Making major-power rivalry work for Asean

The interdependent relationship between the world’s two great powers and largest economies is key to addressing a range of global issues. But what China and the US decide between themselves also has crucial implications for the rest of Asia. A key example is the South China Sea disputes, where Asean needs to have its own agenda and role – one that is not limited to Asean-only issues.

Four Asean member states are in dispute with China over territory in the South China Sea. Many observers – including Unesco’s Chair in Transnational Challenges and Governance Amitav Acharya – believe that Asean must prioritise this dispute over regional conflicts in the Korean peninsula and Taiwan Straits. 

The larger question here is not about how Asean can survive the rivalry between the major powers, but rather how it can make the power play work to the region’s benefit. 

Singapore’s Deputy Prime Minister Teo Chee Hean recently warned that allowing potential flashpoints such as the South China Sea to deteriorate into a dangerous zero-sum game would benefit neither claimant states nor those indirectly involved. 

It is for this reason that the major powers should not be allowed to dictate the regional agenda and thereby forge a regional order predicated primarily on power calculations. Neither should Asean or any of its individual member states permit themselves to be manipulated in this power play. Instead, the bloc should guard its unity while at the same time remaining open to parties to come together to discuss regional issues and potential areas for cooperation.

 

An Asean-led Asia

Asean is trusted because it offers a neutral platform for concerned states to discuss and resolve wider issues. It must, therefore, seize its central place and develop its own agenda and strategy so that major powers are forced to respond to it rather than remain impassive.

The South China Sea disputes were in focus again during the recent Asean Regional Forum (ARF), as escalating tensions threatened to overturn peace, security and stability in Southeast Asia. But making the disputes the focus of the ARF carries no benefits for Asean, especially as the US and Japan are forum members. Nor would the regional bloc be wise to let territorial disputes over rocks and small islands colour the wider Asean-China relationship. 

Instead, Asean’s efforts should be focused towards pushing forward on a Code of Conduct (CoC) in the South China Sea with China. The potential benefits are threefold. 

First, establishing an effective CoC would help remedy the erosion of trust among parties and allow Asean to approach its relations with China in a less guarded manner. Second, it would reduce the fraught dependence on the United States for protection of the region’s security. The danger of a regional arms race would also be curbed. Overall regional tensions would ease, allowing a foundation of mutual trust to build among the major powers. 

Third and more importantly, the CoC would be an agreement on how disputes are managed in the region. It would also push countries to seek peaceful solutions, maintaining positive engagement with major powers even as tensions rise and ebb in the region. Over the South China Sea for example, Asean-China cooperation on activities such as marine research, search and rescue operations and combating transnational crime would and should continue.

 

Taking political, economic reins 

Asean must also take the reins where geopolitics and economics overlap, shaping outcomes rather than being subject to them. There is fierce Chinese and Japanese rivalry in Southeast Asia, and the ambitions of both Asian powers to carve out spheres of economic influence in the region need to be managed. Otherwise, Asean risks being split and beholden to whichever side it chooses to accept capital from. 

Instead of allowing major powers, investors or multilateral financiers to drive and dictate regional projects, Asean must start to adopt a partnership approach with these stakeholders as well as develop the confidence to reject proposals that do not benefit its people or the region. 

In so doing, Asean’s engagement with the major powers will not be viewed as American-, Chinese- or Japanese-centric, but Asean-driven and focused. This will ensure that Asean’s interests and goals remain central to its decision-making process, which will reduce the risk of it being influenced or dictated to by larger powers. More broadly, an Asean that is a key driver of Southeast Asia’s geo-politics and economics will help to calm tensions in the region. 

The capricious nature of US-China relations demonstrate that issues in this region are best dealt with “in-house” rather than by a major power. Yet in taking on this role, Asean must be careful to avoid being painted as biased towards any side, and lead by keeping its interests front and centre. Unity is also important, to show the major powers that it is a reliable partner and can be counted on to be an effective leader and problem-solver for the region in the long term.

 

Cheryl Tan and Sivashangari Kiruppalini are, respectively, assistant director and policy research analyst for Asean at the Singapore Institute of International Affairs (SIIA). The recently released SIIA report “Moving Ahead with the Asean Economic Community: Business Initiatives Across Borders” offers more insights on how Asean can make use of the AEC to manage major-power 

rivalry in the region.