Challenges of a military-dominated Cabinet

The “Prayuth One” Cabinet faces the same basic tests that most of its military-installed predecessors flunked. 

Yet the challenges are even tougher for the current government because of the circumstances that led to its formation. Never have the Thai people been so divided. And never have expectations been so high in the wake of a military takeover.

The first challenge is the issue of freedom of expression. This one is glaring because matters related to how freely citizens can speak out against their governments often draw international attention. It doesn’t mean it’s the biggest challenge, though – the survival of a “dictatorial” government depends on many other factors, primarily whether that government is corrupt or not.

Which brings us to one of the two biggest challenges that the Prayuth Cabinet faces. It must overcome the very thing that destroyed the credibility of many previous military-installed governments – the lure of corruption. General Prayuth Chan-ocha, the prime minister and leader of the National Council for Peace and Order, sounds like he understands the importance of transparency and honesty, having repeatedly warned officials that he will not tolerate any graft scandals. But the historical trend is not in his favour.

He needs to guard against personal greed, and not just his own but also that of the many others he has brought into the potentially lucrative political mechanism. There will be close scrutiny, despite the limits on freedom of information and expression.

The other biggest challenge is the economy. Soldiers may be good at “quick fixes” – like snuffing the threat of civil war or getting emergency aid to those in need – but running the economy is an entirely different ballgame. There are a few respectable and reassuringly capable figures in or around the interim government, but if the economy turns sour, the public will be far less forgiving than it would be under a democratic system.

The next challenge is to perform efficiently, and not just on the economic front. There is the narcotics-trade problem, the traffic snarls, the deep South insurgency, the imminent launch of the Asean free market, domestic and immigrant labour issues, the comparatively poor performance of Thai students, and the list goes on. The government’s “interim” status can hardly be used as an excuse, because how well or poorly it performs will be closely linked to the credibility of the political reform that Prayuth has pledged to deliver.

The last major challenge of the Prayuth One Cabinet is to provide an atmosphere conducive to that reform process. 

For the doubt-beset process to be credible and sustained, the Cabinet will have to do all of the above. It must not give in to corruption. It must run the economy well. It must handle other pressing issues efficiently. And it must allow a reasonably free and relaxed political environment.

Critics have mocked the Cabinet’s “powers”, saying the interim charter gives the NCPO the right to veto government policies. Again, that cannot be used as an excuse for a weak or inefficient administration. On the contrary, the fact that the interim government and the NCPO are closely linked will be used as ammunition to attack them both if things turn bad. If this government fails, it will simply mean the NCPO has failed too.

There is no room for error. Prayuth must have realised this when he decided to stage the coup in May. However, there are more dangers in the minefield of Thai political realities than meet the eye, and if the task looked very daunting then, it must seem a lot more so now.