Negotiating the perilous new world of cyber frontiers

The campaign, which is believed to have started some eight months ago, allows remote attackers to steal files from infected PCs, monitor e-mails and record key strokes, among other things.

This latest discovery comes on the heels of an attack on Iranian network infrastructure in May by a computer virus known as Flame, a similar software said to be 20 to 40 times more powerful than Stuxnet, a worm that infiltrated Iranian uranium infrastructure in 2010. 

Notwithstanding Tehran’s charge that these attacks were the work of the US and Israeli spy agencies, neither country has publicly admitted responsibility for these actions. 

With the multiplication of computer viruses that could reach transnational targets, governments have begun to ponder the feasibility of moving the governance of cyberspace to a post-Westphalian model. Named after the Treaty of Westphalia that was signed in 1648, the existing system has guaranteed the principle of the sovereignty of states and the fundamental right of political self-determination, the principle of legal equality between states, as well as the principle of non-intervention by one state in the internal affairs of another state. In the future, this may not be tenable.

One of the key challenges in cyberspace today is the problem of attribution. The nature of cyber attacks and cyber-infrastructure often spans several political jurisdictions, making it difficult to accurately pinpoint the national identity of a hostile agent. The multiple denial-of-service attacks carried out against Estonia – allegedly by Russia – in April and May 2007 highlighted the complicated nature of cyber warfare and the ambiguity surrounding international regulation.

Unlike armed conflict, which is covered under the United Nations Charter (UNC) and customary international law, there is at present no clear or comprehensive framework under which states are able to shape policy responses to the threat of hostile cyber operations. The emphasis on preserving the state’s territorial integrity means that anything other than an armed attack is not expressly prohibited by international law.

The conduct of war in an age of cyberspace can be equally problematic. The provisions of the Geneva Convention necessitate a distinction between combatants and non-combatants in a physical battle. With cyberspace, however, this distinction becomes increasingly blurred. 

As Sun Tzu pointed out, those adept in warfare are able to subdue the army of the enemy without having to resort to battles. In this respect, the ability to strike at the plans and strategies of the enemy, without attacking his cities, is viewed as the supreme objective in war. Accordingly cyberspace opens up an entirely new battlefield as far as national security is concerned. The offensive player is now able to utilise greater means by which to wage war against his enemy. These include intelligence gathering (open source or signals), information piracy, superimposition fraud and perception management (sometimes known as psychological operations).

Furthermore, the increasing interconnectedness of information systems vital to a country’s critical infrastructure and the dual usage of such systems render discrimination far more complex in cyberspace than physical space. It may be extremely difficult to distinguish, for instance, the code in a computer that governs delivery of power to an early warning radar system (which may be a lawful target of a cyber attack) from the code that controls power to a hospital’s intensive care unit. The risk of unintended consequences and the possibility of collateral damage further complicate the targeting picture.

While the Stuxnet attack demonstrated the possibility of remote control of a nation’s technological apparatus, this capacity would not have been possible without the meticulous reconnaissance of Iranian physical and technological architecture. 

According to a Stuxnet dossier released by Symantec, the attackers, among others, would have to gain access to the schematics of the industrial control systems (ICS); set up a mirrored environment that included the necessary ICS hardware; obtain the digital certificates to avoid detection; and finally, introduce Stuxnet into the target environment, most likely by removable drive. All these suggest that substantial human effort is required.

Cyberspace has allowed the human factor to be amplified many times; a security breach from a single employee can potentially affect the entire system. Ironically, this results in a situation where a technologically advanced country has more to lose than a less endowed adversary. Existing vulnerabilities become more pronounced and state secrets can be easily broken as a result of individual negligence. Indeed, the usual categories related to national security - imposed by the Westphalian markers of geography and territory – becomes less salient in an age of cyberspace as state borders become increasingly porous.

In July 2011, the US Department of Defence announced that it was developing strategies for operating in cyberspace, thus highlighting the importance of cyberspace as an operational domain in matters of national security. Other technologically advanced countries such as South Korea, the United Kingdom and Singapore have all invested substantial effort in boosting their cyberspace capabilities.

Indeed, the past two decades have witnessed the unprecedented – and ubiquitous – influence of cyberspace on political and diplomatic affairs. From the development of net-centric concepts and defence transformation in the military to the use of technology in myriad facets of national policy (counter-terrorism, financial systems, provision of energy), cyberspace has become an indispensable medium for achieving national objectives. The future will witness a more challenging cyber-environment for states to operate within; rethinking Westphalian norms of command and control is urgently needed.

 

Benjamin Ho Tze Ern is an associate research fellow at the Centre for Multilateralism Studies, and Jennifer Yang Hui is an associate research fellow at the Centre of Excellence for National Security, both at the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. 

 

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