Charter reform: More tightropes to walk
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The government's first balancing act on constitutional amendment has been completed.
It was not pretty, but somehow the administration has managed to walk from one end of a tightrope to the other. Reward is months of breathing space and the passing of the buck to a charter drafting assembly that will comprise directly and indirectly elected representatives.
That the government bill on the setting up of the drafting assembly has come about without fanfare should be a reprieve for Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra. She has tried to distance herself – or her brother Thaksin, to be more exact – from charter amendment, so the lukewarm media attention to the government bill at the moment must be good news. Like they say, though, there’s always calm before a storm, and here are key points that this week’s development (or non-event, if you will) tell us:
1. The ruling camp will likely dominate the drafting assembly. Don’t believe the talk about “independence”. Political parties will be behind most candidates vying for seats in the assembly. The Election Commission, most likely to be tasked with holding the drafters’ election, may design some kind of deterrent, but that could be next to no avail. The stakes are too big to let 99 people you don’t know write the new rules for the game you play. The government bill calls for one drafter to represent each province, or 77 in total, while another 22 will be elected by Parliament. So, how many pro-government drafters will be among the 77? If we take the last general election’s results as an indication, the answer could be well over half. Government influence will also more or less dictate who will be the 22 indirectly elected drafters.
2. New political turbulence is due around the end of the year. The drafting assembly should start functioning around the middle of the year. It should be given a maximum 180 days to write a new constitution. Considering that “nothing else” is there to be changed about this charter except its protection of legal consequences of the 2006 coup, the drafters will have no choice but to zoom in on this highly explosive matter.
In other words, the assembly will have to amend (or erase) Article 309 of the existing Constitution. What is related to that article? Thaksin Shinawatra’s conviction in the Ratchadapisek land case, as well as the seizure of his massive assets. You may argue that coup consequences also involved parties’ dissolution and the five-year bans on a lot of politicians, but they are irrelevant now. The last of the banned politicians will be freed next year (whether we have a new constitution or not), and life has been going on for the “dissolved” parties.
3. A public referendum is a must. As the existing charter, whose military blessing is decried by critics, came through a referendum, the new one has to do the same so it can earn full legitimacy. Campaigns for and against the draft of the new charter ahead of the referendum will raise the political temperature by several degrees. The current Constitution passed a referendum somewhat narrowly, giving critics strong ammunition to attack it with. Therefore, the new charter draft must win public approval by a considerable margin to prove its worthiness. Having said this, while a resounding “No” vote is unlikely, it’s not entirely impossible, particularly if the drafting assembly comes up with a draft that pleases nobody. If the public reject the draft of the new charter in a referendum, expected around February next year, the whole process will end there or a new drafting assembly will have to be elected.
4. Thailand should have a new charter around May next year. This is assuming that the turbulence I predict in (2) does not derail everything. Given the government’s strong public support, the draft of the new charter should be something it likes and should comfortably pass the referendum.
5. New charter, (potentially) new trouble. As mentioned in (2), a new constitution that keeps Article 309 of the existing one will be as good as the existing one. So, if we assume that we are going to have a new charter, we also will have to assume that it will contain no protection for the consequences of the 2006 coup. And a charter that virtually disowns the 2006 coup will open up a lot of possibilities (good or ominous depending on your political stand). For example, it may allow Thaksin to come home a free man and even enable him to launch a legal fight for his seized assets. As we all know, Thailand’s crisis has revolved mostly around him and his wealth, so, while there is no urgent need for seatbelt tightening, keeping one hand on it wouldn’t hurt.
