Violence versus power: Examining the Obama Doctrine

The first key point to take away is that Obama thinks long and hard about foreign policy and, most importantly, about the appropriate use of power and the meaning of leadership. His is not a reflexive approach to US engagement with the world; it reflects deep thought about, continued grappling with and considerable scepticism toward the guiding principles of American foreign policy.

For Obama, “real power means you can get what you want without having to exert violence”. He does not believe in posturing, chest-thumping or bullying. Instead, he seeks to unite governments in pursuit of shared interests and concerns. Washington leads by marshalling coalitions, setting agendas and making it possible for diverse nations to work together, each contributing its own perspectives and resources. This is the classic application of “soft power”, Harvard Professor Joseph Nye’s notion that power reflects the ability to get other countries to join your efforts willingly, in the belief that what you want is also good for them. This approach also means that one of the most important things the US can do is to get its own house in order. The US must be strong at home, with both physical resources and moral strength, before it can claim to lead others. This belief animated Obama’s first National Security Strategy. It is sometimes mistaken for a desire to disengage, but that is a misreading of his intentions.

Plainly, Obama believes in multilateralism. In an age of transnational threats and dwindling national resources, each country must do more with less. But, and this is critical, all nations must contribute. Obama’s disdain for “free riders” is clear, and no nation – no matter how “special” its relationship with the US – gets a pass. Apparently, there is considerable heartburn in London over some of Obama’s comments about Prime Minister David Cameron and his government’s readiness to spend on defence. At the same time, however, the US retains a central role by mobilising nations and ensuring they act to address international concerns. Obama values multilateralism for the brake it imposes on US unilateralism. It is “a way to check America’s more unruly impulses”.

That last acknowledgement is part of the larger idea that, “For all of our warts, the United States has clearly been a force for good in the world.” That qualifier has infuriated hawks and conservatives, but for many others the humility is refreshing. Obama’s readiness to see through the idealised notion of US “greatness” is a corrective to the confidence, certainty and periodic hubris that has often dominated US foreign policy.

Central to the Obama doctrine is the reorientation of US foreign policy. Obama has tired of the Middle East, believing, consistent with his “realist” orientation, that the US’ ability to shape outcomes there is limited. Absent a desire among that region’s inhabitants to make peace, the US cannot impose one. With US reliance on the region’s energy resources being reduced, the hold that traditional allies have had on US foreign policy is reduced as well. Obama sees other governments attempting – and succeeding – in getting the US to advance their interests, often at the expense of the US national interest; Saudi Arabia comes in for particular criticism here. Israel, on the other hand, remains a privileged partner and the US commitment to that democracy remains strong.

The Middle East’s loss is Asia’s gain. Obama understands that the centre of global dynamism, wealth and power is shifting to Asia. He seeks to tap that new energy for his country and to help channel it toward resolution of global problems. Asia is also a powerful test case for his model of leadership: US military strength is important, but the region seeks engagement on different terms, primarily economic. The rebalance to Asia, Obama’s signature initiative, operationalises that approach with the priority it gives to the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreement.

One of the most important components of the Obama doctrine is his rejection of the “Washington playbook” on foreign policy. He is ready to challenge fundamental assumptions about US foreign policy – who its best partners are, how to use US strength – to play the “long game” to protect US interests. He is ready to make deals with Cuba and Iran, two governments long assumed hostile to US interests and thus beyond the pale for diplomatic engagement. He is less concerned with abstract notions of credibility and more with the concrete results of policy decisions. He is not prepared to join the chorus hyping threats because they dominate headlines.

The president looks long and hard at the world around him and tries to maximise US influence with a minimum of resources. That makes him a real realist, one who believes in the economy of power. It is a break from the recent practice of American presidents, although the US presidential debates suggest this cool thoughtful analysis may only prove to be a temporary respite.