Stability in Northeast Asia requires defence diplomacy

It began with South Korean leader Lee Myung-bak’s visit to the disputed Takeshima/Tokdo Islands on August 10 – the first by a sitting South Korean president.

On August 15 – the anniversary of Japan’s surrender in the Second World War – Chinese activists landed on the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. A few days later Japanese nationalists responded likewise. In September this territorial dispute caused further problems in Sino-Japanese relations when the Japanese government decided to purchase – or nationalise – three of the five islets of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.

This outbreak of territorial disputes has strained Japan-South Korean and Japan-Chinese relations in the political, economic and security domains. Strong words were exchanged between the three governments in defence of their individual positions. Official visits and exchanges between them were also cancelled. Most visibly, Japan’s purchase of the islets led to widespread protests in more than 100 cities in China, which in many instances turned aggressive.  

As a result of the strained relations affecting Japan, China and South Korea, numerous pessimistic analyses, especially on the future of Northeast Asia, have emerged recently. Caution is advised here for two reasons.

Firstly, pragmatism and level-headedness are defining features in the manner in which the governments of China, Japan and South Korea deal with each other – even on issues related to the controversial historical legacy of the three. Historically motivated issues – the territorial disputes are just one of the many sensitive ones – have long featured in Northeast Asia’s national security debates. All states know that these issues are not going to be resolved anytime soon. Tokyo, Seoul and Beijing clearly recognise this, and expect these issues to emerge regularly, perhaps more now than ever.

However, these three states also realise that these issues should not be allowed to affect the stability of the region, as stability is an essential element for economic development. This is a shared objective held by all three states, which has brought them together, leading to strengthened economic inter-dependence. This is also the impetus for the three states to strengthen Northeast Asian regionalism through the trilateral arrangement, which has become an annual event.

The presence of the United States is another important factor to mitigate the current pessimism about Northeast Asian stability. The Obama administration’s announcement of a “pivot” towards Asia is a message to all Asian states that the US economic, political and military presence in the region will not only be maintained but strengthened through its “rebalancing” strategy. The US presence in the region will continue to serve as a source of stability, and China, Japan and South Korea should welcome this stabilising influence of the US.

Following President Lee’s controversial visit to the Takeshima/Tokdo Islands, the US urged Japan and South Korea to exercise restraint, so as to restore stability in their bilateral relationship. While the official policy is not to take a position on sovereignty issues, the US officially declared that the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands are covered under the US-Japan Security Treaty. This means that the US will protect Japan in the event of an armed attack. This declaration serves as a deterrent against any escalation of tensions into a conflict between Japan and China. 

One of the significant repercussions of the strained relations in Northeast Asia, however, has been the interruption of defence diplomacy efforts between China, Japan and South Korea, namely in the area of military exchanges and cooperation. This area of regional cooperation is already the weakest and hence, the further waning of these efforts is certainly not a positive sign. 

Defence diplomacy is critical in ensuring stability for the region, for two main reasons. Firstly, the straining of relations is largely motivated by domestic politics. Various factors, such as President Lee’s attempt to bolster his declining popularity, the Chinese leadership transition, and the push by Tokyo Governor Shintaro Ishihara to purchase the islands from a private Japanese owner, were largely responsible for the deterioration of Japan-South Korean and Japan-Chinese relations.

This situation is further complicated by the growing nationalism in all three countries, leading to stronger policy positions on issues related to the historical legacy and the weak political channels of communication in the region.

Secondly, the military has the responsibility to defend national security and protect the lives of its citizens. In the event of a conflict, military personnel are deployed to the frontlines and face the consequences of what could be negative judgements made by politicians, which could lead to an unfortunate loss of lives.

Both reasons make it imperative that the militaries of China, Japan and South Korea maintain regular contacts at all levels. This would preclude miscommunication resulting in the unnecessary escalation of politically motivated issues into a conflict, and maintain a stable line of communication between them. Defence diplomacy efforts should be elevated at the bilateral, trilateral (along with the US) and multilateral levels (at the Asean Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM+), for example, through military exchanges and cooperation, naval ship visits, and military exercises in addressing humanitarian and disaster relief crises.

China, Japan and South Korea face leadership transitions either at the end of this year or at the beginning of next year. Strengthening defence diplomacy efforts between them should be a top priority of the new governments.

 

Bhubhinder Singh is an assistant professor at the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Singapore, and a fellow at the National Institute of Defence Studies, Japan.

 

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