Pushing back against Beijing’s colonisation of the sea

For the countries of our region, territorial disputes have always been resolved by referring to international law, from the Cambodian civil war to overlapping claims by Indonesia and Malaysia on the islands of Sipadan and Ligitan. Today, that law is being flouted by a resurgent Beijing using the South China Sea as a springboard for global reach and influence. Yet for Indonesia and its neighbours, China’s rise presents a major dilemma involving the need to weigh up national versus regional security and economic interests. 

Most Asean member-countries see Beijing’s stance on the South China Sea as an effort to erode international law by hiding behind dubious historical rights. That regional concern is heightened by the growing quarrel between Washington and Beijing. China’s unilateral acts in building artificial islands in the sea and reinforcing its claims with military might are also blamed for driving an arms race among Asian nations.

Beijing has two main motives for its assertive maritime moves. First, China is practising “maritime colonialism” by rejecting calls to reduce tensions in a bid to dominate the world’s busiest commercial sea lanes. Second, China is improving its physical security to block external threats and interference.

Beijing’s actions resemble Western colonialism in projecting influence by employing a mix of military, political and cultural forces. The aim is to control everything from language, capital, patronage and trade, to education and culture. Deploying warships and surface-to-air missiles in the South China Sea reflects Beijing’s self-image as conqueror of the sea, undermining the Declaration of the Code of Conduct that Asean is currently negotiating with China in a bid to reduce tensions and resolve disputes. 

When European powers began colonising Asia in the 15th century, no Western colonist claimed the South China Sea as its domain. Even the expansionist Japanese never sought dominion over the sea and its islands – most of which are uninhabited and incapable of sustaining life.

The Chinese strategy involves delaying tactics that are drawing non-claimants, including external powers, into the South China Sea stand-off.

Yet the maritime dispute between Washington and Beijing is part of a greater global drama. A new world economic order is being forged with tools like the China-led 57-member Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, which has strong backing from Western countries. However, neither the US nor Japan has joined the bank. Instead Tokyo has tightened security cooperation with Washington in response to the rise of China, Russia and India, sabre-rattling from North Korea and the escalating tension in the East and South China Sea.

For Asean member-countries, the dynamic engagement of the US, Japan, China, India and Russia in the region raises the need for equilibrium, not only among the major powers, but also between them and Southeast Asia. Yet we must understand that Beijing’s efforts to maximise influence do not make China an enemy seeking open conflict in the South China Sea.

Indonesia and Asean must redouble their efforts in building confidence, not only by persuading China to work sincerely towards the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea, but also by convincing other great powers to refrain from disruptive activities.

Asean must now work on declaring the disputed territories non-military areas, in accordance with Asean’s doctrine of a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality. Declaring the South China Sea a non-military area, with a guarantee of free passage for all civilian ships, would be in line with President Xi Jinping’s repeated assurances that China will not militarise the South China Sea.

We cannot rely on such repeated pledges not to militarise the area. Southeast Asian countries need concrete political gestures from China towards a practical and peaceful resolution of the maritime stand-off.