Control and command mentality will undermine reform

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 20, 2014
Control and command mentality will undermine reform

If the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) and the Prayut government think "control and command" is the name of the game when it comes to dealing with the media and academics, then the reform process is bound to fail even before the National Refor

It’s not clear who gave the instruction for military officers to try last week to halt a “town hall-meeting style” TV programme on public broadcasting’s Thai PBS station. But the consequence is bound to be disastrous for the powers-that-be in general, and Premier Prayut Chan-o-cha in particular. Unless he comes up with a more acceptable mode of dealing with those trying to perform their professional duties, “Strongman Tu” will find his mission to put the country on the track of “sustainable democracy” subverted by his own men from the outset.
The military officers assigned to rein in the media and academics have tried to adopt a “soft approach” but when push comes to shove, it’s the substance and not the form that really matters. Whether they call it a “request for cooperation” or “polite persuasion”, the move to halt a TV programme or an academic seminar on political issues will inevitably be seen as a threat to the freedom of expression.
The NCPO doesn’t seem to be able to distinguish professional “freedom of expression” from “deliberate provocation to create disorder”. The officers assigned to oversee possible anti-establishment activities seem to have considered every utterance that doesn’t fit the Army’s thinking an offence that needs to be checked, restrained and blocked.
General Prayut has consistently sought “cooperation and understanding” from those who may not agree with him or his approach. He doesn’t appear to be a tolerant leader when it comes to listening to opposing views. But he has at least shown a certain degree of acceptance that there are alternative paths to achieve the goal of returning the country to a democratic system.
He has repeatedly called for “democracy, Thai style”, whatever that means in practice. But any attempt to reform the country’s political system to avoid past mistakes and overcome a decade of conflict will have to be “inclusive”, meaning that he will have to embrace ideas from all sides. That obviously means that divergent views will be aired – and the NCPO doesn’t have a monopoly on the best ways to accomplish this mission.
This is why the role of a free and responsible media is so crucial to the success of the reform process. General Prayut has sparred with reporters. He has shown his tough side, yet also demonstrated his ability to be flexible over controversial issues. But he has yet to design and adopt a communication system whereby the majority of the people can feel and act as part of the process. Those who don’t necessarily agree with everything he says believe they are being threatened under an “atmosphere of fear”.
Harassment, fear and frustration can’t promote cooperation and understanding. Once the 250-member NRC gets off the ground, heated debate and vibrant deliberations will be the order of the day. And the NCPO will have to live with the hard, cold fact that unless the “reformers” are given a free hand to arrive at their proposed constitution draft – and the whole country is encouraged to express their views – the reform process will be a farce – which means the very rationale cited for the May 22 coup would
be undermined from the very beginning.
NCPO Orders No 97 and 103, which place stringent controls over the work of the mass media, will have to be lifted if General Prayut wants to go down into history as someone who was willing to undertake a great risk to save the country from ruin. He will have to consider press freedom and freedom of expression in general partners – not foes—in the pursuit of national reform, reconciliation and salvation.
“Control and command” must be replaced by “consultation and consideration” if the NCPO leader doesn’t want to “waste a good crisis”.