Politics obstructing the quest for peace in the South

To understand the prospects of that peace in Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat provinces, it is first necessary to comprehend Bangkok’s latest motive. However, doing so encourages more pessimism than optimism.

The government of Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra approached Malaysia to host peace talks with Malay-Muslim insurgent and separatist groups. Malaysia obliged, as it did before, on the understanding that any peace had to be worked out among the Thai principals themselves.

Then, in the midst of preparatory bilateral meetings, without being asked, the Thai side let it be known that it “would not rule out” a role for Thaksin Shinawatra, Yingluck’s brother and deposed former prime minister.

Either Yingluck’s government had decided to appoint Thaksin as its representative, or he had volunteered for the role. Experience suggests the latter, plus the whole initiative having secretly originated with him.

That just about sums up the meagre prospects of any real peace. Thaksin’s government presided over the gruesome killings of local activists in Pattani in separate incidents in 2004.

In April that year, troops apparently executed dozens of militants gangland-style, following a siege at the Krue Se mosque, Pattani’s holiest. Six months later, scores of local young men were arrested following a demonstration and dumped into trucks, piled atop one another, where they suffocated to death.

Local sentiments against Bangkok, resulting from years of indifference, neglect and abuse, were already raw and ready to explode. Thaksin raised the stakes immensely by adding prolifically to the list of complaints.

No self-respecting southerner may want to sit down and talk with a Bangkok representative with such an unenviable record. No tendering of regret by the former premier will work either, as had recently transpired. Yet Thaksin’s role is not the only problem that will obstruct meaningful talks. It is rather an example and a symptom of the range of problems that bedevil any chance of successful negotiations.

Deputy Prime Minister Chalerm Yoobamrung had been named the Cabinet point man in the talks, despite personal issues that could compromise that role. Any of Yingluck’s other four deputies would not have the same kind of liabilities that would impede progress.

On both the Thai government side as well as that of the southern rebels, too many players claiming to represent the principals have also emerged. Whether for love or money, or a resurgent political ambition, as in Thaksin’s case, most of them seem motivated by something other than the cause of peace itself.

At the same time, too many of these self-proclaimed representatives actually represent only themselves. On the separatist side, the dubious credentials of chief negotiator Hassan Thoyib are already an issue affecting the credibility of the “peace talks”.

Hassan claims to represent the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), the group that many believe to be most closely linked to the southern insurgent movement. But Hassan’s main claim to fame has been as a former personal assistant to an ex-leader of one of the rebel factions.

Hassan has pledged to relay the content of talks to the BRN’s inner circle, which has so far refused to meet him. Anyone on the separatist side who deigns to meet Hassan may also lose credibility, especially since he is said to have “clicked” with Thaksin in initial meetings.

Just as serious is Bangkok’s unwillingness to show any goodwill to ensure the success of the talks. For example, no amnesty is granted for genuine BRN leaders who may emerge to engage in negotiations. So these leaders refuse to surface for fear of arrest. Thai officials like National Security Council chief Paradorn Pattanathabutr continue with speeches about the need to meet and talk with those directly involved in the insurgency, but without substance.

The result is that the Thai delegation can only meet with middlemen masquerading as principals. Worse still, the image of those involved tends to discourage real activists from having anything to do with them.

On the rebel side (or sides), little that is definite is known or knowable. Not only are there different groups involved, but their identities, positions and demands tend to be fluid, to the point that even the factions have their own internal factions.

On my two tours of the southern provinces in recent years, even local government officials are at a loss over what the insurgents actually want. On many occasions, sporadic violence occurs “unclaimed” (with nobody taking responsibility), so any distinction between criminal activity and political action is blurred.

Nonetheless, what remains promising is that few if any of the separatist groups have ruled out talking with Bangkok outright. There can still be useful negotiations, but much continues to depend on how much Bangkok is prepared to accommodate the other side. But that is not encouraging so far. There is Thaksin’s personal involvement, for example.

From Prime Minister Yingluck’s office down, Bangkok’s priorities seem to be on creating favourable headline-grabbing issues to generate political capital. The purported “surrender” of southern activists is one such show, comprising the occasional capture of local “militants” who are then quietly released after the news cameras have gone away.

Another obstacle to genuine peace talks is the way various parties have been “crowding the aisles” by wanting to claim ownership of the process, again for political capital. But since failure is more likely than success, they need not have bothered.

 

 

Bunn Nagara is a senior fellow at the Institute of Strategic and International Studies.