Southern peace initiative was flawed from the start
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The country's new security chief should face reality and start talks anew with credible representatives of the separatists
Just days into his new job as chief of national security, Deputy Prime Minister Police General Pracha Prombok has already shot himself in the foot as he drifts into a state of denial about the ongoing insurgence in the three southernmost provinces.
Pracha, who has replaced a bitter Chalerm Yoobamrung in overseeing the conflict in the deep South, insisted that recent bombings and other attacks at the beginning of Ramadan were not carried out by Malay-Muslim separatists.
Like others in this government, Pracha seems terrified that the half-baked "ceasefire agreement" and current "peace talks" will be jeopardised by any kind of negative publicity.
Sources in the separatist movement say the Thai authorities have invented this peace fantasy and got Kuala Lumpur to go along with it. The fact that the Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Coordinate (BRN-C) "liaison" has retreated from making a public statement about the "peace process" should have been enough of a warning that something was seriously wrong with this "ceasefire".
Beside the ever-optimistic Thai side, the only other person to say anything about a peaceful Ramadan was the official facilitator from Malaysia, Ahmad Zamzamin Hashim.
It seems that it was just wishful thinking indeed on Thailand's part and Kuala Lumpur went along for the ride.
Perhaps if this "peace process" had been better planned and conducted, the participants wouldn't be in this embarrassing predicament.
Four months have passed since Thailand, Malaysia and a motley crew of self-proclaimed BRN-C cadres, led by the "liaison", Hasan Taib, began the current process.
Just hours after they sat down for discussions, bombs were already going off. That should have been taken as a message that something is seriously wrong with the initiative.
At first, observers were prepared to give the benefit of the doubt and suggested that perhaps Hasan was "permitting" the violence to continue so he could enhance his bargaining power. After all, this is what insurgent conflict is about – the non-state actor using violence to force the state to come around to a compromise.
But as time went by, it became clear that Hasan had no influence over the militants or the secretive BRN-C leadership, whose identity is still unknown.
Hasan himself is not even well known in the southernmost provinces, the historical Malay homeland he is supposed to help liberate from the invading Thais.
Hasan's status and ability should have been made clear from the very beginning. We should not have to ponder his credentials four months after entering into talks.
It's meaningless to make ridiculous demands and counter-demands, or to point fingers via the media. After all, this is not supposed to be a circus.
The February 28 announcement of peace talks was a significant milestone because Thailand basically told the world it was willing to seek out a political solution to the insurgency in the South, as opposed to pursuing a military one.
A political solution to the conflict is important. But do we really understand what it means or how to achieve it?
The way the Thai authorities are conducting this peace process is absurd. Much of what has been said and done should have been kept out of the public sphere. After all, we are supposed to be in an experimental period, where building confidence is the aim for the time being.
