From crisis to crisis: The danger of zero-sum thinking

As each crisis is resolved, however momentarily and inconclusively, the underlying socio-cultural, bureaucratic and political contexts in which they have occurred have remained and have become more complex and intensive, as have the resulting tensions and conflicts.

The present floods are but the latest manifestation of the unsettling pressure on, and testing of, an increasingly fragile Thai body politic. This fragility is a function of the inability of traditional Thai structures, practices, values and behaviour to adequately respond to challenges posed by the dramatic shifting of the cultural and political tectonic plates underpinning Thai society. Each new crisis seems somehow to be more volatile, more intensive, more destabilising.

Floods or droughts are today more destructive not only because of climate change, and the inability of past governments, over time, to protect against environmental degradation, but because of a lack of an efficient, functioning national water development plan. And, the political and bureaucratic decisions made or deferred to deal with such a crisis are subject to the constraints of a culture rooted in hierarchy. Ministries find it difficult to coordinate and cooperate with each other, as they fear a diminution of their authority, status and power if they do so. Often departments within the same ministry will similarly prefer to maintain their independence by avoiding cooperation with other departments. And one must also factor in the oft-quoted tradition of the old director-general-new director-general syndrome wherein a new director-general must stamp his authority by overturning policies and practices pursued by his predecessor.

Add to the above constraints the increasingly divisive political environment, with accelerating regional and rural-urban antagonisms as well as conflicts between opposition political parties and between those parties and their affiliated movements. 

In the above dysfunctional mix, decisions are often postponed or contradicted. Further complicating the political decision-making and implementation processes are hierarchical bureaucratic values that favour deference to one’s superiors, avoidance of criticism, challenge and confrontation, and the disparagement of initiatives, however constructive, by one’s subordinates, which are generally deemed to be, in Thai parlance, “offside”.

Alas, aside from the bureaucratic and political constraints noted, one must consider the cultural parameters in which crises are played out today and will be played out in the foreseeable future. A hierarchical value system entrenched within the traditional centres of power – the bureaucracy, military, police, judiciary, medical profession – is being challenged and pressured by an opposing corpus of competing values championing individualism, egalitarianism, popular participation, the rule of law and good governance. These rival and clashing value systems affect behaviour, practice and decision-making in and out of the centres of power. Potentially destabilising protests and demonstrations lurk off stage and can erupt at any moment. Check-and-balance mechanisms, including not yet fully operational independent watchdog institutions, as well as existing somewhat muted and quiescent NGOs, investigative journalists, socially engaged academics and public intellectuals are ranged against the powers that be. Each new crisis will inevitably become enmeshed in this battle of wills between these two forces competing for social and political space.

The present floods have evidenced a certain posturing and advancing of personnel interest and agendas, as well as a lack of coordination and cooperative effort, at the national political and bureaucratic levels. However, at the level of those affected by the floods, despite some instances of selfishness and brandishing of privilege, there have been positive and edifying individual and communal responses evidencing a spirit of voluntary help, cooperation and shared sacrifice. Previously, rural Thailand was an exemplar of mutual help and shared sacrifice, as the common good and communal solidarity took precedence over individual interests. However, the rapid transformation of village society from a barter economy to a more personal interest-focused cash economy and consumer-oriented lifestyle makes it more likely that rural Thailand will now be more seriously affected by crises that have immediate negative economic consequences.

Last but not least, present and future crises must be dealt with in the context of Thailand’s legal framework. Such a framework includes not only a generally conservative judiciary but similarly conservative public prosecutor and police officials. As for the judges, it is not surprising that in Thailand’s code law system, cases are adjudicated by following a narrow definition of code sections. Compounding this conservative bias is the legal education of both lawyers and judges, which is undertaken in faculties of law at the undergraduate bachelor degree level. Thus, both lawyers and judges have a minimal liberal arts education and tend to view the law in a vacuum independent of the socio-cultural, economic and political context in which the law is promulgated and enforced; or rather, often not enforced. Lacking a liberal arts background to inform their thinking and perspectives, the legal and judicial professions do not produce a cadre of “social engineers” who could, and most likely would, take a proactive and creative role in overcoming the above constraints and combating crises. This lack of liberal arts education is likewise true for doctors, scientists, engineers, economists and other disciplines. In addition, whatever the discipline, teaching is largely by rote rather than by the more intellectually stimulating Socratic challenge-and-response method. Such rote learning has a negative effect on encouraging creative thinking and intellectual initiative.

And, we may assume that future crises will occur and escalate in a Thai body politic that is not only subject to the constraints described above but where vital and necessary institutional reforms have yet to be undertaken. Such reforms must be carried not only in the education sphere but in the economic and political arenas in order to assure a more just, equitable and participatory society under the rule of law.

As long as the political will and courage are lacking to overcome the above-noted constraints and to institute and enforce necessary reform legislation, crises will continue to have fertile soil to spread and flourish.

It is imperative that all sectors of society, both public and private, actively cooperate to meet the challenges posed by the constraints outlined above. The status quo is no longer tolerable. All levels, sectors and communities within the Thai body politic must be prepared, however entrenched their beliefs fears, and prejudices may be, to forego a zero-sum game and accept the necessity of accommodation, compromise and conciliation. In this hopefully evolutionary process, a revised sense of national identity will be forged with newly defined core values; changed educational content and methods of teaching will be introduced; and new institutions will emerge while traditional structures will be modified and enhanced. There will emerge a synthesis of the most productive core elements of the old and new, of tradition and change in terms of values, behaviour and institutions. When and if this occurs, crises will not escalate but will be more quickly diffused. At that moment, Phra Siam Devathirad will cast off the stultifying depression and frustration that has led to a certain lassitude and, once again, with fortitude and compassion, guard and protect a more deserving homeland.

William J Klausner is a senior fellow, ISIS-Thailand, Chulalongkorn University.