
This was the second of the three phases in her impeachment process.
Many following the inquiry would have absorbed a premonition that Yingluck’s fate had already been sealed – that she would be impeached, banned from politics for five years, and may face the threat of a jail term and heavy fines from the Supreme Court.
During the impeachment process, NLA members, especially the inquiry commission, stubbornly refused to hear evidence from lawyers defending the former PM or her former ministers. They included former deputy prime minister Kittirat Na-Ranong and Niwattumrong Boonsongpaisarn, former PM’s office minister Varathep Rattanakorn and former deputy commerce minister Yanyong Phuangrach.
There were many questions for Yingluck but they were very repetitive, compared to the much fewer and less provocative questions directed to Wicha Mahakhun of the National Anti-Corruption Commission (NACC).
NLA members who played a key part in the questioning were members of the former 40 Senators Group who were in office during Yingluck’s administration and political adversaries of the Pheu Thai Party.
This is disappointing, and the prospect of reform and reconciliation looks likely to take a major blow as a consequence.
Wicha was right in saying that a reconciliation process involves truth seeking and that, “people must be able see right from wrong, in accordance to the rule of law, where facts are clarified for the public”.
He also said reconciliation involved legal processes that must be fair and just to everyone in the country. Public officials who are guilty must be punished so that no one dares to repeat such acts again in the future.
However, the current impeachment process lacks the right timing and political legitimacy.
It lacks timing because during an effort for national reform, the junta needs to draw in as many varied groups of people from society as possible. However, Yingluck’s impeachment would trigger the perception of injustice – at least among a large proportion from the North and Northeast.
As a result, the junta’s reform forum may be further ignored by people angered by the impeachment decision, regardless of any reconciliation attempts.
NLA members can argue all they want about how impeachment is strictly a legal process based on legal principles, rather than a political issue – that those who commit wrong must be punished, and that reconciliation does not involve letting corrupt officials go free.
But the fact that Yingluck’s political future will be decided by NLA members – all hand-picked by the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) that staged the May 22 coup last year after ousting her government – will undoubtedly be viewed by many as a highly political issue.
The connection and influence of the junta and NLA is undeniable. General Somchet Boonthanom was quoted as describing both as “like father, like son.”
Those hoping that the junta would act impartially to lead the country through major reforms and reconciliation would be disappointed if the stage has already been set already for Yingluck to be impeached. Such an outcome may well show that the junta has brought its own political agenda to the table since staging the coup.
This may intensify the pursuit of their political goals, which will become clearer as time goes on.