Deep South peace process an empty game of numbers

Deputy Prime Minister Pracha Promnog, in charge of national security, told reporters earlier this month the two groups were the Pattani United Liberation Organisation (Pulo) and the Barisan Islam Pembebasan Patani (BIPP).

Pracha said he had been informed by phone of the development by Dato Ahmad Zamzamin Hasim, the retired intelligence chief designated official pace-talks mediator by the Malaysian government. 

No one knows precisely what was said during the phone call between Pracha and Zamzamin. But, in the typical style of a senior Thai government official, Pracha failed to put things in perspective with his statement. 

It could be that Pracha neglected to provide the context on purpose, fearing it would raise questions he would not want to answer. Thailand has so far struggled to show its citizens and the wider world that the process it jump-started on February 28 is moving in the right direction. The simpler the explanation, the better, Pracha probably thought. 

The Thai government’s thinking has always followed the shallow notion that the more people at the table, the better the chances for peace. 

Bangkok insists it has the blessing of the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), the group that has the best working relations with the deep South insurgents. 

But the so-called leaders that were introduced on February 28 failed to generate any meaningful traction for the peace process, largely because they don’t have influence over the insurgents on the ground or the support of the core BRN leaders, who have so far chosen to stay out of the public spotlight. 

BRN operatives behind the scenes say these so-called leaders are nothing more than go-betweens who hold no real power in the BRN inner circle. 

As for the participation of the Pulo, Pracha failed to explain to the public that three different people claim to be the group’s president. 

The faction under the directive of Noor Abdulrahman (also known as Abae Kamae) arrived at the negotiating table almost immediately after the February 28 launch.

The second faction, under the directive of Sweden-based Kasturi Mahkota, has been trying hard to get an invitation to the talks. Kasturi’s message to the media has been that unless the peace talks are inclusive, his Pulo faction will continue with its military and diplomatic assaults on Thailand. Kasturi and Abae Kamae were part of the same outfit until a bitter split in late 2011.

Samsudine Khan’s faction of Pulo, on the other hand, continues to boycott the ongoing peace process. When a team of senior military and civilian officials visited Sweden at the end of August to sound out Kasturi and others, it was completely shunned by Samsudine.

As for the other prospective peace-talk participants, sources within the BIPP say its executive committee is not endorsing the ongoing negotiations and has told its members to leave the organisation if they want to take part. And so they dug up the group’s old name – BNPP, or Barisan Nasional Pembebasan Patani – and went with it.

Because of bickering and differences among the leaders of these long-standing groups, observers and officials are joking that Zamzamin might have to revise his job description to include mediating disputes between various separatist outfits.  

BRN operatives said Thailand took a big leap of faith when it launched the talks with mere go-betweens, presenting them as leaders who could actually change the course of the deep South insurgency. Nine months later people are still debating whether these go-betweens have any influence with the insurgents on the ground.

Nevertheless, BRN sources say its core leaders are willing to talk peace with the Thais, but only if its done properly – meaning no public relations stunts and without the presence of Malaysia, at least not at this point in time. 

BRN leaders want a guarantee that Kuala Lumpur will not deport them or members of their political wing should they surface.  

Senior BRN operatives and other leaders who sat out of the February 28 initiative say they couldn’t careless who comes to the table because all but a few of the participants have nothing much to lose. 

One exiled BRN leader, who spoke on condition of anonymity, summed up the situation: The people talking to Thai officials and representatives don’t have any influence on the ground, while those who can influence the situation are not prepared to surface because they don’t see a coherent peace process. 

Instead of looking for more participants, Bangkok should focus on creating a coherent peace process. 

In the meantime, the BRN leadership is taking a wait-and-see approach, waiting for Bangkok to convince them that Thailand is serious about peace. 

But if Bangkok can’t even agree to give the BRN’s political wing immunity from prosecution, its operatives ask, how can the group expect any serious commitment or concessions in the peace process from Thailand?