BRICS 2026: A Bridge to the Global South or a Bridge to the World?

Among ASEAN countries, Indonesia is a full member of BRICS, while Malaysia, Thailand and Viet Nam are BRICS Partner Countries, reflecting growing interest in the economic opportunities offered by a grouping that accounts for around 40 per cent of global GDP and 26 per cent of global trade.

Yet BRICS continues to be perceived and portrayed as an anti-Western grouping, positioned on the opposite side of the political spectrum from the Global North, particularly as it seeks to promote greater use of local currencies in international trade, a move that has faced strong opposition from the United States. BRICS countries themselves have challenged this interpretation, arguing that such a narrative is largely constructed from the perspective of the Global North rather than reflecting how BRICS members see the grouping. At the same time, it cannot be denied that BRICS reflects a degree of dissatisfaction with the international power structure that emerged after the Second World War.

This raises a more fundamental question: should the Global South and Global North really be understood as two opposing camps? Their economic, political and social interests increasingly overlap, and neither can be entirely separated from the other. The more important question for the 2026 BRICS Summit, therefore, is whether India can help BRICS move beyond strengthening cooperation within the Global South to become a bridge between the Global South and the Global North.

According to the World Bank, since 1990, the expansion of international trade has increased incomes by 24 per cent globally and by 50 per cent among the poorest 40 per cent of the population. International trade has also created greater employment opportunities for women, particularly in developing countries, where export-oriented firms tend to employ more women than non-exporting firms. Yet the expansion of international trade has also raised persistent concerns over labour exploitation and the protection of basic human rights within global supply chains. Major multinational corporations from the Global North, including global sportswear and fashion brands such as Nike and H&M, have faced scrutiny over wages, working conditions and labour rights among workers employed by suppliers in developing countries. Although concerns over corporate social responsibility (CSR) and business ethics have gained increasing international recognition since the 1970s, questions remain over whether voluntary corporate commitments are sufficient to protect workers and communities across global supply chains.

Whilst countries in the Global South have also benefited significantly from international trade, this presents a difficult dilemma. The choice does not necessarily have to be between the Global South and the Global North. Although narratives of growing rivalry between the two have become increasingly prominent, particularly amid concerns in the United States over the expanding role of BRICS, their economic interests remain deeply interconnected. Indeed, treating their relationship as a zero-sum game and seeking to separate the two entirely could undermine the economic and security interests of both. Rather than separation, greater cooperation may be necessary to address the economic and security challenges that increasingly affect both the Global South and the Global North.

For Thailand, a BRICS Partner Country since 2025, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Sihasak Phuangketkeow will attend the summit to reaffirm Thailand’s determination to play a more active role on the world stage. At the BRICS Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in New Delhi in May 2026, Thailand recognised the growing importance of BRICS amid an uncertain international order and emphasised the need to reform global governance and the multilateral system. Thailand’s position closely corresponds with the priorities articulated by India during its BRICS chairship. At the same meeting, India’s External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar called for reforms to global governance and the multilateral system to ensure that they better respond to the needs and aspirations of the Global South. However, differences among BRICS members meant that the meeting was unable to reach consensus on a joint statement, resulting instead in a Chair’s Statement issued by India.

On the one hand, internal rivalries and disagreements arising from the different interests of BRICS members remain a major challenge to the grouping’s ability to make progress. On the other hand, perceptions of BRICS and its individual members, particularly from the Global North, present another challenge for India as it seeks to bridge the Global South and the Global North under its 2026 BRICS theme of ‘Building for Resilience, Innovation, Cooperation and Sustainability’. In an increasingly interconnected world, the European Union’s de-risking approach towards China, which emerged prominently in 2023, may help reduce economic vulnerabilities, but complete decoupling could prove both difficult and counterproductive. Indeed, while the European Union has sought to reduce critical dependencies in its economic relationship with China through a strategy of ‘de-risking, not decoupling’, it has simultaneously strengthened economic engagement with India, culminating in the conclusion of negotiations for the EU–India Free Trade Agreement in January 2026, described by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen as the ‘mother of all deals’. Prime Minister Narendra Modi similarly highlighted the significance of the agreement, which brings together a market of around two billion people. This demonstrates that strategic competition and economic cooperation do not necessarily have to be mutually exclusive. The extent of this interdependence is also reflected in a 2024 European Parliament briefing, which identified BRICS+ collectively as the EU’s main trading partner for goods, with trade between the two having risen substantially compared with 2007 levels.

India itself illustrates the complexity of dividing the world neatly between the Global South and the Global North. Alongside China and Russia, India is one of the leading members of BRICS, yet it is also a member of the Quad and has continued to deepen its strategic and economic partnerships with the United States and the European Union, with which it shares important democratic principles and strategic interests. China provides another example. Despite continuing strategic and economic tensions between Beijing and Washington, US–China trade remains substantial. Although US goods trade with China declined sharply in 2025, it still amounted to approximately US$415 billion. These relationships demonstrate that geopolitical rivalry and the coexistence of competition and cooperation do not necessarily remove economic interdependence, making a clear separation between the Global North and the Global South increasingly difficult in practice.

Therefore, the future of BRICS and its relevance to the international order do not depend simply on the ability of its members to remain united, but also on its ability to engage beyond the grouping itself. Whether the New Delhi Declaration will focus primarily on strengthening BRICS and the collective voice of the Global South, or reach beyond the narrative of a Global South versus Global North divide, remains to be seen. At the same time, the Global North need not perceive the growing influence of BRICS and the Global South simply as a challenge to the existing international order, as a stronger Global South can also create opportunities and benefits for the Global North. If India’s commitment to ‘Humanity First’ and a people-centric approach is to have wider meaning, the challenge for BRICS is not only to strengthen the voice of the Global South, but also to identify common interests and opportunities for cooperation with the Global North in addressing challenges that affect people across both. If BRICS can become a bridge to the world, rather than a grouping defined by the divide between the Global South and the Global North, people across both the Global South and the Global North may ultimately gain more from its economic integration and growing cooperation.

Titipol Phakdeewanich is a Political Scientist, Faculty of Political Science, Ubon Ratchathani University, Thailand