Surge in Sino-Thai security cooperation

At this juncture, China would like to broaden and deepen securitisation [structured finance] of the economy-oriented ties between the two countries.
Chinese State Councillor and Defence Minister Chang Wanquan and Meng Jianzhu, head of the Commission for Official and Legal Affairs of the Chinese Communist Party, used the visits to assure Thai leaders that Sino-Thai relations would be further strengthened under the leadership of President Xi Jinping.
What does China have in mind?
It was succinctly clear that China is establishing a new type of relationship with Thailand, which will build upon the strong foundations nurtured over the past four decades. Both countries plan a year-long commemoration of their 40th anniversary of diplomatic relations. What is most interesting would be the strategic elements in this new relationship.
By 2020, it is hoped that Sino-Thai relations would have reached a top-level strategic partnership with China with a full-blown joint military exercise involving all branches of their armed forces. By that time, Chinese-made military hardware would increase proportionately in comparison with the current procurement list, dominated by the US and Western allies and friends.
For the time being, there would be continued military training with Thai counterparts — which has already included the Royal Thai Air Force — as at the end of last year. Transfer of military technology and joint production of arms, as well as a procurement plan for two submarines by the Royal Thai Navy, are in the pipeline. A series of special-forces training that was discontinued recently has been revived and expanded — indicating China’s strategic shift to improving the capacity of the Thai navy and its special forces.
Next year, the Thai and Chinese navies are planning a large-scale joint exercise. The naval cooperation is in line with Thailand’s Maritime Security Strategy 2015-2022 completed in October. It envisages a modernised and active naval force protecting the country’s huge maritime resources in the Andaman Sea and the Gulf of Thailand.
This strengthening of Sino-Thai security cooperation comes at a time when Thailand's friendship with the United States, the oldest ally in the region, has hit its lowest ebb. The annual Thai-US annual military exercise, Cobra Gold, which will kick off tomorrow, remains this year’s only large bilateral event at this point.
As long as political developments in Thailand do not produce an elected government, it will be difficult to jump-start the 182-year-old relationship. Another diplomatic mishap or social media blunder could further throw the delicate and emotional-ridden ties into a dustbin.
The sudden surge of Sino-Thai security cooperation is the outcome of the latest assessment by top strategists at the National Security Council, which has recently completed the much-delayed draft of National Security Strategy 2015-2021.
The 17-page blueprint outlines the country’s future relations with all major powers including the US, China, Russia, Japan, India and the European Union.
The draft presents a bifurcated view of the role the US and China will play in Thailand’s future. While both superpowers remain pivotal to the preservation of the country’s national interest, China’s potential for overall cooperation is much better than the US. In evaluating the state of Thai-US relations, Thailand still gives high value to the Thai-US alliance that has provided security and economic development. The positive perception immediately turns negative when analysing Washington’s attitude towards the Thai political situation. It remains the biggest stumbling block to promoting bilateral ties because “it does not coincide with American values.”
In the Sino-Thai case, there is no antagonism. Thailand wants to maximise its relations with rising China in all areas as “Thailand and China do not have territorial and national conflicts at all.” The draft reiterated that China places a high premium on Thailand as a leading Asean member with a central location in the continental Southeast Asia with links to South Asia and East Asia that would enhance its connectivity.
Thailand recognises the US and China as the two most important powers to promote its security and economic development as well as national profiles and policies in the international arenas.
However, Washington and Beijing have different approaches when it comes to the principle of non-interference and national treatment. In comparison with the US, China treats Thailand better as an equal partner without any interference in domestic affairs. From the Thai perspective — a rather cynical one — the more powerful and stronger the US becomes, its power to intervene in domestic affairs of other countries also increases.
Recently, a new issue has emerged in Sino-Thai relations that could impact on Beijing’s core interest: the asylum seekers from Xinjiang. In the past 20 months, nearly 500 Turkish-speaking refugees have sneaked into Thailand from various borders adjacent to Myanmar, Laos and Cambodia. Nearly 70 per cent of those arrivals crossed the Thai-Cambodian border and were smuggled through land and sea routes to Malaysia via southern Thailand. But they were caught by Thai authorities.
Before meeting with Chang and Meng, the Thai leaders were anxious about their attitude towards the fate of these asylum seekers — some of them victims of human smuggling. If China raised the issue, the Thai positions would be firm, opposing any repatriation until proper identifications were completed. As it turned out, China displayed pragmatism. The Chinese leaders did not pressure the Thais. Instead, they expressed understanding of the circumstances Thailand faced and agreed to set up a joint working group to resolve this sensitive issue.
The upgrade of Sino-Thai defence cooperation reflects Thailand’s latest geostrategic views of China’s economic and military rise. Bangkok does not want to choose between Washington and Beijing. As a strategic alliance, Thailand will continue to engage the US and at the same time try to ensure a dynamic equilibrium between the two major powers.