Junta's 'reforms' may herald a return to older ways

In the political sphere, the term ‘reform’ is widely used among progressive figures to champion changes in the system. Generally speaking, it is expected the reform would achieve progress in the political, economic and social spheres.

The real objective for any reform in this world is to improve a system for people, or bring about something in the public interest. Public interest is the core and key to reform – but the style being conducted by General Prayut Chan-o-cha and his junta seems to have everything backward, working for the benefit of the elite only.

Thailand has gone through so-called reform processes many times. In recent memory, reform took place during 1995-1997 after the bloody 1992 uprising against a military-backed regime and gave birth to the 1997 “People’s constitution”, which offered many positive changes to suit the public.

It was a product of the Thai elite and they were proud of it at the beginning – that they could empower people and create effective checks and balances in a political system. Among reformers who drew up the 1997 charter were people like Anand Panyarachun, Prawase Wasi, Wissanu Krea-ngam, Bowornsak Uwanno, Chai-Anan Samudavanija and many other NGO elites now active again in the latest reform body.

The previous reforms empowered strong government and strong premiership. Unfortunately for the elite who created the system, a politician called Thaksin Shinawatra emerged with powerful popular support.

Initially, Thaksin was perfect for the elite, as he was a visionary billionaire who had experience in both bureaucracy and business. He bypassed the red tape bureaucracy to revive the economy after the 1997 financial crisis.

Corruption seemed not to be a serious problem as the Thai elite disregarded any concealing of his wealth. The then Constitutional Court, which Chai-Anan was a member of, allowed Thaksin to continue his administration until the end of his term.

But things became problematic as Thaksin emerged as a dangerous figure in Thai politics. But he was popular among the poor and his political base became stronger. For the elite, Thaksin had become a maverick.

The coup in 2006 took threw out of office but the 2007 Constitution, written intentionally to prohibit him from returning, failed to get rid of Thaksin or those like him. He created a crowd of political clones and surrogates. People, notably the poor, loved his political creativity and policies. They asked for a universal healthcare service, high prices for farm products and capital to make their entrepreneurship become true. The poor could not be blamed as this was the nature of politics in a democratic system. People will elect leaders who bring them benefits.

General Prayut, who staged a military coup in May to oust Thaksin’s sister Yingluck from office, and run the country, is also undertaking so-called reform to prevent the return of Thaksin. It’s confusing. But there has not been great difference to Thaksin’s political style and a democratic political system.

Prayut has commissioned Thaksin’s enemies and the conservative elite in the bureaucracy to undertake “reform”. Unable to bar Thaksin from politics, they have instead prohibited “his people” from participating in the system.

The junta’s blueprint for reform, as proposed by the Defence Ministry days ago, is not about improving the Thai political system but a return to a bureaucratic polity.

Chai-Anan’s idea to have an unelected figure as the next prime minister is nothing but a form of government that rejects people participation. His idea is as simple as creating a way for Prayut’s administration to last longer.

But, what is the point of having an election when the government is led by people outside the electoral regime?

Most of the intellectual elite in the reform council never had a political dream or imagination far beyond a quasi-democracy and a quasi-authoritarian regime.

Throughout modern history, Thailand’s reform has gone back and forth between an authoritarian elite and democracy. The more reforming it does, the less democratic it gets.