China at crossroads: the anti-corruption campaign decoded

What really lies behind the campaign? Many in the West have quickly dismissed it as politically motivated, arguing that Xi is using the anti-graft drive to eliminate his opponents and consolidate his power. While there is a certain element of political retribution in the process, the issue is far more complex. The scope of the clean-up, which has swept away thousands of mid-ranking and junior officials nationwide from various government and commercial sectors, cannot be explained as a mere power struggle. No such campaign took place during previous leadership transitions. The bulk of those caught in the anti-corruption net are small fry, and thus pose no treat whatsoever to President Xi and his associates. 

The current communist leadership is genuinely concerned over the rampant corruption permeating all sections of Chinese society.

Endemic corruption has hit the legitimacy of the ruling Communist Party of China (CPC), in power since 1949. Graft has reached sub-Saharan proportions at provincial and country levels, leading to thousands of protests and riots every year. Provincial and county officials are generally despised by the populace and only a strong security apparatus keeps the situation under control.

Last year China spent $5 billion more on domestic security than it did on external defence. Growing corruption in the provinces has led to the rise of powerful local interests that have undermined the centre’s control. Corruption and rapid economic growth have seen the gap between rich and poor widen significantly, further eroding the CPC’s legitimacy. 

While most foreigners who live in China may seldom come face to face with corruption, the average Chinese deals with it on a daily basis. From getting your residence permit renewed to trivial matters like obtaining a driver’s licence, bribery is the norm. This has created high levels of resentment that threaten to generate unrest. Corruption threatens the very survival of the CPC in ways not seen since the beginning of market reforms launched under Deng Xiaoping in 1978 to “open” China.

Contrary to prevailing opinion in the West, many in the CPC believe the 1989 Tiananmen protests were motivated much more by practical issues such as graft, nepotism and mismanagement, than concepts of democracy far removed from the daily concerns of an average Beijinger worried about feeding is family.

Hence, the CPC must tackle the issue of corruption seriously if it wants to avoid turmoil in coming years. That the anti-graft campaign has received unprecedented coverage, with at least two articles a week appearing on state media, reflects a serious move by the CPC to restore public confidence in its leadership.

With Marxism-Leninism now completely discredited, economic growth and nationalism have become the main sources of legitimacy for the party. 

From the 1990s to the early 2000s there was a general optimism among the Chinese people that despite all the challenges, the average citizen was benefiting. While the rich were getting richer, the poor were also improving their lot. This optimism seems to have foundered in recent years, with large numbers of young Chinese, many of them wealthy, leaving the country. A decade ago many Chinese students were eager to return after finishing their studies in the West, believing a rising China offered them better opportunities. Today that trend is reversing. Chinese social media is full of abuse against “those who abandon the country”.

This explains Xi’s “China Dream” slogan, an attempt to bring back the spirit of optimism that all Chinese can benefit from the country’s rise. Xi has adopted a totally different style of leadership from his predecessors’, reaching out to the people and portraying a relaxed “everyman” image. He often frequents simple restaurants and is even reported to have jumped into a Beijing taxi incognito. He encourages young Chinese to call him uncle and is trying hard to reach out to the youth. This is also part of the attempt to address the CPC’s legitimacy crisis. For years the Chinese people have perceived their leaders as aloof and having little contact with their reality. 

There is also a tendency among foreign observers to see Chinese leaders as conniving Machiavellis, merely interested in keeping themselves in power. Chinese leaders, like many of their American or European counterparts, are also patriots who love their nation and want it to prosper. Indeed, the current Beijing leadership is very conscious of China’s humiliation at the hands of the West and Japan. Beijing is also aware of the reasons why China was so weak in the past. Corruption, isolation and disunity are usually the explanations given for China’s decline in mid-19th century. 

Thus, fighting corruption, ensuring national unity and fostering China’s global economic presence are seen as essential to the continued prosperity of the nation. This explains China’s growing assertiveness in its territorial disputes with neighbours, the targeting of several foreign companies in the ongoing anti-graft campaign and the promotion of Xi’s ambitious economic initiatives, and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road. 

It’s also worth taking a closer look at Xi’s background. The son of a senior party official called Xi Zhongxun known for his honesty, Xi made fighting corruption a hallmark of his 1999-2002 term as governor of Fujian, a coastal province notorious for corrupt officialdom. Xi’s remarks on the need to fight graft by go back to the 1980s. Like many of his generation, he also seems strongly influenced by memories of China’s humiliation at the hands of foreign powers, telling reporters that he cries when he reads about this period of Chinese history. 

China’s leaders are genuinely trying to establish a strong rule of law and fight corruption – yes, in part as a way to secure their power, but also to ensure the well-being of their country and people. Are Chinese leaders who in a mere three decades pulled 400 million people out of poverty not capable of loving their country? 

Many are sceptical of the ability of the Chinese government to build a rule-of-law-governed society due to the undemocratic nature of the communist regime. However, Chinese leaders seem to be rather confident that this is a fallacy. They look at the example of Singapore, a non-democratic country (at least by Western standards), which is constantly ranked among the top five least corrupt countries on earth. They also point to cases like the UAE and Qatar, absolutist monarchies, yet ranked rather high in transparency indexes. 

Beijing strongly believes it can establish a systematic rule of law without necessarily having to democratise; a system under which property, finance and people need not fear illegal state action as long as they don’t get involved in politics. In the same way that US presidents like Theodore Roosevelt enacted anti-trust laws to curb the excesses of early 20th-century American capitalism, President Xi and his colleagues want to tame some of the worse effects of Chinese capitalism before they lead to revolution, like in so many other instances through history. After all China is communist, but in name only, and as good old Karl Marx reminds us: “The exploitative nature of capitalism will inevitably lead to a proletarian revolution.”

Will socialism with Chinese characteristics be able to address this central contradiction?

 

Loro Horta is a senior diplomat based in Beijing. He is a graduate of the People’s Liberation Army National Defence University senior officers course and the Chinese Ministry of Commerce Central School. He is also a graduate of the US Naval Post Graduate School and the American National Defence University.