Too soon to count on lasting peace on the border

It seems like such an easy thing to do: the Myanmar regime reaches ceasefire agreements with the ethnic minorities. The willingness behind the decision and the efficiency of its implementation make one wonder why there was any delay to begin with.

Indeed, over this past year, ethnic armies have one by one agreed to ceasefire pacts yet again with the military-backed government. Right now we’re back to 1989, when many of the ethnic armies – like the United Wa State Army (UWSA), the Shan State Army-North, the National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA) and others – agreed to set aside weapons in exchange for autonomy. Then-security chief Lieutenant General Khin Nyunt orchestrated those moves.

The junta wanted none of the armed groups teaming up with the Karen along the Thai border, and the ceasefires served to hold them back while the army concentrated on the frontier rebels.

But two decades later, in August 2009, the junta decided the ceasefires had outlived their usefulness. It launched an all-out attack on one of the smaller ceasefire groups, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army – also known as the Kokang – in the process driving some 30,000 Chinese shopkeepers back to China.

The attack upset Beijing because it disturbed the delicate relationship it enjoyed along the border with the ethnic armies it had financed during the communist insurgency two decades earlier. The end of communism in Myanmar hadn’t meant an end to personal links between comrades on both sides of the boundary.

To safeguard this precarious balance – and specifically China’s leverage in the Myanmar sector of the Golden Triangle – Beijing had to intervene before the Myanmar military turned its guns on the UWSA and other ceasefire groups.

These ethnic armies had long fought the Burmese for self-rule. Some financed their military operations by selling opium, heroin and later methamphetamine. Others became proxies of the Thai Army.

Some of the Wa commanders, like Wei Hsueh-kang, are said to have networks of investments throughout Myanmar, Thailand and parts of China. Wei and other leaders, notably the Bao brothers, have been indicted in the US on drug-trafficking charges and will sooner or later become a major issue with Washington as the government of President Thein Sein continues its reforms. 

While the ethnic armies – with the exception of the Kachin, who continue battling the government – are no longer talking about independence, their status has changed little, insofar as they’re still able to administer their own areas and engage in any legal or illegal activities they wish.

Myanmar is banking on the current ceasefires leading to a political solution, with all the groups eventually coming under the authority of regular army. It’s a gigantic step, indeed, as this would likely mean an end to the ethnic armies as separate functioning entities. After all, no government wants armed groups controlling pockets of sovereign territory, ceasefire or not. 

Still, we cannot deny that Thailand and Myanmar have used many of the ethnic armies to do their dirty work. They’ve also been used as a buffer between our countries, which have never completely trusted one another. 

But can we really believe that the current reforms in Myanmar will have a positive impact on Thailand-Myanmar relations in terms of security? Is it enough to change the nature of our bilateral ties? 

Given that internal politics shaped Myanmar’s relations with the ethnic armies, as well as the fact that relations with Thailand still bear historical scars, perhaps it’s too early to put all our eggs in one basket. 

For the time being, relations between the rebels and the Myanmar government may be back where they were following the 1989 ceasefires. But those were not peace treaties. They only agreed to stop shooting at one another until further notice.