Halfway into its term, coalition faces countdown to collapse?

As the coalition government reaches its halfway mark, multiple challenges are converging. Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra has repeatedly reaffirmed her intention to see all ten coalition parties through to the end of the four-year term, shoulder to shoulder. However, the path ahead appears increasingly fraught.

Economic uncertainties—fuelled by both global volatility and domestic instability—are colliding with an equally combustible political climate. The next two years may prove even more perilous, as hidden obstacles begin to surface.

Speculation surrounding a potential Cabinet reshuffle continues to reflect deep-seated unease within the coalition. Behind the scenes, political factions are still clutching their bargaining chips, waiting for the right moment to play their hand.

One of the most glaring rifts is the growing friction between the Pheu Thai and Bhumjaithai parties—colloquially seen as the red-blue divide. The push by Pheu Thai to reclaim control of the Interior Ministry, reportedly under orders from party patriarch Thaksin Shinawatra, has ignited tensions with Bhumjaithai. Members of Pheu Thai have not shied away from escalating the rhetoric, even challenging their coalition partners with remarks like, “If you're not happy, you can leave.”

Such statements inevitably leave deep scars, particularly for Newin Chidchob, the influential political strategist and de facto leader of the "blue" camp.

Signs of pushback from the Bhumjaithai Party—the so-called “blue camp”—are becoming increasingly visible. One key signal was the release of a photograph showing party patriarch Newin Chidchob dining with influential political figures from the “Sweet Tamarind” faction, including Santi Promphat and Phetchabun provincial administration chief Akkaradet Thongchaisod, known as “Mayor Deutsch.”

The image was widely interpreted as a message that a deal had been struck to poach six Palang Pracharath MPs from the Sweet Tamarind group.

Further fuel was added on Sunday, June 15, when Deputy Prime Minister and Interior Minister Anutin Charnvirakul, leader of the Bhumjaithai Party, visited Udon Thani and formally introduced Adisak Kaewmungkhunsap, an MP from the Thai Sang Thai Party, as a prospective defector. Reports suggest Adisak is one of two Thai Sang Thai MPs preparing to jump ship to Bhumjaithai.

Some observers view these moves as a calculated show of strength—a display of parliamentary numbers intended to test the resolve of Pheu Thai’s de facto leader, Thaksin Shinawatra. Whether this show of force translates into real negotiating power remains to be seen. It could yet prove to be little more than political sabre-rattling.

At the same time, Anutin’s remark suggesting Bhumjaithai could opt to move into opposition if the Interior Ministry is stripped of its control has raised eyebrows. While he later backtracked, claiming the statement was prompted by a reporter’s question, it nonetheless reflected mounting pressure.

The idea of a “blue–orange” coalition—between Bhumjaithai and the People's Party—was also subtly floated. Back on 29 June, during the 2026 budget bill deliberation, Anutin hinted at potential alignment with the opposition, saying, “If our policies align in the future, there’s no reason we should be limited by current affiliations.”

Analysts are weighing two likely scenarios as tensions between Bhumjaithai and Pheu Thai escalate.

Scenario 1: Bhumjaithai is bluffing.

Some observers believe that Thaksin has already calculated that Bhumjaithai has little real intention of leaving the coalition. The party is already burdened with several legal cases, including a party dissolution petition over an alleged collusion scandal related to the Senate election. The recent appearance of high-level individuals—both within and above the party structure—suggests deeper exposure is coming. Without access to power, Bhumjaithai may risk losing influence precisely when it needs it most.

Scenario 2: Bhumjaithai is genuinely prepared to move into opposition. This would align with recent comments by key figures from the United Thai Nation Party, another coalition partner. Deputy party leader Witthaya Kaewparadai stated that if cabinet reshuffle negotiations proceed without consensus, particularly concerning the energy and industry portfolios, it could be seen as breaking the coalition agreement.

“If it’s presented that way, then it’s no different from being kicked out. There would be no option but to leave,” he said.

Such confidence may stem from a belief that Pheu Thai’s reshuffle ambitions could trigger its own political undoing. Behind the scenes, rumours of a looming “ lawfare” are gaining traction—dubbed a “silent coup” by insiders—using judicial and constitutional mechanisms to bring down the government.

Key to this is the Senate collusion election case, which could pave the way for a purge of the “blue camp,” as well as cases that potentially implicate Thaksin himself. More urgently, the National Anti-Corruption Commission (NACC) has accepted a petition to investigate whether the cabinet, MPs, and senators violated the Constitution by supporting the 2025 fiscal budget bill, particularly the reallocation of funds to finance the government’s flagship digital wallet scheme.

Under Section 144 of the Constitution, lawmakers are prohibited from any involvement—direct or indirect—in budget disbursement. The worst-case scenario, analysts warn, is that the NACC could forward the case to the Constitutional Court. If the court finds the government in violation under Section 167(4), the cabinet may not only be removed but also barred from serving in a caretaker capacity while a new cabinet is formed.

A senior source within the ruling coalition revealed that top “keymen” from multiple parties have already begun informal talks, exchanging views on several possible political outcomes. These discussions reportedly include both the prospect of renewed deal-making and a complete reshaping of alliances.

In Thai politics, anything is possible—especially amid the current wave of legal warfare engulfing all sides. Ultimately, this volatile environment could accelerate the timeline for a general election, bringing it forward from its scheduled date.

This possibility is underscored by the intensifying friction between Pheu Thai and Bhumjaithai, as Newin grows increasingly visible on the political frontlines. His renewed public presence signals a readiness to directly engage in political power plays.

Meanwhile, on the other side of the aisle, the United Thai Nation Party is witnessing behind-the-scenes manoeuvring. Notably, Suthep Thaugsuban, former leader of the People’s Democratic Reform Committee (PDRC), has reportedly been working to dissuade certain MPs from defecting to rival camps.

Outside Parliament, mass mobilisation efforts are beginning to stir once again—not only in response to high-profile issues such as Thaksin’s hospital stay or the ongoing controversy surrounding Article 112 of the Criminal Code ( lese majeste law)—but also over growing nationalistic tensions.

The renewed Thai–Cambodian border dispute is being used by some factions to spark patriotic sentiment under the popular hashtag #ThisPeacefulThailandIsBraveInWar. This, too, could become a catalyst for street movements and political momentum beyond the legislative chambers.

With both internal and external crises mounting, the political temperature is rising rapidly. All signs point to an approaching inflexion point. Whether it leads to a reshuffle, a rupture, or a reset, one thing is clear: Thailand's political landscape is on the brink of another shift.