Breathing space or legacy for Asean

The South China Sea issue is a potential landmine, not just between the four Asean member states that have overlapping maritime and territorial claims with China. Overall unity can be affected, as witnessed at last year’s Cambodian meeting – where a final communique statement could not be agreed due to national sensitivities.

In the months since, the situation has not improved, and indeed seems to have worsened. At the July meeting, the Philippines publicly released a statement of its concerns that the South China Sea is being increasingly militarised, particularly by China. China’s new Foreign Minister Wang Yi, attending his first ARF meeting, rebutted the accusations and made suggestions to tap the maritime security cooperation fund between Asean and China for cooperation on areas like navigation safety and biodiversity. 

Brunei, as the current Asean chair, has worked hard to calm things, and it is a notable step forward that proposed consultations on a code of conduct for the South China Sea will proceed. Senior officials will meet come September. They should commence to outline principles and practical measures. 

But there are already cautionary notes. The upcoming meeting is termed a “consultation”, and not a “negotiation”. An Eminent Persons and Experts Group will also be convened – which sounds helpful but might distract. It remains to be seen if the official process will move speedily, or degenerate into diplomatic quagmire.

What the Brunei meeting gives is not a solution but breathing space. Moreover, the South China Sea issue should not be the sole measure of Asean’s progress. There is a wider agenda of community building and economic integration, as well as the effort by the regional bloc to be a central player in the Asia-Pacific region. Here are three approaches that Asean should consider, on top of the code of conduct.

First, contextualise China-Asean cooperation efforts. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi seems to be making efforts to manage relations more smoothly and, if so, Asean should reciprocate. Thailand must step up in its role as Asean designated coordinator, and is well placed to do so – with an American alliance on one hand, and economic interests with China on the other. 

One Thai government initiative is to host a high level but informal dialogue with Asean and Chinese officials and thinktanks in early August. This can reinforce the overall and often positive framework of cooperation.

Second, engage on wider strategic issues facing the Asia-Pacific region. Asean must seize opportunities at two summits that will come back-to-back in October – the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (Apec), hosted by Indonesia, and Asean’s own East Asia Summit (EAS), hosted by Brunei. 

While Apec is the bigger entity, the EAS bears special attention. First conceived in 2005, this group expanded to bring in the American and Russian leaders, and its agenda has proliferated. Topics range from energy and environment, disaster management and mitigation, health, regional economic integration, maritime security, food and energy security to the environemnt and biodiversity. 

Each issue may be of interest, but reciting a laundry list of miscellaneous projects will not deliver the overarching aim for strategic discussion among leaders. Asean would do well to prune the EAS agenda to facilitate forward-looking discussions that add to strategic trust. 

The EAS should not encumber the leaders with too much minutiae, but instead aim high, like a G8 for the Asia-Pacific. It can also minimise the danger that maritime issues could spark fractious and divisive diatribes. 

In this context, the third step Asean could well consider is to guide EAS discussion on two broader themes. One would be around energy security and the environment. 

This is an issue that concerns all EAS countries, especially the host Brunei. Energy also underpins the maritime disputes, as the areas under dispute are thought to prospectively hold vast resources including oil and gas. Energy security need not, moreover, be a zero-sum game. There are examples of cooperation and joint development to tap energy resources in disputed areas, like that between Thailand and Malaysia.

The second would be about trade agreements and economic integration. The American-led Trans-Pacific Partnership is reaching a critical milestone, even as the Asean-centered Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership gears up. The former does not currently include China and all of Asean, while the later excludes the USA. If these are not to be inconsistent or clash, a broad and strategic understanding of the two initiatives should be exchanged. 

The South China Sea has seized the headlines over the last few years and it is essential that the official consultations show visible progress. But other efforts must be made for peace in the region. Only then can the breathing space created by the Brunei ministerial meeting be converted from a temporary respite into a lasting legacy. 

 

Simon Tay is chairman of the Singapore Institute of International Affairs (SIIA) and an associate professor at the National University of Singapore’s Faculty of Law. Jonathan Tan is a deputy director and Fellow at the SIIA.