Although on several occasions, Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra has assured ministers from the Pheu Thai Party that there would be no rush to reshuffle the Cabinet—stressing the importance of allowing time for them to prove their capabilities without adhering to a six-month timeframe like during the Thaksin era—it is widely anticipated that once her administration nears its one-year mark, a performance evaluation of the ministers from her party will begin.
Those who perform well and meet expectations will likely continue in their positions, while those who fall short may have to step aside and make way for new candidates.
However, the recent 37% tariff hike imposed by US President Donald Trump has dealt a direct blow to the Ministry of Commerce, headed by Pichai Naripthaphan, who now finds it unavoidable to bear responsibility.
This is especially true as the ministry faces intense scrutiny over its preparedness and response to the trade war, despite the fact that Trump had signaled his intention to raise tariffs since the presidential campaign.
While the world has witnessed proactive moves by several countries negotiating with the United States—lobbying and preparing systematic countermeasures to mitigate economic fallout—Thailand appears to lag behind.
Despite the Prime Minister signaling a desire to negotiate, the Commerce Ministry has shown little visible action. This has drawn criticism toward the government and damaged its credibility.
Many observers have assessed the Ministry of Commerce’s missteps in handling Trump’s tariffs into three main points:
Misinformation to the Prime Minister on “Tariff Measures”
The Ministry of Commerce had consistently assessed that Trump’s policy would have a limited impact on Thailand, estimating that import tariffs would be in the range of 10–20%, amounting to about $7–8 billion. However, when the actual announcement was made, Thailand was hit with a 37% tariff. This left the government unprepared—not only due to a misjudgment of the situation from the outset but also because no proactive or defensive measures had been developed in advance. As a result, the government was unable to promptly respond to the tariff barrier’s impact.
Misinformation on “Trade Negotiations”
Earlier, the Commerce Minister had informed the Prime Minister that there were existing channels and mechanisms for negotiation, such as through the United States Trade Representative (USTR), and that the US could be persuaded not to raise tariffs on Thai goods. However, when the time came, Thailand still faced the 37% import tariff. This raised questions about whether those so-called negotiation channels were effective—or whether the process had not even begun. It also sparked speculation that these claims were merely made to maintain the minister’s position in the Cabinet.
“Confusing Communication”
When the US announced the 37% tariff increase on Thai imports, the media asked the Commerce Minister for clarification regarding the negotiation process. The response was: “We’ve called the US, but they haven’t answered the phone yet.” This led to public comparisons with Vietnam, where the country’s leader had already spoken directly with President Trump—making Thailand’s government appear less effective than Vietnam in terms of diplomatic engagement.
In addition, there was further confusion over communication regarding who would lead the trade negotiations. At one point, it was stated that the Minister of Commerce would personally head the talks or that Thailand’s ambassador to Washington would lead the negotiation team. However, it was later revealed that the Prime Minister had appointed Pichai Chunhavajira, Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister, as the head of the negotiation committee instead.
Previously, several Pheu Thai MPs had openly expressed dissatisfaction with the Commerce Minister’s performance during internal party meetings—particularly over the declining prices of key agricultural products such as rice and cassava, which had led to small-scale farmer protests in various provinces. The Ministry of Commerce had neither implemented adequate measures to address the issue nor reported the situation to the Prime Minister and Cabinet.
There were multiple occasions when Pheu Thai MPs turned internal party meetings into de facto questioning sessions. Yet, Minister Pichai often did not attend these meetings himself, instead sending his adviser, “Jiang” Kunakorn Preedachanachai, a former Surin MP, to represent him.
Even though Adviser Jiang” made extensive efforts to explain the minister’s work and justify the Ministry’s actions, most MPs showed little interest in hearing from a stand-in. They insisted on hearing directly from the Minister himself to ask questions and seek clarifications.
At this moment, if one were to identify the “weak points” of the Paetongtarn government, the Ministry of Commerce would rank among the top—frequently assessed both within and outside the party as having problems with policy management. More importantly, the performance of this once high-performing ministry can either support or undermine the government’s broader agenda and has direct implications for public support at the grassroots level.
As such, this ministry may become a driving force behind Prime Minister Paetongtarn having to reshuffle the Cabinet sooner than the anticipated one-year evaluation mark to bring in a more capable minister who can effectively tackle the "Trump Tariff" issue, which is now inevitably impacting the Thai economy.