Like Yingluck, most Thais are not optimistic about the future

Yingluck said she could only hope to celebrate her birthday with supporters in the same way next year. It was the practical thing to say, since the verdict is expected in September or not much later. Her best case scenario is, of course, an acquittal, but her birthday tears demonstrated the angst she is feeling as she waits for the final day of the historic case. Many of her fellow Thais feel the same way, whether they are sobbing nor not. Worse still, an outcome favourable either to her or her opponents isn’t necessarily good news for the politically neutral.
Yingluck is facing a two-pronged legal assault. On the civil front, efforts to seize her assets appear to have stalled. The Finance Ministry and the National Anti-Corruption Commission are sending conflicting messages on who is to blame for the “delay” in confiscating the Bt35 billion targeted, though some analysts believe their back-and-forth argument is a smokescreen for political unwillingness to go after her assets before the criminal case is settled. (Technically, the assets seizure doesn’t have to wait for the conclusion of the criminal trial, but politically it probably should.)
On the criminal front, there’s only a few defence witnesses left to testify. The trial has mirrored the political conflict. The prosecution has presented several high-ranking witnesses to support charges of malfeasance and gross negligence against her. The rice-pledging scheme was described by the prosecution as a malicious, corruption-plagued project masquerading as an attempt to help poor farmers. Prosecutors said the state suffered massive losses, farmers were duped and vast amounts of paddy had rotted in storage because the government could not find buyers.
Defence lawyers told the court the rice policy had to be carried out because the government was bound by its promise to Parliament, in addition to a sincere belief that the programme would benefit the poor. Identifiable and tangible measures had been taken against corruption and the rotting of the paddy, the defence said. Some damage had occurred, admitted defence lawyers, but it was the responsibility of sub-contractors.
As we can see, the trial goes to the crux of the political divide. All the contentious questions asked since Thaksin Shinawatra was deposed in the 2006 coup will rise to prominence again over the next few weeks.
The first question: How much “mandate” does the ballot box give? Yingluck’s supporters insist that since her party won a general election, it was empowered and in fact obliged to carry out its pledges to voters. Some of the resulting policies might have worked and others might not, but that’s democracy, they say. Her opponents counter that they only have problems with policies intended to serve individuals or vested interests but disguised as beneficial to the public. This latter camp often points to telecom policies of the Thaksin government which benefited his business empire.
The second question: How should we “punish” elected officials who are found to be corrupt? 
Shinawatra supporters and the anti-military camp, of course, demand a “democratic” process be followed in putting away crooked politicians, stating that “two wrongs never make a right”. The opposition counters that no politicians in power will ever punish themselves. In addition, those opponents insist that when “democratic” decisions have gone against politicians, like when the Constitution Court has refused to rule in favour of major policies, politicians merely chose not to listen.
These are political questions, fuelled somewhat by the fact that most prosecution witnesses are permanent officials whereas defence witnesses are mainly politicians. There’s another question with ideological overtones being asked by ordinary citizens with no political stake whatsoever: Can the Thai elites solve their serious problems peacefully? “Elites” refers to both sides – the Shinawatras and their opponents – who are more or less responsible for maintaining this vicious cycle in which the country has been trapped for so long.
This last question is the most difficult one to answer. In a few weeks’ time, Thailand will reach yet another crossroads, one whose features are all too familiar. Paths will appear offering the promise to lead the country to “something new”. In fact they will merely be routes in the same old loop. Yingluck’s tears are probably warranted, but her pessimism about her own future certainly coincides with concerns about that of the country as a whole, which is a lot more complex. The latter worries are also expected to last considerably longer.