors of the three provinces – Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat – would have some degree of autonomy, like those of Bangkok and Pattaya. Sovereignty, of course, would still reside with the Thai state. 

In line with the principle of decentralisation, the idea sounds positive. The logic goes like this: if the local people, nearly 90 per cent of whom are Malay Muslims, can have a bigger say in charting their own destination, separatist violence would have no justification. 

But if that is all there is to it, one should ask why the government took so long to come up with this idea. 

Then again, if the historical relationship between the deep South and the Thai state tells us anything, nothing comes easy. The historical mistrust between the two sides is so deep that any simple textbook answer to the conflict is likely to fail.

Chalerm tossed out a similar idea about autonomy for the restive region about a year ago, but had to quickly drop it following uproar from the conservative elements in his political camp. Just days ago the same idea was revived. The manner in which it was introduced was not much different from last time. 

Again, it was a typical knee-jerk reaction from a senior political leader desperate to come up with something, anything, to give the impression that the government is serious about making a real difference in the troubled region. But unlike last year, those who opposed Chalerm’s proposal are keeping quiet – perhaps realising they have nothing better to offer.

Perhaps Chalerm and the Pheu Thai Party should start with a simple question: Does the Malay Muslim majority really want autonomy? During the general election last year, every political party except the Democrats campaigned on a platform of autonomy for the region. But the people of the deep South rejected the notion. Of 12 parliamentary seats, 11 went to the Democrats and one to the Mathubhumi Party of former coup-maker General Sonthi Boonyaratglin.

To be fair to the Democrat Party, Abhisit Vejjajiva has said in the past that “autonomy” should not be understood in the narrow sense of administrative reform. He argued that one should not overlook the importance of greater cultural, as well as economic, space for the local people.

He has a point. After all, the conflict is essentially rooted in the construct of Thailand’s statehood, which the Malays of Patani feel comes at the expense of their cultural and historical identity. In other words, the two sides embrace a different set of narratives, and it makes no sense to force one to accept the other. What we should be doing is ensuring that the Malays feel less like colonial subjects to the Thai state. 

Moreover, ever since the Tak Bai massacre in October 2004, political figures and parties associated with Thaksin Shinawtra have failed to recover any ground they might have had in the region.

If the history of bilateral ties between Patani and the Thai state tells us anything, it is that the Malays are willing to be part of Thailand, but only on their terms. The Malays of Patani have always resisted assimilation, but that doesn’t mean they won’t accept Thai sovereignty. 

Voter turnout in the region has always been high, thus suggesting that the Muslims there are very much part of the state system.

If last year’s general election is any indication, there are other issues that are more important than locally elected governors and district chiefs. The election results suggest that the Malays are more concerned about social mobility, equality and justice. 

Instead of tossing out ideas that have already been rejected by local people, perhaps the Thai state should work harder at identifying common ground.