Maritime disputes need not be a zero-sum game

MONDAY, AUGUST 19, 2013
Maritime disputes need not be a zero-sum game

Claimants in the South China Sea cannot agree on what process to adopt to ease tensions; cooperation and compromise are clearly needed to end the impasse

China and and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean), regarded as major regional drivers of economic growth, will not be able to resolve ongoing territorial disputes in the South China Sea without political will and brave decision-making.
The foreign ministers of Asean members and China will gather next week in Beijing to commemorate the 10th anniversary of their strategic partnership, but ceremonial summits alone will not alter the current state of affairs in the region. 
The meeting, from August 28-30, will also give the Asean ministers a chance to discuss the Chinese “high-speed train”, which promises to bring many economic and social changes to both China and its neighbours as the 21st century progresses. 
However, the old problem of maritime disputes casts a dark shadow, and will do so for a long time to come unless the concerned parties decide on sensible ways to defuse the tension.
The Asean foreign ministers made clear during a retreat in Hua Hin last week that they will unite to push for a code of conduct governing good practice in the South China Sea. This will be essential, they say, in bringing permanent peace and stability to troubled waters. The Asean ministers want to see an early conclusion of the code of conduct and, most importantly, give it real teeth so that it is not simply a paper tiger.
 Asean and China have so far agreed on a Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC), which was signed in Phnom Penh on November 4, 2002. But this is a non-binding document that has no teeth to enforce rulings on maritime claims and disputes. 
Some Asean members like the Philippines have sought to establish an international tribunal to end the problem, since Manila has so far found no effective regional mechanism to address its issues with China. 
The situation remains tense as some Asean members begin to put more faith in an increased US presence in the region to counter-balance the rising power of China.
Of course, the Philippines and other Asean members have the right to seek their own solutions to territorial disputes, but that would not be good for either the regional grouping or China, as it might effect overall relations between the two. If individual Asean members see fit to employ their own means, Asean and its regional diplomatic instruments become meaningless. China would then be pushed in the opposite direction, and this could jeopardise other cooperation agreements that Beijing has with Asean.
To be precise, the meeting this month should allocate more time to discussion of the code of conduct, setting out clear directions for formal consultations between senior officials of Asean and China, to be held in mid-September, also in China.
Senior officials hope the September meeting will lead to implementation of the DOC. Asean wants the meeting to be a serious discussion on the essence of the code, but China might not be in a rush to conclude anything just yet.
Early adoption of the code – as some Asean members would like – might not quickly solve problems for the Philippines and Vietnam in particular disputed areas. But the earlier it is adopted, the better – to prevent future conflict in the region’s seas.