Deep South peace talks lead back to square one

Just about everybody insisted that Thaksin was at the meeting - everybody except diehard Pheu Thai executives, whose natural instinct is, first and foremost, to defend and protect their dear leader with all their might, regardless of the facts.

The same quarrel erupted again this past week, and a definite answer is probably nowhere in sight. Pheu Thai big wigs insist that Thaksin did not meet Hasan Taib, the self-proclaimed Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Coordinate's (BRN-C) "liaison" officer", this past week, nor are the two planning to meet in the coming days.

In the March 2012 meeting, separatist leaders talked about how Thaksin fell short of apologising for his heavy handed approch to the southern conflict when he was prime minister. They said he blamed government officials for providing him with false and misleading information that shaped his controversial policy.

It was important for Thaksin to raise that point because the generals who ousted him in the 2006 coup had cited his handling of the deep South as one of the reasons for removing him. The others were corruption and his alleged disrespect to the monarchy.

This time, information about Thaksin's alleged one-on-one meeting with Hasan - who also attended the March 2012 meeting - was sketchy. But sources in the separatist community said it was likely that the two were trying to salvage the "peace process" that was thrown into limbo after Hasan issued a five-point demand that not only violated the term of reference (TOR) signed on February 28 between him and National Security Council chief Lieutenant General Paradon Pattanatabut, but could derail the ongoing process before it has a chance to take off.

Hasan issued the demands on April 26, three days before the second round of talks. Paradon immediately told Hasan that he has until the next meeting, June 13, to prove that he has control over the insurgents on the ground, but did not say what the consequences would be otherwise.

The tit-for-tat continued at the discussion table between the two delegations on April 29. Hasan's camp raised the question of the authorities dropping the hunt for suspected militants, and the Thai side shot back by asking him, sarcastically, to bring together at least 200 wanted insurgents in one single place and the Army will drop the charges.

Paradon also reiterated his previous request for insurgents to scale down attacks. Hasan's reply was that the request has been met, saying insurgents are hitting only security officials.

Speaking to reporters afterward, Paradon admitted that the meeting was tense. But judging from the content, the two sides have yet to move beyond a zero-sum mentality as they try to dominate the discussion by cornering the other side.

On May 1, just two days after their meeting, in an incident that was a big setback to Hasan and his camp, four armed men dressed in black drove up to a grocery store in Pattani's Tambon Rusamilae and killed six Buddhists including a three-year-old boy. To make sure they were dead, the gunmen walked up and fired point blank into the head of each victim.

Officials and some members of the media immediately blamed the insurgents and called on Hasan to condemn the attack and explain it.

It was a blow to Hasan because in his video, the self-proclaimed BRN "liaison" talks about how Thais, Chinese and Malays would be treated equally and justly in a liberated Patani. And so when officials concluded that the Rusamilae killing was carried out by insurgents, the onus was on Hasan.

But strangely, this so-called peace process doesn't seem to have an official spokeman, in spite of the fact that just about every Thai official always has something to say about it.

Over the past decade since this current insurgency surfaced, authorities have blamed just about every violent attack on insurgents. The public accepts the authorities' explanations on face value. But the authorities make no effort to explain the fluidity within the BRN-C command structure and the complex relations between the various camps and organisations. The Patani United Liberation Organisation (Pulo), for example, has three men who claim to be organisation's president.

In fact, many separatist leaders, including BRN-C cadre not affiliated with Hasan, say his "agreement" with Paradon was doomed from the start because he does not have the blessing of the secretive Dewan Pimpinan Party, or DPP, the highest decision-making body of the BRN-C.

From the Thai perspective, they were hoping that a Hasan-led process could generate meaningful traction. But when Hasan was confronted with the ultimatum - to demonstrate that he has some degree of command and control on the ground - he was not able to deliver.

For the sake of continuity, the Thai side is looking for ways to keep this dialogue process alive, with or without Hasan. An effort to identify a new "liaison" may be in the pipeline, say Thai officials working on the NSC-led team. But this time, they will work to ensure that whoever steps up will have the blessing of the BRN-C's DPP.

Regardless of who steps in to fill Hasan's shoes, one thing the Thai side will demand is that the liaison has to demonstrate that he has the ability to influence the insurgents.

Mapping the violence in this highly contested region has always been difficult for academics and officials alike because, as rebel and official sources admit, many of the violent incidents are tit-for-tat in nature and both sides are to blame.

The fact that there is no identifiable spokesman for the separatist movement, the fact that Hasan is not able to speak or account for the insurgents' activties, and the fact that the Thai side has never admitted to the use of death squads and target killings, means that no one will ever really know who carried out the attack on that grocery store in Tambon Rusamilae last Wednesday.

It's tempting to blame the Malay-Muslim insurgents because the victims were Buddhists. This is understandable because of the way the state portrays this conflict, and the way the public understands it - that it's Thai Buddhists versus Malay Muslims.

It's just as tempting to blame the pro-government death squads for incidents such as the Ai Bayae massacre in June 2009 or the Rangae teashop killings in December last year.

One good thing about this so-called peace process that came into being on February 28 is that it places the burden on both sides to address specific incidents that nobody wants to claim.

But if exiled separatist leaders from various groups are to be believed - that there is a generational and operational gap between the exiled leaders and the new generation of militants on the ground, and that there is no adequate command-and-control in place - then the benchmark the Thai side has set for this or any other "liaison" may be unrealistically high. And if the peace process can't move forward or provide some hope that an endgame is somewhere down the road, then the insurgents will continue to do what they do.

Note: For more analysis on the insurgency in Thailand’s southernmost provinces, please visit: http://seasiaconflict.com/