Thailand as China coordinator: So far so good

Thailand began its three-year responsibility in July 2012 when Asean-China ties were at their lowest ebb. During the past 18 months, Thailand succeeded in generating an environment conducive to further negotiations regarding the code of conduct (COC) in the South China Sea.

The current atmosphere has given rise to a new level of confidence for conflicting parties such as Vietnam and Brunei to take up cooperative projects with China. Despite such progress, the COC process will take time and proceed “step by step”, and through “consensus.”

Thailand faces a huge dilemma pursuing a diplomatic course without harming its reputation and ties with China as well as towards Asean. The current task has become even more challenging given the volatile political situation the Yingluck government finds itself in these days.

From the first day as a coordinator, Thailand wanted to be the lifesaver of Asean-China relations. Thai policy-makers at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs adopted the so-called “three Cs” strategy – community-building, connectivity and code of conduct – to engage China.

The first strategy zeroes in on China’s role in community-building within Asean. The grouping needs a peaceful regional environment for its economic development and integration. Like other Asean members, Thailand wants China to contribute to the integration of a 620-million-strong community. China’s fast economic growth, even though slowing down at the moment, is still crucial to the region’s economic development. Both sides share the common dream of stability and prosperity. 

The second strategy is focused on Asean Connectivity – the biggest long-term project since its inception in 1967. The region-wide connectivity will require huge investment from within and abroad. China was first to express strong support for the connectivity blueprints with comprehensive plans and financial packages. China offered to help Thailand in constructing a high-speed train linking key cities and connecting Northeast Thailand with Laos and Southwest China.

The third strategy is all about the COC process for the South China Sea. This will be a litmus test to determine if Thailand has all it takes to manage this important issue. Thailand hopes to make “substantial progress” in the COC process with China, although it is still too early to say what would constitute such progress, especially in the eyes of conflicting parties.

To get the ball rolling, Thailand was first to put forward two proposals – one on maritime-environment conservation, and one on studies of tuna stock in the South China Sea, at a cost of US$1.5 million (Bt47.7 million). China has allocated $500 million (3 billion yuan) as part of the China-Asean Maritime Cooperation Fund, which would be used to support proposals related to research and protection projects, off-shore search-and-rescue, as well as navigation safety between China and Asean. These proposals, Thailand hopes, would serve as a confidence-building measure and encourage other Asean members to submit their ideas.

The Yingluck government sees the coordinating role as a good opportunity to highlight the country’s diplomatic finesse in bridging the gap and differences among Asean countries with China, while at the same time utilising the outcome to promote cooperation with China.

There are three reasons for such optimism: 

First, as a country that is not party to the dispute in the South China Sea, Thailand perceives its role as a “non-provoking” and “neutral” player. This condition distinguishes Thailand from its predecessors. Up until today, China was still impressed with the coordinating country, Malaysia, for promoting in the early 1990s Asean-China friendship and the East Asia economic community. Li praised Thailand’s “leading and exemplary role” in Asean-China relations when he met Yingluck recently.

Second, Thailand believes it can serve as a genuine “interlocutor” as originally intended when the coordinating-country role was created to facilitate bilateral ties between Asean and dialogue partners. Thailand has already approached Asean-China relations as a multidimensional entity without isolating any conflict or inconvenience. Bangkok is quite aware that the South China Sea issue has dominated headlines since 2010, pitching Asean against China. Thailand wants a cooler version of their relationship.

Third, as a country with a long history of friendly ties with China, Thailand is confident in creating and sustaining a sufficient “comfort level” and “mutual trust” to allow both sides to conclude the COC at the earliest timeframe. Given the importance China attached to Thailand as well as the growing interconnectedness between lower China and mainland Southeast Asia, Bangkok believes it has some bargaining power vis-a-vis China. 

In relation to the South China Sea dispute, it remains to be seen how China would put into practice its new approach, called peripheral diplomacy, which gives priorities to neighbouring countries, including Asean, in creating a stable and secure environment for economic growth and social development.