We talked with North Korea: It won’t give up its nukes
Not even the fate of American student Otto Warmbier, who died this week after returning to the United States following his detainment in North Korea, will dissuade advocates of “engagement” with Pyongyang.
They argue that, however repugnant the regime, diplomacy is the only way to stop North Korea’s rapidly advancing nuclear and missile programmes. But our recent experience suggests that trying to talk to supreme leader Kim Jong-un is a waste of time.
This month, we were part of a group of delegates from the United States, Japan, China and South Korea who met in Sweden with representatives of North Korea to explore possible grounds for resuming the six-party talks that collapsed in 2009. After many hours with the North Korean delegation at these “1.5 track” talks, we left more pessimistic than when we arrived.
North Korean officials made unambiguously clear that Pyongyang will not be deterred from augmenting its nuclear arsenal or test-launching an intercontinental ballistic missile that could eventually threaten the US homeland. There were no signals of flexibility or willingness to negotiate on these programmes.
Throughout, the North Korean message was that denuclearisation is off the table. Pyongyang’s representatives declared: “The most perfect weapons system will never become the exclusive property of the United States.”
We tried repeatedly to ascertain whether any combination of economic and diplomatic benefits or security reassurances could induce Pyongyang to comply with its previously negotiated commitments and with UN resolutions. The answer was an emphatic, unwavering no. Citing the fates of Iraq’s Saddam Hussein and Libya’s Muammar Gadhafi, the North Koreans repeatedly said that their nuclear programme is the ultimate life preserver for the regime.
Our North Korean interlocutors presented a stark choice: “First accept us as a nuclear state, then we are prepared to talk about a peace treaty or fight. We are ready for either.” The North Koreans weren’t saying that they would initiate hostilities but that they would fight if provoked. A peace treaty ending the Korean War and legitimising the North Korean state is a long-standing goal for Pyongyang, which sees it as a catalyst for the removal of all US forces from the peninsula.
Strikingly different from similar meetings in the past was the self-confidence, even cockiness, of the North Koreans, clearly a result of the recent successes of their nuclear and missile programmes. The North Koreans also made clear that their nuclear programme is a response to the general “US hostile policy”. As such, nothing Seoul could offer would alter Pyongyang’s commitment to its nuclear arsenal. The North Koreans won’t even deign to negotiate with the South Koreans, whom they described repeatedly as “puppets” of the United States. Thus, the new South Korean president, Moon Jae-in, is in for a major disappointment if he tries to resurrect the “sunshine policy” of unconditional engagement pursued by previous progressive presidents from 1998 to 2008. – The Washington Post
Sue Mi Terry, a former CIA analyst and director for Korean, Japanese and oceanic affairs at the US National Security Council, is managing director for South Korea at the Bower Group Asia consultancy.
Bruce Klingner, senior research fellow for Northeast Asia at the Heritage Foundation, previously served as the CIA’s deputy division chief for South Korea.
