The paradox of democracy in Indonesia

In a speech before a meeting attended by among others President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, Vice president Boediono, People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR) Speaker Taufiq Kiemas and Regional Representatives Council (DPD) Speaker Irman Gusman, he was willing to acknowledge the undesirable and poor features of our system of governance.

In his statement, Marzuki reiterated the fact that our democracy is still shrouded and tainted by nondemocratic practices. He specifically singled out weak law enforcement, money politics, violence, corruption and transactional politics as contrary to our efforts to consolidate democracy.

With all due respect to his well-intentioned thoughts, it is actually a bit late to voice such observations. Several years ago, when the process of democratic transition was still in its early and formative years, many warned that unless we – especially the elites as well as holders of public office – crafted our democracy appropriately, we might well experience a decades-long transition.

In those years, the tendency had been to undertake a speedy process of democratisation without considering the available socio-economic and political capital needed to support it. The initiation and further enhancement of democracy was largely based on a much-applauded political sentiment to make a complete break with the past. As we all knew, the past – for 40 years at least – was deeply rooted in a non-competitive and authoritarian political arrangement.

Given the circumstances, where public discontent and animosity toward the previous regime were widely shared, it was too much to ask reformers and precursors of democracy to move cautiously in deciding the pace and the content of transition. Even to find and appoint skillful leaders to lead the transition was beyond the prescribed agenda. Those who emerged in the limelight of transition were therefore those who had simply been able to seize the moment, riding the wave of reformation.

As long as the tone and rhetoric were to dismantle the structure and substance of the New Order regime, it was more than enough a resource to be in the center stage of democratisation. The euphoric nature of the transition, shaped primarily by the fact that president Soeharto was no longer in power, was the main – and perhaps the only – key to opening in Pandora’s box, a box that for so long had been kept closed by the country’s praetorian guards.

As a result, for reasons yet to be known, Indonesia seemed to move fast democratically: An unprecedented number of political parties were allowed to emerge; the Constitution was amended in four consecutive years; regions were given autonomy that almost resembled a federal system of government.

All of this made Indonesia different. It caused the country to be identified as the third-largest democracy in the world. Given the fact that the majority of its citizens were Muslim, it made this nation a living laboratory where Islam and democracy could work in tandem.

Yet, they did not actually transform Indonesia. If Marzuki’s remarks represent his true feelings about the country’s 13 years of democratic endeavour, then one could not deny the seriousness of the problems in our attempt to change the nation into both a procedural and substantive democracy.

In this context, the democratic election of our public office holders is not an end in itself. Regardless of the commonly used definition of democracy, where free and fair elections are the only accepted yardstick, it is the substantive transformation – socially, economically, and politically – of the citizens that actually count. The ability of the state to respond to public demands should also be treated as a factor in deciding whether or not a country is actually democratic. A free and fair election should only be regarded as the most civilised, decent and appropriate means to ensure a responsive state apparatus.

In other words, the existing gap between the procedural (election) and substantive (policy) notions of democracy has acted as a major factor in making our democracy paradoxical.

The paradox of our democracy can also be explained by the fact that for many political practitioners power is all that matters. This is hardly a surprise – even theorists define politics as who gets what, when and how. Whether or not power yields positive and benign policies is not the primary concern – or logic – of politics.

This is precisely why power-holders generally opt for micro- rather than macro-incentives. Given the fact that Indonesia’s pre-democracy period was also advantageous to many of its politicians, they will not give it away, or replace it with something else even if it is necessary in a democracy.

It is in this context that we see how the development of our democracy is full of contradictions. We feel that the practice of our democracy allows for so many things contradictory to democratic values. Cases in point include weak law enforcement, corruption, transactional and money politics, vote buying, and so on. Unfortunately, many of our party politicians are of the opinion that it would only generate disincentives to dismantle the above undemocratic practices.

Now that many are willing to admit the paradox of our democratic practices, we can only wait with hope to see whether they have the courage to change those undemocratic practices.

 

Bahtiar Effendy is the dean of the School of Social and Political Sciences at the State Islamic University in Jakarta.